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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the roles of four major theologians in Dante’s 
Commedia: Augustine (354-430), Gregory the Great (c. 540-604), Bernard of 
Clairvaux (1090-1153), and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275), and asks what 
their appearances as persons in the poem can tell us about Dante’s 
conception of theology. Dante chooses to represent theology through a 
series of personal encounters with individuals and individual theologians: 
the project asks how he transforms or incorporates these perceptions in the 
Commedia. My claim is that the character of Beatrice should be understood 
as a theologian within the poem, even though her claim to such status 
relies not on an established historical authority—on written treatises, 
sermons, works or reputation—but purely on the nature of the particular 
person which Dante constructed in his poetic career. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Summary and definition of terms 
 
This study forms part of the AHRC-funded project, ‘Dante and Late 
Medieval Florence: Theology in Poetry, Practice and Society’, based at the 
universities of Leeds and Warwick. 1 It examines the roles of four major 
theologians in Dante’s Commedia: Augustine (354-430), Gregory the Great 
(c. 540-604), Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), and Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1275), and asks what their appearances as persons in the poem can tell us 
about Dante’s conception of theology. As case studies, they present rich 
opportunities for understanding Dante’s own views about theology, not 
least because their representations as characters within the poem are each 
very different. These theologians, in some senses exemplary of particular 
theological traditions, will be studied alongside their presence in the 
context of Dante’s Florence in the years between 1280 and 1300. Again, 
their presence here—in the sources through which they were perceived as 
persons—is markedly different. So, as Dante chooses to represent theology 
through a series of personal encounters with individuals and individual 
theologians, the project will ask how he transforms or incorporates these 
                                                 
1 The project, led by Professor Matthew Treherne, Professor Claire Honess and 
Professor Simon Gilson, casts light on the ways in which medieval theology was 
mediated and experienced within a specific historical and geographical context. 
Nicolò Maldina and Anna Pegoretti carry out post-doctoral work on the religious 
and learning contexts of Florence; Kevin Marples’s doctoral thesis examines the 
prophetic, political and theological intersections in Dante’s works; Ruth Chester’s 
public and cultural engagement work, which was assisted by Lois Haines, 
provides new guides for tourists in Florence, based on the outcomes of the 
research. 
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/125117/dante_and_late_medieval_florence  
It should also be noted that the volumes, Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as Poetry, 
edited by V. Montemaggi and M. Treherne (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2010) and Reviewing Dante’s Theology, 2 vols, edited by C.E. Honess 
and M. Treherne (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), form foundational entry points into 
the discussions that are found in this thesis.  
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perceptions in the Commedia. Finally, I make the bold claim that the 
character of Beatrice should be understood as a theologian within the 
poem, even though her claim to such status relies not on an established 
historical authority—on written treatises, sermons, works or reputation—
but purely on the nature of the particular person which Dante constructed 
in his poetic career, beginning in the Vita nova, and supposedly based on a 
real woman whom the poet saw in Florence, and who died in 1290.2  
 
Above all, I shall argue that by including these theologians as persons in his 
poem Dante gives us an opportunity to engage with theology in a way 
which moves beyond merely the analysis of theological texts and therefore 
enables us to see Dante’s theology in a new light. Aspects of their 
characters, how they appear in the poem and in the historical sources, will 
determine the thematic structure of the study, rather than an analysis of 
each theologian in turn. As I have already alluded to, as characters within 
the poem these five appear in very different ways. Augustine is hardly 
present at all: he is mentioned in passing in the Heaven of the Sun, Paradiso 
X, 120, and then later his seated position in the Empyrean is described at 
Paradiso XXXII, 35. Gregory’s name appears only twice in the poem at 
Purgatorio X, 75, and Paradiso XXVIII, 133, and together with an implicit 
reference to him at Paradiso XX, 109, he can hardly be described as a fully-
formed character as such—especially as the mentions of him are twice 
found to be describing someone else, the Emperor Trajan. Aquinas, 
Bernard and Beatrice are different again, of course. Each has a role within 
the second and third cantiche which are substantial, speaking parts.  
 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to Professor Elena Lombardi who first suggested I should consider the 
character of Beatrice as a theologian, in response to my paper, ‘Bernard of Clairvaux in 
Late-medieval Florence’ which was given at ‘Dante’s Theology in Poetry, Practice and 
Society’ at University of Notre Dame’s London centre, 13-14 July 2013. Without Professor 
Lombardi’s helpful comments this thesis would have no doubt have taken a very different 
course.    
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Aquinas, beginning at Paradiso X, 82, introduces himself and the other 
‘candles’ of the Heaven of the Sun—the dancing theologians, and then 
proceeds in the next canto, from line 19 onwards, to eulogise St. Francis of 
Assisi and to chastise members of the Dominican order who have strayed 
from the example which Francis had shown. Bernard’s role, hugely 
important for the pilgrim’s final vision, begins at Paradiso XXXI, 58, with 
Beatrice’s surprise removal from Dante’s side, and her replacement by the 
Abbot of Clairvaux. Bernard’s final words, closing his prayer to the Virgin 
at Paradiso XXXIII, 37, are the last spoken in the poem, and the final image 
of him, beckoning and smiling to Dante at line 49, are the last human 
gestures that the pilgrim sees before his final vision of God.  
 
Beatrice, Dante-personaggio’s second guide, appears at Purgatorio XXX, line 
31, in the Earthly Paradise, but we have known of her intervention in 
Dante’s story since Inferno II, when Virgil tells the pilgrim of his 
commission from Beatrice. At Purgatorio XXX, 55, we hear her words 
directly, naming Dante, commanding him not to weep at Virgil’s 
disappearance, and hinting that there may well be more pain to come. And 
so it proves. She takes up the role of guide but becomes his teacher too, and 
her explanations of theology—for example, of the Incarnation in Paradiso 
VII—are crucial for Dante-personaggio’s spiritual development, and indeed 
comprise much of the more explicitly theological passages of the Commedia. 
Her removal at Paradiso XXXI, 58, when she returns to her place in the 
celestial rose, is a necessary part of his learning about the true nature of 
divine love.  
 
Before we can progress any further, it will be necessary to define exactly 
what it is we are talking about, especially as it will be immediately obvious 
that to include Beatrice as a theologian in this study I am already pushing 
at the boundaries of what it means to be one. More basic than that, though, 
as Zygmunt Barański has helpfully shown, is that to call even Augustine, 
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Gregory, Bernard and Thomas theologians, and to categorise their 
respective works as theology, as though that is a stable term, already trades 
on assumptions that need to be questioned, spelled out in definition, and 
argued for. Laments Barański: 
 
No one feels the need to explain or specify with any sort of rigour 
what she or he means by theology, never mind what Dante, not to 
mention the Middle Ages, might have meant by the term.3 
 
This quote opens up nicely the three-fold way in which this study will need 
to engage with the term theology: how it is used today (also, whether this is 
significant); how Dante understood it; and what the debates in the Middle 
Ages over its status – and Barański tells us that these debates ‘raged’—
mean for the appearance of the characters in the Commedia whom I am 
claiming for theologians. Barański’s essay neatly sets out the many ways in 
which the term theology is employed today, counting six uses of the word, 
mostly connected, but in subtly nuanced ways quite different from each 
other. Broadly, these can be divided into two camps: firstly, those which 
take up an ‘external’ viewpoint, and treat of theistic religion as a practice to 
be studied wholesale, passing no judgement on the truth-claims internal to 
that religious practice. And secondly, those which take up a position 
internal to a particular theistic religion and claim truths within it according 
to different ways of knowing: for example, through theoretical principles, 
through revelation, or through scripture.  
 
Given the differences in definitions over the practice itself, it is 
unsurprising that the word theologian brings with it alternative definitions, 
ones which pick out different sorts of people in each case. For Barański, a 
theologian in the modern sense may be any of those who carry out the 
practices outlined above. For Dante, though, and for others in the Middle 
                                                 
3 Z. G. Barański, ‘Dante and Doctrine (and Theology)’, in Honess and Treherne 
(eds), Reviewing Dante’s Theology, I, pp. 9-63 (p. 13). 
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Ages, the terms teologia and teologo brought with them their own specific 
meanings. In the Convivio, Dante calls theology ‘la scienza divina’ (Convivio 
II, xiii, 8), which he characterises in terms of revelation of the divine 
through scripture. It is a definition which bases its authority on Christ’s 
words in the Gospels, and on the Old Testament; theology’s subject is God, 
a subject which is certain, and not up for debate. In Convivio II, xiv, 19-20, 
Dante describes theology, by way of analogy with the Empyrean, thus: 
 
[L]o Cielo empireo per la sua pace simiglia la divina scienza, che 
piena è di tutta pace; la quale non soffera lite alcuna d’oppinioni o 
di sofistici argomenti, per la eccellentissima certezza del suo 
subietto, lo quale è Dio. E di questa dice esso a li suoi discepoli: ‘La 
pace mia do a voi, la pace mia lascio a voi’, dando e lasciando a loro 
la sua dottrina, che è questa scienza di cu’ io parlo. Di costei dice 
Salomone: ‘Sessanta sono le regine, e ottanta l’amiche concubine; e 
de le ancille adolescenti non è numero: una è la colomba mia e la 
perfetta mia’. 
 
 
Kenelm Foster, in the Enciclopedia Dantesca entry on teologia, draws 
attention to the unusual focus on peace in Dante’s conception of theology, 
found in the Convivio, and underlines the fact that it bears little 
resemblance to the practice which Aquinas had helped to establish, and 
which had at its core the role of reason. 4 Instead, Dante’s focus on 
revelation through scripture, and an idiosyncratic engagement with the 
notion of peace, downplayed reason and was, according to Barański, ‘a 
sincere effort to mitigate conflict rather than foster it’.5  
 
In the Monarchia III, iii, 13, Dante extends the reach of theological authority 
to include not just scripture, but the written works of the Fathers of the 
Church, naming (only) Augustine as the prime example of an authority 
divinely inspired by the Holy Spirit: 
 
                                                 
4 K. Foster, ‘Teologia’, in Enciclopedia Dantesca, V, pp. 564-68.   
5 Z. G. Barański, ‘Dante and Doctrine’, p. 26. 
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Sunt etiam Scripture doctorum, Augustini et aliorum, quos a Spiritu 
Sancto adiutos qui dubitat, fructus eorum vel omnino non vidit vel 
si vidit, minime degustavit.6 
 
Thus there is a two-fold distinction in the activity of Dante’s theology itself: 
the first is available to all Christians, as they read and interpret scripture 
and respond to its affective revelation. The second is the remit of 
individuals who produce written exegesis upon the Bible: those who 
engage in scripture’s interpretation are theologians, properly understood, 
but only insofar as they avoid error, according to Dante’s own prescription. 
Augustine’s expertise as an exegete provides not only a benchmark 
towards which other theologians can aim, but also furnishes them with a 
hugely influential method of doing theology by way of his allegorical 
readings of scripture.     
 
Albert Ascoli sees an ambiguity in Dante’s use of the word teologia.7 Like 
Barański, he notes Dante’s focus on biblical interpretation, but Ascoli gives 
further emphasis to Dante’s question of scriptural authorship and the nature 
of those ‘theologians’, the scribes of the Bible. In doing so, Ascoli revives 
the debate over whether the scribes could be understood as writing poetry 
in their use of metaphorical language when describing the nature of God, 
and he reminds us of Aquinas’s gloss on why scripture employs such 
devices—a reason which separates theology from poetry.8 In canto II of 
                                                 
6 ‘There are also the writings of the doctors of the church, of Augustine and others; 
anyone who doubts that they were helped by the Holy Spirit has either entirely 
failed to see their fruits or, if he has seen them, has not tasted them.’ Monarchy, ed. 
and trans. by P. Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 68. 
7 See A. Ascoli, ‘Poetry and Theology’ in Honess and Treherne (eds) Reviewing 
Dante’s Theology, II, pp. 3-42. 
8 See: ST Ia.i.9.1: ‘Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra Scriptura non 
debeat uti metaphoris. Illud enim quod est proprium infimae doctrinae, non 
videtur competere huic scientiae, quae inter alias tenet locum supremum, ut iam 
dictum est. Procedere autem per similitudines varias et repraesentationes, est 
proprium poeticae, quae est infima inter omnes doctrinas. Ergo huiusmodi 
similitudinibus uti, non est conveniens huic scientiae.’ ‘It seems that Holy Scripture 
should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not 
to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid 
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Purgatorio, Ascoli reads the souls’ ‘enactment’ of Psalm 113, In Exitu Israel, 
which they also sing, as a deliberate contrast with Casella’s song of Dante’s 
earlier poem, Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona (Purgatorio II, 112).9 For Ascoli 
it is a means for Dante-poeta to claim a closer identification with the scribes 
of the Bible than with those authors of straightforward poetry, including 
his own earlier self. I return to this question, that is, Dante’s supposed 
claim to theology as someone who writes scripture, below. For now, it is 
enough to suggest that this further definitional ambiguity over the nature 
of theology will need to be addressed in light of Dante’s poem and his 
engagement with the theologians within it.  
 
2. The Theologians within Dante Studies 
 
What follows is a review of five examples of works which explore the 
connection between Dante and a particular theologian. The works are, in 
the order which I consider them: Steven Botterill’s study of Bernard; 
Vittorio Montemaggi’s essay on Gregory; Elena Lombardi’s article on 
Augustine; and Simon Gilson’s analysis of Christian Aristotelianism, which 
focuses in large part on Thomas Aquinas. My fifth, and possibly at this 
stage controversial, inclusion is Regina Psaki’s essay on Beatrice. It will be 
left to the remainder of this thesis, and in particular, Chapter IV, to show 
why I have included Beatrice as an example of a theologian, when by 
almost every conceivable definition of that term, she is no such thing. As 
should be obvious, this is not in any way meant to be an exhaustive 
examination of the field but, rather, an illustration of the different ways in 
which one might want to consider the person of the theologian and how 
that person, their works, ideas and influence appear in the Commedia. The 
                                                 
of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. 
Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.’ 
Summa Theologiae, ed. and trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), also available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/  
9 Throughout this study I will be using the numbering of the Psalms from the Latin 
Vulgate. 
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literature on each of these theologians is vast (so, too, on the character of 
Beatrice) and thus my intention here is to maintain a focus on how these 
theologians have been read in contact with Dante. I shall restate this at 
points throughout the thesis because it is important: my aim is not to 
critically assess any of the particular positions that these theologians might 
espouse; this is emphatically not a work of academic theology, by way of 
literary criticism. Rather, it is an examination of how Dante the author co-
opts the portrayal and the authority of these individual theologians—given 
what emerges of their personhoods from their works, images, 
hagiographies and plain old common knowledge—in order to do 
something very particular in his poem, with the concept of theology itself.  
 
It will become clear that the aims of my project do not map precisely on to 
the aims and methodologies of those found in these examples, but, having 
said that, in some cases there is considerable overlap, and in each, there are 
useful things to be learned both from the content of the analyses and the 
methodological approaches to the context of Dante’s culture. Of the five 
outlined here, Steven Botterill’s book-length study of Saint Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, appears closest to my project in 
its methodological approach.10 His analysis looks at the historical Bernard 
and how he might have been known to Dante, through his works, his 
reputation and his influence on other theologians and schools of thought. 
Botterill’s study comes closest to the approach that I will be taking because 
he wants to know why Bernard was chosen by Dante for such an important 
role within the Commedia, and whether or not sense can be made of his 
characterisation and function in the text when compared with the 
knowledge of the real, historical Bernard which was available. But 
Botterill’s focus is not exclusively on the Bernard that was available to 
Florentines of the 1280s and 1290s, as is my particular project, even though 
                                                 
10 S. Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition: Bernard of Clairvaux in the Commedia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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he does sketch some of this knowledge in. Thus there is room here for 
further exploration, particularly with regard to representations of Bernard 
beyond his own works—in the visual and oral culture of Florence.  
 
It must be said that all four of the examples about the historical theologians 
here focus—as one would expect—on the content of the works of the 
respective theologians and not necessarily on the person of the theologian 
himself. Vittorio Montemaggi’s essay on Gregory the Great is undoubtedly 
interested in the person of Gregory—indeed, the subject of personhood and 
particularity is central to his essay—but he approaches the person of 
Gregory first and foremost through his appearance in the text, and this 
includes both explicit mentions of Gregory the character, and implicit 
appearances of historical Gregory’s influence and works. For Montemaggi, 
the appearance of a particular theologian in the text provides a rich source 
of ways to think about the theology within the poem more generally (and, 
in fact, provides a model for theological discourse and practice itself). This I 
will argue is exactly right—and so although Botterill’s methodological 
approach will be closest to mine, it is Montemaggi’s starting assumption 
which I share from the outset and which will inform my critical 
engagement with the text. At the end of his article, Montemaggi suggests 
how further explorations of how Dante may have encountered the 
historical Gregory in Florence could be helpful to his analysis, extending 
the reach of the study of personhood beyond the character found in the 
text, but out in to the context which Dante inhabited. 
 
Elena Lombardi’s approach gives a passing nod to that context, noting that 
Dante may have come to know Augustine in the schools of Santa Maria 
Novella, Santa Croce and Santo Spirito, and most probably through his 
relationship with the Franciscans, but she provides no concrete examples of 
how that knowledge was transmitted, suggesting only that the mediation 
of Augustine via other authors was complex and now possibly opaque to 
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modern readers. Indeed, she claims that the dialogue between Dante and 
the works of Augustine must be ‘imagined’, because Dante provides only 
very few echoes of Augustine and his works in the poem, and because he 
as a character in the Commedia has no speaking role at all. Thus she 
provides no presentation of Augustine the person, other than claiming that 
he must have been known to Dante as a ‘decontextualised […] authority’.11 
How this fits with Dante’s familiarity with the ineluctably personal work of 
the Confessions is unclear.12 Further, although she hints at Dante’s 
acquaintance with the Augustinians at Santo Spirito, Lombardi does not 
pursue in any depth how the order were using the works, reputation or 
image of Augustine to further their own ends during this period (bringing 
them close to the machinations of Boniface VIII, in fact) or how it could be 
argued that his Regula there and at Santa Maria Novella provided an 
enactment of some aspects of Augustine’s own character.  
 
Simon Gilson’s essay is not aimed at pursuing the perception of the person 
of the theologian in question—in this case, Thomas Aquinas—either. How 
to get at the person of Thomas himself is left for other studies. Nor does 
Gilson examine the character of the person within the text, but rather 
provides a closely argued but extremely high-level history of the 
transmission of philosophical and theological ideas. How scholasticism 
was developed by Aquinas and Albert, and how Aristotle was mediated 
through a matrix of other authors gives us a better understanding of the 
Aquinas and the Aristotle that Dante would have known. Moreover, it 
provides an alternative view of the intellectual milieu of the late Middle 
Ages which Gilson suggests was more nuanced than is often portrayed. 
The debates coming out of Paris, however, and their relationship with the 
studia of Florence, go unexamined by Gilson in this essay, so there is scope 
                                                 
11 E. Lombardi, ‘Augustine and Dante’, in Honess and Treherne (eds) Reviewing 
Dante’s Theology, I, pp. 175-208 (p.178). 
12 See Convivio I, ii, 14.   
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here to build on what is a useful overview of the intellectual territory in 
order to bring its horizon down to the local, Florentine level.  
  
2.1 Botterill/Bernard  
In Dante and the Mystical Tradition, Botterill argues for a reading of the 
Bernardine episodes from two perspectives: the first, he says, should be an 
attempt to re-create an initial, innocent encounter with the final three 
cantos of Paradiso.13 The second should be a ‘re-reading’, in light of the first 
                                                 
13 For other discussions of both the historical Bernard and the character in the 
poem relevant to this study, see: A. W. Astell, The Song of Songs in the Middle Ages 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); P. Boitani, ‘The Sibyl’s Leaves: A Study of 
Paradiso XXXIII’, Dante Studies, 96 (1978), 83–126; S. Botterill, ‘Mysticism and 
Meaning in Dante’s Paradiso’ in Dante for the New Millennium, ed. by T. Barolini 
and W. H. Storey, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), pp.143-152; A. H. 
Bredero, Bernard of Clairvaux: Between Cult and History (Edinburgh: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing and T&T Clark, 1996); K. Brownlee, ‘Language and Desire in 
Paradiso XXVI’, Lectura Dantis, 6 (1990), 45–59; M. Casey, A Thirst for God: Spiritual 
Desire in Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs (Kalamazoo: Cistercian 
Publications, 2005); M. Chiaranza, ‘Solomon’s Song in the Divine Comedy’ in Sparks 
and Seeds: Medieval Literature and its Afterlife, ed. by D. E. Stewart and A. Cornish 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp.199–208; P. Dronke, ‘The Song of Songs and 
Medieval Love-Lyric’, in The Bible and Medieval Culture, ed. by W. Lourdaux and D. 
Verhelst (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979), pp. 256–62; G.R. Evans, The 
Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); F. Ferrucci, Il 
poema del desiderio (Milan: Leonardo, 1990); E. G. Gardner, Dante and the Mystics: A 
Study of the Mystical Aspect of the Divina Commedia and Its Relations With Some of Its 
Mediaeval Sources (London: JM Dent & sons Limited, 1913); E. Gilson, The Mystical 
Theology of Saint Bernard (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1990); M. 
Gragnolati, Amor che move: Linguaggio del corpo e forma del desiderio in Dante, Pasolini, 
Morante (Rome: Il Saggiatore, 2013); M. Gragnolati, T. Kay, E. Lombardi, F. 
Southerden, (eds), Desire in Dante and the Middle Ages (Oxford: Legenda, 2012); B. S. 
James, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux: An Essay in Biography (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1957); R. Kay, ‘Dante in Ecstasy: Paradiso 33 and Bernard of Clairvaux’, 
Mediaeval Studies, 66 (2004), 183–212; R. Kirkpatrick, Dante’s ‘Paradiso’ and the Limits 
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encounter, and in light of the rest of our cultural baggage and histories. For 
Botterill thinks that modern-day readers, now familiar with the abbot of 
Clairvaux’s sudden appearance at the end of the cantica, and aided by 
critical commentaries and helpful notes, miss much of the significance of 
Dante’s choice. The significance is lost as we are already conditioned to the 
inevitability of the appearance, thus losing its dramatic import, but also 
because, simply put, saints mean different things to us now than they did 
in Dante’s day: the choice of this saint in particular, presented as a 
character with such a prominent role in the Commedia, should be 
questioned in light of Bernard’s meaning for readers in fourteenth-century 
Italy.14 
 
The first part of the book, then, attempts to reconstruct the figure of 
Bernard as he was in the Middle Ages and, in doing so, attempts to see 
Dante’s choice and his characterisation of Bernard with new eyes. Botterill 
is alert to criticisms of this methodology, criticisms which my own study 
will tackle head-on too, namely ‘that the attempt to re-create Dante’s own 
cultural horizon […] can no longer be reconciled with the awareness that 
we ourselves are inescapably conditioned by our own historical situation’.15 
This is what critics of this approach call a ‘fundamental and insoluble 
incompatibility’, but it is something which Botterill believes can be 
overcome by proposing his condition of the innocent reader, although one 
not ‘blind to historicity’.16 Botterill is cautiously optimistic that such a 
                                                 
by A. A. Ianucci (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp.148–166; La 
puttana e il gigante: Dal Cantico dei Cantici al Paradiso Terrestre di Dante (Ravenna: 
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Firenze: Cadmo, 2005); M. B. Pranger, Bernard of Clairvaux and the Shape of Monastic 
Thought: Broken Dreams (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); F. Sissini, ‘Il canto di San 
Bernardo’, L’Alighieri, 25 (1984), 18–31; D. Turner, Eros and Allegory: Medieval 
Exegesis of the Song of Songs (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1995). 
14 For more general considerations of the representation of Bernard in his works, 
and especially his hagiography, see Bredero, Bernard of Clairvaux. 
15 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, p. 8. 
16 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, pp. 8-9.  
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reading of Dante will provide new and fruitful interpretations which will 
head off any charges of anachronism. 
 
Although my study will be attempting a similar trick, I am not so confident 
as Botterill that by merely assuming the position of an innocent reader, we 
will be able to re-create in ourselves someone significantly closer to the first 
readers of the Commedia in the fourteenth century. We know both too much 
and too little for that. This is why some filling in is needed—perhaps from 
the ground up—in order to see Dante’s culture afresh. The danger of 
anachronism is still there: the question remains, can we separate when and 
where it takes hold, even in the midst of our readings? It is a question to 
which I shall be returning below, when I set out the methodological 
assumptions of my study, the opportunities it opens and the pitfalls to 
which it is subject.  
 
In any case, Botterill begins by asking what a Trecento reader would have 
made of Bernard’s appearance in canto XXXI of the Paradiso. What would 
such an opinion be of Bernard, given his reputation in the Middle Ages? 
The myriad forms which make up his reputation are analysed in depth, 
and Botterill’s careful research into the cultural transmission and 
presentation of these forms—literary and material—will prove invaluable 
for my study. There are additional ways in which the historical Bernard is 
present in Dante’s Florence which Botterill misses, for example in the lauda 
tradition which I will be examining, but overall, Botterill’s summary of 
Bernard’s presence in Duecento Florence is thoroughgoing and meticulous.  
 
The first point that Botterill makes is that by the late twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries, Bernard’s legacy was already being appropriated by 
different groups for different purposes. The Cistercians, interested more in 
his miracles and in writing hagiography, were fashioning Bernard’s image 
in readiness for their attempts to see him canonised, whereas the 
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scholastics were reading his written works as those of an auctor. But 
Bernard did not sit well amongst the scholastics, and was most often taken 
up by those who were theologically conservative. Aquinas, notes Botterill, 
was sceptical about Bernard’s intellectual achievements, whereas Albert 
quotes him extensively. Of the Franciscans, Bonaventure is particularly 
enamoured with the abbot of Clairvaux, lauding Bernard as a preacher and 
mystic. Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202), Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) and 
Ubertino da Casale (1259-1329) all quote Bernard in their works, Ubertino 
most of all. Botterill provides further useful references to Bernard in the 
works of other medieval writers and theologians, ones to whom Dante may 
have had access, including the Franciscan and Tuscan popular text, 
Meditazioni delle vita di Cristo, in which Bernard is prominent, and in which 
the aspects of Bernard present are his devotion to Mary and his renown as 
a contemplative.  
 
So Botterill gives us a useful overview of the forms in which Bernard was 
present in Medieval Florence—noting the surprising lack of evidence of his 
works in the Franciscan house of Santa Croce, where his influence one 
would have thought might have been greatest. He goes on to show how 
Bernard’s image in the culture of Dante’s day is entirely compatible with 
the character who appears at the end of the Commedia, and who, on 
Botterill’s reading, has a specific purpose in the narrative action which 
Trecento readers would have recognised as suitably Bernardine. This 
conclusion is furnished by a careful reading of each of the cantos in which 
Bernard appears, which re-balances some earlier scholarship which had 
focused heavily on the historical Bernard’s devotion to Mary as the 
primary motivation for Dante’s choice.  
 
The ‘appearance’ scene is pivotal for Botterill. It functions as a dramatic 
means for a reassessment of the point of Dante’s journey which seemed to 
be heading for its culmination with Beatrice. Bernard’s sudden appearance 
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and Beatrice’s removal to the candida rosa echoes the earlier switch of Virgil 
for Beatrice—but reinforces, here, for Botterill, the difference between the 
earlier guides. Beatrice sits now in glory, whereas Virgil is back in Limbo. 
More than this, though, Bernard’s arrival heralds the possibility of Dante-
personaggio seeing Beatrice as an ‘icon rather than a person’ placed now 
within a universal and not merely personal order.17 With Bernard revealing 
his identity in such an abrupt manner, Botterill notes the conscious 
narrative effect which further underlines the separation from Beatrice and 
provides the way for Dante to develop his devotion to Mary as intercessor 
who will bring his gaze, ultimately, to Christ, and to the vision of God 
itself.  
 
The unveiling of Bernard’s identity receives careful scrutiny by Botterill, as 
he asks at what point a Trecento reader would recognise the abbot of 
Clairvaux through the character’s self-ascriptions. It is through Bernard’s 
devotion to Mary and in his mystical contemplation that he can be 
recognised, and these aspects of the historical Bernard, as they are 
represented by Dante in his fictional character, are analysed in depth by 
Botterill. In addition, he goes on to offer a reading of Bernard in Paradiso 
XXXII, which Botterill thinks has been too-often overlooked, as the dottore 
whose duty it is to speak. Thus Bernard’s lecture on doctrine (specifically, 
lines 67-87), although seemingly placed in a strange position within the 
cantica, provides evidence for Dante’s perception of Bernard as an auctor; 
indeed, Botterill thinks that Dante uses Bernard’s voice to authorise his 
own non-orthodox views on infant baptism—views which the historical 
Bernard did not necessarily espouse. Botterill suggests that historical 
Bernard’s conservatism on doctrine—in De Baptismo and in his letters he 
states that he has no wish to ‘usurp’ the teaching of Church Fathers—is 
used to great effect by Dante in order to create a language of authority for 
himself. And Botterill makes an important point about the difference 
                                                 
17 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, p.72. 
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between theologians as they might appear in the Commedia and how they 
and their teachings are presented in their theological works: 
 
It is not necessary to assume, because a historical figure in the 
Commedia presents certain teaching, that such teaching invariably 
conforms to the historical figure’s real view of the same subject, or 
even to Dante-poet’s acquaintance with it. On the other hand, it 
seems unduly reductive to assume that Dante’s choices of such 
spokesmen (and women) are arbitrary.18 
 
Botterill’s aim in this section of the book, though, is to set out in the 
strongest terms how and why Dante-personaggio is in need of someone like 
Bernard, and it is here that Botterill wants to pay particular attention to the 
attribute of eloquence at the centre of Dante’s characterisation of the saint. 
This eloquence, Botterill shows us, is fully ‘consonant with a widespread 
perception of the historical Bernard in Dante’s culture’ but is an aspect of 
the abbot of Clairvaux that has become neglected in favour of other 
attributes, such as his Marianism.19 Bernard’s words, his prayer to the 
Virgin, are not only the last that are spoken in the poem, they are the 
climax of his role in paradise. Through his eloquence, Bernard is able to 
teach Dante-personaggio how to approach God; where to direct his eyes; and 
secure for Dante the intercession of Mary. His voice speaks for the ranks of 
the blessed in the candida rosa, in a prayer for Dante’s salvation.  
 
In chapter six of the book, Botterill provides a careful critique of Rosetta 
Migliorini Fissi’s argument20 which proposes that Dante’s coining of the 
term trasumanar (Paradiso I, 70) is indebted to the historical Bernard’s use of 
the concept of deificatio; indeed, that they are part and parcel of the same 
mystical experience, described in different ways. Botterill is in broad 
agreement with Migliorini Fissi that Bernard’s renown as a contemplative 
                                                 
18 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, p.99. 
19 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, p. 113. 
20 See R. Migliorini Fissi, 'La nozione di deificatio nel Paradiso', Letture classensi, 
9/10 (1982), 39-72. 
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mystic is key to unlocking Dante’s choice of Bernard (together with the 
other reasons that have been outlined above), but Botterill is unsure that 
there is enough evidence in the text to suggest that it is exclusively Bernard 
to whom Dante is indebted. He traces the long and complex history of the 
concept of deification and then places this alongside his reading of the 
trasumanar passage in Paradiso I. What he concludes is that both Dante and 
Bernard are in agreement about deification being about the ‘accord of wills’ 
between human beings and God (set out nicely by Piccarda at Paradiso III, 
85) but suggests that trasumanar is actually merely the first step in the 
process towards deification which Dante-personaggio only reaches, in a fully 
Bernardine sense, in line 143 of Paradiso XXXIII. That deification is possible 
for Bernard on Earth, and for Dante-personaggio, before his own death, 
provides succour to the argument that the ‘accord of wills’ between man 
and God does not necessarily mean the negation or abolition of the human 
will altogether: that ‘deification’ is possible whilst still fully human, the will 
being an essential part of human personhood which does not require 
annihilation in order to participate in God.  
 
Botterill ends his study by returning to the theme of eloquence, and picks 
up the ineffability topos that a reading of the Paradiso inevitably invites. Far 
from a gloomy analysis of the final canto that focuses on the failure of 
human language to get close to speaking of God, or further, one that is 
sceptical about meaning full stop, Botterill presents a positive estimation of 
Bernard’s—and Dante’s—eloquence which celebrates its power. It is the 
attempt to say things at all that matters: Dante knows that ‘imperfection is 
inherent in the human condition yet it does not make life unliveable or 
words unsayable’, and it is this that Botterill thinks Dante ‘rejoices in’. 
Through a mouthpiece like Bernard, Dante can ‘come infinitesimally close 
to the plenitude of meaning, beauty, and referential power that, in the last 
analysis, is reserved for the Word that is God’.21 Such a reading leaves 
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room for an unequivocal acceptance of the apophatic nature of language, 
but sees great value in it all the same. 
 
2.2 Montemaggi/Gregory 
How better to understand the capacity of human language and intellectual 
endeavour in relation to theology and its practice is, ultimately, what the 
figure of Gregory can teach, according to Vittorio Montemaggi, in his essay 
‘Dante and Gregory the Great’.22 In this study Montemaggi invites us to 
reappraise the figure of Gregory and his significance in Dante’s works, as 
he believes that a misperception has arisen over Gregory’s presence in the 
Commedia and its influence on Dante’s thinking. Within his essay 
Montemaggi focuses on the few appearances of Gregory in the Commedia 
and on the mention of him in the letter to the Italian cardinals, providing a 
close reading of these episodes which reveals a new way to make sense of 
Dante’s understanding of Gregory. Montemaggi generously concludes the 
essay by offering ways in which this particular reading of Gregory might 
bear fruit in future research, both in what it means for scholars reading the 
Commedia, but also for those thinking about Dante’s connection with 
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historical figures, their works, influence and authority, and the aims of 
theological discourse more generally.  
 
The fact that there are only three brief, and sometimes indirect, mentions of 
Gregory in the Commedia might be good grounds for supposing that Dante 
was more interested in other theological and ecclesiastical authorities. 
Indeed, Montemaggi asks whether the lack of prominence in the Commedia 
of such an important figure of medieval Christian history does not warrant 
the relative lack of scholarship in this area. His answer, an emphatic no, 
comes with a helpful summary of the literature of Dante’s portrayal of 
Gregory, including the interpretations of Gregory’s famous smile which the 
scholarship contains. He also outlines some of the major critical works on 
Gregory’s own theological corpus, which might provide the literary scholar 
with new clues in how better to conceive of Gregory through Dante, and 
vice versa. 
 
The core of the essay is split into two parts: the first concerning the 
connection between the significance in the Commedia of the Thrones and 
their relation to love and justice, and the second, Dante’s conception of 
prayer and humility. Gregory’s connection with such large themes of 
theological import, Montemaggi says, shows us that ‘to think seriously 
about […] Gregory is to engage with some of the most important questions 
concerning Dante’s theology’.23 A theme which arises throughout, 
connected in fundamental ways to both the Thrones, love and justice, and 
to prayer and humility, is the particularity of individual human beings. 
This Montemaggi illustrates in relation to the notion of human error, a 
theme to which I return in greater depth in Chapter III.  
 
Montemaggi begins by setting out the ways in which Gregory appears in 
the Commedia, both implicitly and explicitly, the first of these in reference to 
                                                 
23 Montemaggi,‘Dante and Gregory’, p.211. 
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the debate—or confusion—over which heaven the angelic Thrones govern. 
For Montemaggi, the pilgrim’s journey through the Heaven of Venus 
contains important allusions to Gregory, from start to finish. Charles 
Martel describes the sphere and the angelic order that governs it, quoting 
Dante’s own words from the Convivio at the pilgrim.  The actual line taken 
does not describe the Principalities, to which Charles Martel refers, but the 
Thrones, which Dante in his earlier work had claimed governed the 
Heaven of Venus. Thus the poet has Charles correct what Dante must have 
thought was his own mistake, albeit in a rather underhand (or perhaps, 
satirical) way; one which does not draw attention to this alternative view. 
The change adopts the order found in the Pseudo-Denys and leaves behind 
Gregory’s hierarchy.24 
 
Montemaggi sees further implicit reference to Gregory later on in the 
Heaven of Venus in Paradiso IX, during Folco’s speech. It contains a 
description of the souls laughing in light of the Love that has saved them 
from the sins that they have repented. This foreshadows, Montemaggi 
claims, Gregory’s smile at his own shortcomings later in the cantica. This 
may well be right, but to be a ‘foreshadowing’ Folco and Gregory must be 
responding with joy to the same object: the Love which in its perfection 
resolves both sin and human error. Cunizza, too, is joyful at being saved 
from the sin that caused her fate, in lines 34-36. It is useful to think of all 
three of these individual responses as connected, and in some sense 
echoing each other, but Montemaggi offers no distinction—or separation—
between sin and intellectual error here. Viewed from the perspective of the 
limited human being, as opposed to the omnipotent and perfect God, this 
may not be a problem per se, but some fruitful work might be done to probe 
more deeply Dante’s characterisation of the difference between sin and 
                                                 
24 For a discussion of Beatrice’s intersection with this error see, A. Cornish, Reading 
Dante’s Stars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 117. 
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error.25 Such a study would, of course, need to take into consideration 
Dante’s use of the phrase ‘grande errore’ which Beatrice uses to describe 
original sin at Paradiso VII, 29. 
 
 Where Montemaggi’s discussion of error and Gregory develops most 
convincingly and has real impact on how we should think about Dante’s 
theology, is where he shows how error is no obstacle in reaching God. In 
fact, error can take on a real theological significance as we understand that 
it is not in philosophical propositions or treatises that truth is found, but 
‘in, through, and as love that the mystery of our relationship with truth 
proceeds’.26 So the theologians in the Heaven of the Sun are in harmony 
with each other, in fact can dance, even though their respective theologies 
might have been in tension with each other on Earth. And Dante humbles 
himself, just as Gregory is humbled at his own error, in questioning Peter 
Damian in the Heaven of Saturn, an encounter which, for Montemaggi, is 
captured within one of the most important terzine in the Commedia, Paradiso 
XXI, 103-5: 
 
Sì mi prescrisser le parole sue 
ch'io lasciai la quistione e mi ritrassi 
a dimandarla umilmente chi fue. 
 
This seemingly backward step of the pilgrim’s, from his lofty curiosity 
about the whys and wherefores of the structure of Heaven, to the rather 
more mundane, face-to-face encounter with another human being, 
demonstrates that recognising and responding to the particularity of 
individuals, even here in the heaven of contemplation, should be ‘placed at 
the core of theological reflection’. The theme of particularity is developed 
                                                 
25 See also T. Barolini on ‘non-false’ errors in Chapter 7 of The Undivine Comedy: 
Detheologizing Dante (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp.143-165.  
26 Montemaggi,‘Dante and Gregory’, p. 228. 
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further, to beautiful effect, in Montemaggi’s discussion of Gregory’s prayer 
for Trajan.  
 
The legend of the prayer for the soul of the emperor—Gregory’s  apparent 
response to seeing Trajan depicted in sculpture (or, perhaps, in marble 
relief in Trajan’s column), helping a widow—is referred to by Dante in 
Purgatorio X, 70-96, the terrace of Pride. In these lines, Trajan is again 
portrayed in marble, albeit animated and seemingly talking, and is 
celebrated here as an example of humility. At this point, Montemaggi 
draws our attention back to the letter to the cardinals, where the leaders of 
the church are berated for abandoning the works of the Church Fathers, 
including Gregory: 
 
Iacet Gregorius tuus in telis aranearum; iacet Ambrosius in neglectis 
clericorum latibulis; iacet Augustinus abiectus, Dionysius, 
Damascenus et Beda; et nescio quod 'Speculum', Innocentium, et 
Ostiensem declamant. Cur non? Illi Deum querebant, ut finem et 
optimum; isti census et beneficia consecuntur.’27   
 
Epistola XI, 16. 
 
The cardinals’ actual pride and Dante’s perceived pride are themes of the 
letter. Further, the work which the cardinals have supposedly left to 
languish in the cobwebs, Gregory’s Moralia in Iob, itself ends with 
Gregory’s concern that he appear proud in writing a book which will win 
him praise. And Dante does indeed praise Gregory in the Commedia, not for 
his celebrated theological treatise, but for the ‘great victory’ that he wins for 
Trajan’s soul. The compassion, love and hope which Gregory has for Trajan 
                                                 
27 ‘Your beloved Gregory languishes among the cobwebs; Ambrose lies neglected 
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2007), pp. 92-93.   
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is enough for the pagan to be saved. The poet tells us that humans cannot 
explain the mysteries of salvation, or the divine will which sanctions it, so 
that all we are left with, as Montemaggi cogently points out, is ‘the 
possibility of telling and reflecting on the stories of salvation of individual 
human beings’.28 Thus, although we may not understand how it is that 
Trajan could be saved, we can reflect on the particularity of the story, and 
on the lives of the individuals themselves, in order to reach a clearer 
understanding of our own peculiarly human relation to Truth. The pilgrim 
does not understand why Peter Damian should meet him in the Heaven of 
Saturn. Here his vulnerability to error and pride is pointed out, but he is 
able to reorient himself, through his error, back to the particular individual 
he is now encountering. 
 
Montemaggi’s overarching argument, then, is that for Dante, vulnerability 
can be a route to Truth; errors may be constitutive of theological 
understanding; the unknowability of the divine is due to humans as 
creatures, particular and individual, dependent on God and yet able to 
participate in God through this dependency and not without it. The upshot 
of Montemaggi’s argument has real repercussions for my thesis, building 
as it will on the concept of particularity and personhood, not just in relation 
to Gregory and the theological importance of him for Dante, but to 
Augustine, Aquinas, Bernard and Beatrice, and in developing an argument 
which will see the theologians in the light of Dante’s text and in the light of 
their historical contexts and presence in Florence (which was not part of 
this, Montemaggi’s introductory essay). My engagement with the 
theologians in the Commedia will enrich our understanding of how and 
why Dante chooses to 
 
 
                                                 
28 Montemaggi, ‘Dante and Gregory’, p. 242. 
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[…] craft theology in the form of a narrative poem in which 
progress towards God is made primarily not through abstract 
argumentation but through the concrete interaction of human 
persons.29 
 
 
2.3 Lombardi/Augustine 
 
Elena Lombardi pays some attention to the historical context in which 
Dante would have encountered St. Augustine, in her essay, ‘Augustine and 
Dante’, but, like Montemaggi, focuses primarily on the rhetorical modes 
and theological themes that they share.30 The context that she delimits is 
one of the ‘Middle Ages’ and, as such, does not restrict her purview to 
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Italy, or to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Gregory and 
Bernard are key figures in understanding how Augustine’s mysticism took 
hold in the Middle Ages; Bonaventure is central in presenting 
Augustinianism in a Franciscan context through his interpretation of 
Augustine’s works. The theological dialogue between Franciscan and 
Dominican orders, between Augustinianism and Aristotelianism/Thomism 
is, according to Lombardi, ‘a continuous attempt at reconciliation, a mutual 
exchange which permanently modifies both doctrines’.31  
 
These broad brushstrokes are helpful in framing Augustine’s huge 
influence on medieval Europe and the developments in theology to which 
his works gave rise. Lombardi gives a useful account of the changing 
influence of Augustine from the early to the later Middle Ages, from a 
decontextualised auctor to an interpreter of scripture, as the Augustinian 
order helped to recover more of his corpus. Indeed, by the time he is 
writing, Dante’s appeals to Augustine as an authority to highlight the 
weaknesses in others’ thinking are intended to persuade and to cajole. In 
the Convivio and in the Monarchia, Augustine is mentioned on each occasion 
almost in the same breath as Aristotle, confirming his status as auctor. In 
the letter to the Italian cardinals, as we saw in Montemaggi’s essay with 
Gregory, Augustine is chosen as a named authority to which the Church 
should take heed, and yet his works, Dante tells us, gather dust in the 
libraries.32 In the letter to Cangrande,33 Dante challenges the naysayers who 
doubt the ‘truth’ found in the Commedia, ‘legant Bernardum in libro De 
Consideratione, legant Augustinum in libro De Quantitate Anime’.34 It is 
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notable that Dante demands that the texts themselves are read, that 
Augustine’s authority (and Bernard’s) comes here specifically from his 
written corpus, rather than, for example, knowledge of his life, actions, or 
ideas (although, as I discuss at length in Chapter III, the Confessions 
presents a particularly personal written articulation of a life). 
 
Of the corpus itself, Lombardi suggests that De civitate Dei, De doctrina 
christiana and the Confessions had the longest-lasting impact on the Middle 
Ages. De civitate Dei provided a way to make sense of the unfolding of time 
and of providential history, through the images of exile, grace and return. 
De doctrina christiana inaugurates the hugely pervasive method of fourfold 
scriptural interpretation, which would leave an indelible mark on medieval 
exegesis. And the Confessions just about ‘created’ the genre of 
autobiography—which would be an influence on the early ‘self-
explorations’ of Guibert of Nogent and Aelread of Rievaulx—and 
established a new model of conversion which would, unlike Paul’s 
Damascene moment, unfold over time.  
 
The major Augustinian themes which impact on Dante’s thinking are, for 
Lombardi, those of providential history; rhetoric and interpretation; love, 
language, and desire.35 The first, of course, with complex repercussions for 
Dante’s Commedia, and the vision contained therein, is Augustine’s 
impassioned response to the sack of Rome, and the blame that the Christian 
church received for its part in its downfall. It led him, in De civitate Dei, to 
lay out how the history of two cities, one earthly and one heavenly, could 
make sense sub specie aeternitatis, that is, under the purview of providential 
history, a history which is rescued from meaninglessness by the 
Incarnation, and which culminates in the resurrection of Christian souls at 
the Last Judgment, creating the city of God in paradise. Dante’s and 
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Augustine’s ideas of Rome, and its pagan past—including its celebrated 
poets—are markedly different, of course. On Augustine’s account, 
although he quotes him throughout De civitate Dei, and refers to his love for 
the poet in his youth in the Confessions, Virgil is part of the pagan culture 
which should be vilified: Virgil’s own vision of the founding of Rome, and 
its future glory, is further at odds with Augustine’s history. 
 
Alongside the writing of history comes its interpretation, inevitably bound 
up, for Augustine, with Biblical interpretation and exegesis. Lombardi joins 
the majority view, in her comment on De doctrina Christiana, that 
‘Augustine’s theory of signs and things, his theory of styles, and his 
principles of exegesis are crucial to understand medieval culture and 
literature’.36 The Convivio is where Lombardi sees Dante, when he becomes 
his own interpreter in the commentaries on his poetry, begin to take on the 
rhetorical modes of a narrator who ‘expounds his own experience’, as 
Augustine had done nine centuries before him, in the Confessions.37 John 
Freccero has likened Dante’s dark wood with Augustine’s ‘region of 
unlikeness’: the structure of these conversions played out and narrated in 
the same way.38  
 
Augustine’s skill as a professional rhetorician is put to use most powerfully 
in the Confessions and it retains its power because we recognise in it a 
person with an internal life that resembles our own. It is tempting to think 
that the presentation of this particular self must be timeless, equally 
powerful for any who encounter it in any time. But the Confessions may 
well have resonated for Dante in subtly different ways, conditioned by and 
drawing upon sources to which we no longer have immediate access. In 
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late-medieval Italy, the tools and approaches for deciphering life-writing 
and autobiography were necessarily different from our own and would, 
inevitably, have yielded different understandings. So, although Lombardi 
is right that on a structural level, Dante’s writing about his own putative 
journey to God draws heavily on the ‘narrator who expounds his own 
experience’ in Augustine, yet there is more fruitful work to be done on how 
this particular Augustine of the Confessions is received and understood in 
Dante’s late Duecento Florence. Lombardi offers no account of the person 
of Augustine found in this intensely personal work, or what such an 
intimate portrait of conversion might have had on Dante and his own 
work. 
 
Lombardi’s essay is at its most powerful when she reads Dante’s language 
in the Commedia in an Augustinian mode, taking her cue from De doctrina 
christiana, where Augustine claims that human language and signs had 
been moving towards obscurity until Christ intervened in their history. 
Christ and the apostles present the sacraments as signs that are both simple 
and holy when practiced, signifying something else of great magnitude, 
which a person of ‘servile weakness’ would misinterpret. For Lombardi, 
the understanding for the pilgrim and for us as readers, ‘that signs stand 
for something else […] mysterious […] is the beginning of the redemption 
of language and language users’.39 Christ as the redeemer of signs means 
that, by the time the pilgrim reaches Paradise, meaning is no longer ‘exiled’ 
from language, but becomes stable and communication is ‘excessively 
easy’.40 
 
As for the explicit appearance of Augustine in the works of Dante, there are 
rather more examples than Montemaggi found of Gregory: ten altogether 
in the Convivio, Monarchia and the Epistles, where he is appealed to as an 
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authority, rather than as a contemplative or mystic. Lombardi notes the 
significant absence of Augustine from Paradiso X and XII, in the Heaven of 
the Sun, where the other theologians, not all of them auctores, are found. 
This absence seems almost pointed: dancing around Dante are the giants of 
Christian theology, and yet Augustine is not there, indeed his naming at 
Par. X, 120 draws attention to the fact that he is missing. In Paradiso XXXII, 
Augustine is back where we expect him, in the garland of the rose, 
alongside the leaders of holy orders. He is named, as he was in Convivio IV, 
in amongst a list of authorities, but has no active role in the narrative 
action. This brief mention of Augustine in the Empyrean where he faces 
Sarah confirms him, Lombardi suggests, as an orthodox figure in Dante’s 
conception. But these few explicit mentions of Augustine are, for 
Lombardi, ‘disconcerting, even disappointing’.41 My reading of Augustine 
in the Commedia acknowledges this deliberate omission of the person of 
Augustine in the fiction, but suggests that the narratorial structure that the 
Confessions provides, in which the various persons of author, narrarator 
and character stand in relation to each other, is one which is fundamental 
for Dante.    
 
2.4 Gilson/Aquinas 
Simon Gilson, in his essay, ‘Dante and Christian Aristotelianism’, traces the 
ways in which Aquinas’ Aristotelianism has been aligned with Dante’s 
theology, since the earliest commentary tradition to the present day, and 
asks how this tendency to assimilate the two has affected our reading of 
theology and poetry in Dante’s works.42 Gilson develops a careful criticism 
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of commentators who suggest Dante offers a critique of theology in 
oppositional terms—that is, positing one school of thought against 
another—and focuses instead on the nuance that can be read in Dante’s 
treatment of supposedly competing theories. This nuance, thinks Gilson, 
can only be understood if we ask ourselves about the ways in which 
thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato were mediated through centuries of 
other commentators, translations and criticism. Such an approach will 
leave behind easy and over-simple categorisations of the way in which 
Dante would have encountered his philosophical and theological learning, 
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and will provide a snapshot of the perspective which he must necessarily 
have had, given the time in which he was working. Gilson’s analysis gives 
us a clearer idea of how Dante’s Aristotle would have been very different 
from our own: necessarily partial; appropriated and recast by thinkers with 
whom we are not now familiar; and perhaps, most importantly, not 
actually considered as ‘a current of thought to be defined in conflict with 
other currents’.43 
 
Gilson begins his study by giving us a concrete example of how modes of 
interpretation will alter with time and with intellectual fashion. So, for 
example, the earliest commentators on the Commedia suggest that Aquinas 
was Dante’s principal theological authority, and saw the Dominican’s 
influence in many parts of the poem. As scholasticism waned in popularity 
in to the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so too did the 
tendency to view Dante as a loyal disciple of Thomas, or, if he was still 
judged to be Thomist in his thinking, then this was cause for 
disapprobation rather than celebration. Reminding ourselves that we are 
context-bound interpreters is a useful lesson to learn. But as I suggest 
below, whether one can slip loose the chains of cultural determination is 
another matter. Gilson’s reading of the last twenty years of scholarship on 
Dante’s Thomism, conceived more widely as a Christian Aristotelianism, 
and wider still as an Aristotelianism richly endowed with the platonising 
tendencies of the Pseudo-Denys, shows us a more complicated picture. It is 
a Dante clearly heavily influenced by ‘scholastic commonplaces’ (these not 
necessarily direct borrowings from Aquinas), but one who also engaged 
with monastic theology, rich in Biblical commentary, especially the 
commentaries on the Song of Songs, and with the works of affective and 
non-rationalist thinkers.  
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But there are gaps in the scholarship which Gilson thinks could be 
fruitfully filled: a closer attention to the institutional contexts and curricula 
of the two Florentine studia and the Bolognese studium, including a wider 
appreciation of the works of those who were teaching at the time and who 
have been largely forgotten and even, most obviously, further 
consideration of some of the more ‘minor’ theologians of the Heaven of the 
Sun who get overshadowed by their more famous counterparts. And all 
these to be read, for Gilson, with an acute eye on Dante’s synthesising and 
creative force: one which marries the rigours and forms of scholasticism 
with the poetry of affective theology; which joins Aristotle’s theory of 
desire, through Virgil, with the doctrine of divine love, as in Purgatorio 
XVIII; and which brings the contemporary poets of his day and recent past 
into dialogue with centuries of philosophical and theological discourse. 
 
2.5 Psaki/Beatrice 
The literature on the figure of Beatrice in the Commedia shows how the 
portrayal of an individual woman can be pressed into the service of a host 
of functions: literal, symbolic and allegorical.44 From the earliest 
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commentaries, her rendering in the Commedia has variously been equated 
with Love, Grace, Theology, Christ, the Church and Wisdom, amongst 
others. And yet, crucially, her appearance remains in the poem the 
historical individual—the uneducated, Florentine woman—whom 
Boccaccio tells us was called Beatrice Portinari. This is a point to which I 
shall return throughout this thesis, and in Chapter IV particularly: how it is 
and why, that Dante should endow this portrait of a real woman with the 
kind of attributes one might have expected to be better embodied in other, 
celebrated and authoritative persons.  
In this introductory section, though, I start by considering F. Regina Psaki’s 
essay, ‘The Sexual Body in Dante’s Celestial Paradise’ as an entry point for 
considering how Beatrice and Dante-personaggio’s relationship provides a 
far from straightforward way of understanding the truths that are available 
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in Heaven. Psaki insists that we should resist the tendency to erase the 
erotic, the sexual, from the relationship as it is represented, that erotic love 
is neither replaced by, nor metamorphosed into, divine love. Her argument 
is that what occurs in the narrative between Dante and Beatrice after 
Purgatory XXVII is ‘emphatically […] not […] a purification or 
transformation of desire’.45 
It is not hard to understand why critics have been drawn to allegorise the 
figure of Beatrice almost to the point of her annihilation as a person: the 
text certainly invites readings of her character as being anything other than 
herself, because—they could cry—what else could Beatrice be, beyond the 
passive, silent figure, like the one in the Vita nova, a cipher that only gives 
up something of the poet, and nothing of herself, a figure that adumbrates 
the limitations of a woman’s power over her own life and its meaning 
within the medieval period? Indeed, the type of exegesis that Bernard of 
Clairvaux produced in his Sermones super Cantica canticorum exerts a pull on 
us to read an active female figure in medieval texts as though it is 
something else entirely: the Bride of the Song becomes both more and less 
than just a woman, a lover: she is the Church, and as such her desire for her 
beloved is chaste, because it is the desire to kiss the mouth of God.46  
Beatrice’s back-story as Dante’s beloved, the desire for her that powers 
Dante-personaggio’s journey, and the desire for his salvation that powered 
Beatrice’s intervention and which gave Virgil his commission, shows us 
that the author of the Commedia considers that love for an individual—and 
erotic love at that—has the capacity to reveal truths about our place in 
God’s universal order. The desire that functions as the narrative driving 
force of the poem begins as fully human and ends in the absolute peace of a 
vision of God which harmonises all desire and will. Psaki sees in the erotic 
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desire of Dante for Beatrice a love that remains sexualised, even in Heaven; 
her ‘heterodox’ view, as she calls it, fixes our focus on the lover-beloved 
relationship and takes seriously the resurrection of the body and all that 
that entails in Heaven. This will be an important element in my discussion 
of Beatrice, too, and indeed, the other theologians in this study, particularly 
Augustine and Gregory. As Psaki says: 
[T]he blessed remain individuals forever, not blending their 
identities into a kind of cosmic amoeba, their memories, knowledge, 
will and desire, though resolved and harmonized in the divine, can 
remain specific and unique, with their individual memories and 
loves.47 
For Psaki, ‘sex can inhabit the sacred’ and as such she 
cannot conclude that for Dante erotic love is desexualized, purged 
of the corporeal, superseded by generalized and purely mental 
communion. The individual matters; the relationship with Beatrice 
powers the entire journey; and Dante insists too heavily on the 
return of the body for his experience of her to remain aphysical. 48  
And yet, as I shall explore in Chapter IV, where in the Commedia there 
seems to be some kind of resolution about the nature of erotic love 
specifically, in the Earthly Paradise, when the whole poem seems to have 
been leading up to this point of retrieval, the ground shifts and we are told 
by the theological virtues that Dante-personaggio, in fact, looks at his 
beloved ‘troppo fiso’ (Purgatorio XXXII, 9). According to Hollander, here, 
‘Dante is caught up in carnal appreciation of a spiritual entity’.49 So the 
erotic love that powers his journey to God, that provides the conditions 
under which he is able to appreciate Beatrice as a manifestation of God’s 
truth and perfection, still retains the power to distort—in ways as old as 
time—that truth. It is a perplexing and precarious situation.  
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The impetus to view the character of Beatrice as something other than 
herself, as a something that would make her powerful and authoritative 
enough to effect the pilgrim’s journey and ultimate destination, is 
unsurprising. And it is certainly not wrong-headed to read Beatrice under 
these different aspects—Church, Grace, Wisdom, and so on—as many 
critics have already done: I am not advocating a one-dimensional view of 
her function in the poem. My concern is that the person of Beatrice is re-
instated such that we can understand Dante’s way of thinking about 
theology—his way of understanding the truths contained within the 
Bible—as being available through the personal relationships that we have 
on Earth; that something of God can be understood in loving Creation 
itself, demonstrated in the love of our particular, temporal, limited selves. 
Psaki’s challenge to ‘orthodox’ Dante scholars is to collapse the 
‘decontamination zone between the erotic vocabulary of salvation and 
erotic vocabulary period’, and in doing so break apart a binary opposition 
which does not help us ‘into the illogical verities of Christian doctrine’.50  
3. Methodology 
 
As I hope has been made clear, the five pieces of work which I reviewed 
above, demonstrate that the relationship between Dante and theology, and 
between Dante and specific, named theologians, can be approached in very 
different ways. My study will be picking out features of each of these 
approaches, but will be going beyond them too, as the fundamental 
question at the heart of this project focuses on a concept—that of 
personhood and its relationship with theological practice—which none of 
the scholars took to be their primary target. Montemaggi, as I indicated, 
comes closest to this intention, but his study remains partial with its text-
based approach. In addition to the conceptual upshot of an inquiry into the 
nature of persons—which I tentatively introduce at the start of Chapter I—
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my approach will also embed this theoretical engagement firmly in the 
historical context of Dante’s early life.  
 
It is a methodology, then, which examines closely, and takes seriously, the 
material and intellectual culture of a very specific time and place—Florence 
in the 1280s and 1290s—when we know, according to his own hand, that 
Dante attended the ‘le scuole de li religiosi e a le disputazioni de li 
filosofanti’ (Convivo II. xii. 7). And so the project is motivated by the 
thought that the Commedia will be better understood if we have a richer 
account of the precise time and place in which its author lived. Rather than 
reading the text itself as the sine qua non of how to understand a medieval, 
theological mind-set, our readings go in the other direction: contextual 
evidence, in an array of forms including but also going beyond the literary, 
will open up the poem to new interpretations of the theological questions 
that it raises and the way in which those questions are expressed. The aim 
is to avoid supposing any naïve causal connections between the existence 
in Florence, say, of a particular theological work, or image, or hymn, and its 
appearance in the Commedia. Instead, the drive will always be to ask how 
Dante’s seemingly radical poetic experimentation and theological 
expression intersected with the cultural, social and intellectual life of which 
he was a part, and with which he was in dialogue. 
 
On a practical level, this will involve returning to Florence itself in order to 
create a portrait of the city’s life which was available to an educated young 
man like Dante. This portrait will take in the intellectual, social and 
political, religious and aesthetic texture of the time and place and will 
consider both ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture as equally enlightening. Inherent in 
the research will be the privileged position of the learned, written texts 
which have been preserved in the archives, and the visual and material 
culture which has survived in the fabric of the buildings and in the spaces 
of museum collections. Even so, it will be an attempt, in the new historicist 
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tradition, to create what Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt call 
the ‘life-world’ of Dante.51 The intention will be to read this context in 
parallel with a close study of the text itself, and thus I will not assume an 
order of priority for interpreting the evidence on the page in light of the 
evidence in the archives: my working hypothesis will be that they will each 
illumine the other, and present perspectives for understanding medieval 
theology—Dante’s and others’—which literary scholars of Dante may 
heretofore have missed.52  
 
The textual sources are mostly to be found in manuscripts now housed in 
the libraries of Florence, at the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana and the 
Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale. Nicolò Maldina and Anna Pegoretti have 
identified, via the surviving catalogues of the libraries of the convents of 
Santa Maria Novella and Santa Croce, the works which we know with 
some certainty were present in Florence during the period that I am 
considering. Their work builds upon and updates earlier analyses, 
particularly those of Charles T. Davis53 and Gabriella Pomaro,54 and 
provides a detailed account of the manuscripts held by the two studia—for 
my purposes, not only of the theologians themselves, but also those others 
who were influenced by them.  
 
Further, the work of the wider project, Dante and Late Medieval Florence: 
                                                 
51 Practicing New Historicism (University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 12. 
52 For a discussion on the opportunities that an historicist approach might provide 
in Dante studies, see T. Barolini, ‘“Only Historicize”: History, Material Culture 
(Food, Clothes, Books), and the Future of Dante Studies’, Dante Studies, 127 (2009), 
37-54. For an interesting example of an historicist approach, see J. Steinberg, 
Accounting for Dante (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). 
53 C.T. Davis, Education in Dante’s Florence’, Speculum, Vol. 40.3 (July 1965), 415-
35; ‘L’Istruzione a Firenze nel tempo di Dante’, in L’Italia di Dante (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1988), pp.135-66; ‘The Florentine Studia and Dante’s “Library”’, in The 
‘Divine Comedy’ and the Encyclopedia of Arts and Sciences, ed. by Giuseppe Di Scipio 
and Aldo Scaglione (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1988), pp. 339–66. 
54 G. Pomaro, ‘Censimento dei manoscritti della Biblioteca di S. Maria Novella’, 
Memorie Domenicane, N.S. 11 (1980), 325-470. 
  45 
Theology in Poetry, Practice and Society, will be invaluable for my study 
because it enriches these sources in ways which would have been beyond 
the scope of this thesis alone. Maldina’s research on the sermons preached 
in Florence, and the preachers themselves, provides another source of 
information about the perception of named theologians.55 So too, will an 
investigation into the Dominican disputations, which Dante mentions in 
the Convivio, and of which we have some textual record from Santa Maria 
Novella. Pegoretti’s analyses of individuals and the practices within the 
convents, will shed further light not only on which texts were present, but 
also in what form they were kept and catalogued by the mendicant 
orders.56 My study can take advantage of such an analysis because the way 
in which manuscripts were handled or loaned by the libraries brings with it 
information about how particular theologians were perceived.  
 
Another textual source, which supplied both visual representations of the 
theologians and information about the oral culture of the city, are the 
laudari once belonging to the confraternities in the city.  An Augustinian 
laudario survives, for example, containing illuminations of both Augustine 
and Bernard (BNCF Banco Rari 18). The visual and material culture in the 
city, including paintings, frescoes and sculpture in the churches and the 
civic buildings of Florence will provide yet another perspective on the 
theologians in this study. 
 
It is also clear that I need to account for the decision to focus on a narrow 
time period, the 1280s and 1290s, and place, the city of Florence. During 
this time we know that Dante, from his mid-teens to mid-thirties, was 
studying and writing in Florence, but of course, this was his early work: the 
Vita nova was completed by 1295. The first copies of Inferno were not in 
                                                 
55 N. Maldina, Dante, la predicazione e i generi della letteratura religiosa medievale 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, forthcoming). 
56 See, for example, A. Pegoretti, 'Filosofanti', Le tre corone, 2 (2015), 11-70. 
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circulation until well after Dante was in exile, his geographical location 
harder to pin down, and his encounters with people and institutions 
becoming hazy for historians to see. Importantly, the decision to focus on a 
specific period and place necessitates a reconstruction of a context which 
brings together different discourses and practices: intersections which 
might not have been obvious, or have come to light at all, in an analysis of 
a broader geographical area and wider sweep of history.  
 
There are deep methodological and theoretical issues going on in the 
background, here, some of which trade on assumptions which it would be 
useful to spell out in a little more detail. Such reflections are not, ultimately, 
going to undermine this study, but it will be useful to have some answer to 
those critics who suggest that a context-bound approach to reading Dante 
is wrong-headed. It is almost impossible to reconstruct the Florence of the 
last two decades of the thirteenth century without importing into it the 
conceptions of our own modernity. We may remain blind to what is in 
front of us in such a reconstruction: meanings which would have been 
available, if not obvious, to an individual living during those times, 
because they have been made inaccessible by our own conceptual and, in 
the philosopher Charles Taylor’s words, inescapable frameworks.57 That is 
a risk, but one worth taking, because such a reconstruction renders at least 
the possibility of new understandings—both of those times and of our own, 
of texts and of ideas, of persons and of ourselves. We may breathe the 
invigorating air of modernity and postmodernity, confident in the powers 
of our own critical interpretations, but that air is supplied to us by an iron 
lung of which we may be aware, but from which we are unable to escape. 
The critical acuity with which we ask what inevitable distortions impede 
our understandings of cultures past, in virtue of own predicament, does 
not in itself remove our potential blind spots.  
                                                 
57 Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 3. 
  47 
 
Another contemporary philosopher who has engaged with such questions, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, understands this worry about subjectivism but 
counsels us that our historical situatedness, our inevitable hermeneutical 
position derived from the tradition in which we find ourselves, brings with 
it positive ways to engage with other, past traditions.58 There is no need to 
view these dialogues as a clash or as a battle of competing world-views: 
our hermeneutical ‘horizons’, as Gadamer calls our particular historical 
situations, can engage with another, and that horizon can be understood in 
light of our own. In turn, our understanding of our own position will be 
changed as a result. The dialogic process need not have a definitive end, 
but can be characterised by ever-unfolding understanding.59  
 
So it is on the basis that meaning can arise from such an analysis that we 
proceed, trusting we are able to understand a tradition, its practices and its 
art in light of our own horizons. A historicising approach, which is what 
this project proposes, also ‘carries the core hermeneutical presumption that 
one can occupy a position from which one can discover meanings that 
those who left traces of themselves could not have articulated’.60 That is, we 
may well find new medieval meanings which resonate with us today, but 
we may also be able to provide meanings from our own perspective which 
were unavailable to the medieval culture which we are studying: these 
meanings I anticipate below, and they centre around the concept of 
personhood itself. That is, how modern accounts of personhood, taking in 
the sweep of intellectual history available to us now, but unavailable to 
Dante and his contemporaries, can shed light on ‘persons’ in the Commedia, 
                                                 
58 H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall, 
2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989). 
59 For a discussion which connects Gadamer’s position with a historicist approach 
to theology, and to the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey in particular, see S. Greeve 
Davaney, Historicism: The Once and Future Challenge for Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2006). 
60 Practicing New Historicism, p. 8. 
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and on the person of the theologian in particular. These are two sides of the 
same coin: we will be able to uncover new meanings through a closer 
appreciation of the precise time and place from which that text arose, 
whether by better understanding the dialogues between the poet and his 
own cultural and intellectual milieu, or, the flip-side, by providing an 
interpretive framework for understanding or discovering that culture and 
the texts to which it gave rise, that is peculiarly our modern-day own.   
 
To be clear, we are talking about reconstructions of a particular context, so 
as to render a fuller account of the ‘life-world’ of a particular poet, in order 
that we can better understand something that comes out of that life-world, 
in this case a particular text—and within it a vision of a life and its relation 
to God. In these reconstructions, we may attempt to build a city, or a 
church, read its books, feel its materiality, hear its sounds and see its visual 
arts, and occupy the position of its different inhabitants—whether high- or 
low-born, male or female, from the laity or clergy. We hope that this will 
reveal new things about that world of which the poet was a living, 
breathing part: someone who encountered those sights, sounds and people, 
those ideas and institutions every day.  
 
But we are also talking about applying interpretations which discover new 
meanings about those lives—about the poet himself and the texts which he 
wrote, or about the man in the Florentine street, or about the theologians 
from farther back in history—which those individuals ‘could not have 
articulated’, using as I will a conceptual apparatus which is only available 
to us now, and unavailable to them. That seems to me two quite different 
modes of going about this project, even though they will be inextricably, 
and sometimes invisibly, intertwined. 
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4. Overview of the thesis 
Chapter I introduces the concept of personhood, and in particular, the 
substantive features of personhood that Dante prioritises in his 
characterisations within the Commedia.  These features, I suggest, are: 
names and naming; embodiment; memory; language; interpersonal 
relationships and the values and commitments which hold them together. I 
further consider how some twentieth-century conceptions of personhood 
might be useful when we consider Dante’s text. Finally, I sketch the ways 
in which the four theologians of this study were ‘present’ in the Florence of 
the late Duecento, and how something of their personhoods might have 
been transmitted to Dante, via the visual, material, educational and 
religious cultures of the city. 
 
In Chapter II, I consider the virtues of the characters of Bernard of 
Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas as they appear in the poem, and ask how 
and why Dante represents them as he does. I explore how their 
characterisation either adopts or departs from the kind of personhood that 
is transmitted in the sources of the historical theologians that were 
available in Florence. Further, I sketch case studies of virtue and vice in the 
Commedia that might embody a peculiarly Bernardine sensibility.  Lastly I 
consider the question of the primacy of the intellect over the will, and ask 
how Dante’s depiction of Bernard and Aquinas illuminates Dante’s own 
particular stance on this perennial question. 
 
Chapter III has as its focus the figures of Augustine and Gregory. It 
considers how the nature of turning points and error play a crucial part in 
the conception of personhood, contained within either the historical 
theologians’ oeuvre or the poem itself. I compare Augustine’s narration of 
his own conversion with the architecture of Dante’s poem, and consider 
how echoes of the Bishop of Hippo’s subsequent mystical experience at 
Ostia can be read in the pilgrim’s journey through the Earthly Paradise and 
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beyond. The role of memory for Augustine and for Dante, in constituting 
personhood, including beatified personhood, is also considered. The 
second part of the chapter considers how human vulnerability to error is 
embodied in the character of Gregory the Great.  I end the chapter with a 
discussion of the positive role of error and its power to individuate 
particular persons, on the one hand, and on the other, to carve out the ways 
in which Dante’s God must remain unknowable, and his theology 
apophatic.  
 
Chapter IV, the last chapter, builds on the analysis of the theologians’ 
qualities of Chapters II and III and compares them to the characterisation of 
Beatrice in the poem. I argue that of any character within the poem, it is 
Beatrice who fulfils the function of theologian most effectively because of, 
rather than in spite of, the role she plays in the author’s biography. My 
analysis of the way in which the poet constructs her authority, which 
depends both on Beatrice being the locus and the originator of an erotic 
desire, and upon her theological discourse, brings into focus how it is that 
in Dante’s poem the only way for the pilgrim to understand theology, to 
reach the face of God, is through the person-to-person relationship he has 
with his beloved. Only in and through love of a particular person can he 
understand the requirement upon him, as a creature of a Creator, to take 
up his proper place in God’s universal order.
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CHAPTER I 
The Person of the Theologian 
  
 
1. Personhood in the Commedia  
  
The panoply of characters that Dante-personaggio meets on his journey in 
the afterlife already calls attention to the poet’s considerable interest in 
individual stories. This much is obvious even as we ask what the 
representation of these individual characters reveals about the importance 
which Dante attaches to the concept of personhood itself. Personhood 
might be a tricky concept, no doubt meaning something different to Dante 
from how we understand it today. My reading of personhood in Dante is 
theoretically framed, to be sure, but it takes Gadamer’s optimism about 
understanding the historic horizons of the past seriously, and is thus an 
attempt to capture and distil something about human beings which Dante 
presents in his work, even though the term may not have been one which 
he would have used. Thus I begin, below, with a brief look at some of the 
features of persons-in-general in the Commedia, as an entry point for 
looking at the person of the theologian more specifically. 
 
As is well known, many of the individual persons found in the Commedia—
those who take part in the narrative action of the poem, or speak with the 
pilgrim directly—are named individuals, even when they are relatively 
minor characters. At times we are left to work out who the characters are 
by description alone, but in many cases, this naming is performed by the 
character themselves. For example (and chosen with a certain degree of 
randomness), Ciacco, the glutton who the pilgrim comes across in Inferno 
VI, refers to himself thus, at line 52: ‘Voi cittadini mi chiamaste Ciacco’, 
possibly suggesting a porcine nickname; Sapia, the envious soul, at 
Purgatorio XIII, 109, says, ‘Savia non fui, avvegna che Sapìa fossi chiamata’; 
and, with one of the shortest narrated lives in the Commedia, Pia, at 
Purgatorio V, 133, says, ‘Ricorditi di me, che son la Pia’; finally, Folco at 
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Paradiso IX, 94: ‘Folco mi disse quella gente a cui fu noto il nome mio’. 
Naming, then, is important, and for the souls themselves it remains 
important, even in the afterlife. This is the first feature of personhood 
found in the Commedia which I want to suggest is deliberately 
foregrounded by Dante, and it is a theme to which I return throughout this 
study, but especially in the last chapter. Below, these four characters will 
further illustrate, through a very brief sketch, some other features of 
personhood through which Dante constructs his characters, and which I 
propose in the short philosophical discussion below, will provide a way of 
understanding the person of the theologian in a way that is capable of 
yielding a deeper understanding of theological truths themselves. But first, 
I return to persons-in general. 
 
The characters in the Commedia are immaterial souls and, following the 
orthodox view, will not be reunited with their bodies until after the Last 
Judgement.1 But, as we know, they are ‘embodied’ in a peculiar way 
throughout the poem and are obviously different from the living body of 
Dante-personaggio, to whom some respond with anger or confusion—as at 
Purgatorio V. 25-34, when the singing shades are almost stunned to silence, 
and yet this difference is not spelled out until Statius explains the nature of 
aerial bodies in Purgatorio XXV. So when we meet Ciacco in Inferno VI, and 
Dante-personaggio and Virgil walk over the bodies of the gluttons, from line 
34, the corporeality of the shades is emphasised, not least by reference to 
the soles of the feet of the pilgrim and his guide:  
 
Noi passavam su per l'ombre che adona 
la greve pioggia, e ponavam le piante 
sovra lor vanità che par persona. 
 
Inferno VI, 34-36 
                                                 
1 For discussions about the state of Dante’s bodies in the afterlife, see:  Gragnolati 
Experiencing the Afterlife; ‘Nostalgia in Heaven’; Jacoff, ‘“Our Bodies, Our Selves”’. 
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The shades seem like persons to the pilgrim and even though their ‘vanità’ 
speaks of a kind of absence, it is a moral absence and not a corporeal one. A 
strong sense of the shades’ bodies is crucial throughout the poem because 
bodies are not merely the site or the cause of sin for Dante: bodies are 
essential, along with souls, for constituting persons. This can be true even 
if, in one’s metaphysics, souls are ontologically prior to bodies. And 
without their aerial bodies, souls in the afterlife would be unable to 
communicate with the pilgrim, having neither sense organs nor the 
capability to converse with him through language.2 Although this might 
seem an obvious point, it has deep significance for discussions about how 
persons are individuated and recognised, how they conceive of themselves 
and their histories through memory, and, crucially, how they come into 
communion with each other. Virgil’s prompt to Dante-personaggio at Inferno 
VI, 106-08 to remember his Aristotle, shows us that the poet believes a fully 
embodied soul, after the Last Judgement, is more perfect than any other. 
 
So, with their strange aerial bodies the souls throughout the Commedia can 
take on characteristics which are recognisably earthly in their humanity. 
Sapia recounts her memories to the pilgrim through a haughty language 
which one suspects was the same on Earth. Language is personal and 
powerful here and it is memory and language, hand in hand, that enable 
Sapia to narrate her life and reconstruct a person which she claims as her 
self: 
 
 
Eran li cittadin miei presso a Colle 
in campo giunti co' loro avversari, 
e io pregava Iddio di quel ch'e' volle. […] 
E cheggioti, per quel che tu più brami, 
se mai calchi la terra di Toscana, 
che a' miei propinqui tu ben mi rinfami. 
Tu li vedrai tra quella gente vana 
                                                 
2 An exception to this rule would be the souls who make up the eagle of Paradiso 
XVIII-XX. 
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che spera in Talamone, e perderagli 
più di speranza ch'a trovar la Diana 
ma più vi perderanno li ammiragli. 
 
Purgatorio XIII, 115-17 and 148-54 
 
There is much to notice here, just in this one brief example, which must 
stand for now for other characters throughout the Commedia: firstly, that 
memories are constitutive of who a person thinks they are; secondly, that 
language is essential in understanding that person, forming part of their 
individual particularity and making possible a narrative about their life 
and enabling social interaction. Further, Sapia’s memories of her life are 
spoken in such a way that she defines herself by and through the 
relationships she had with civic and familial entities. So important are these 
relationships, even many years after her death, that she entreats the pilgrim 
to restore her reputation to her family when he returns to Earth. That 
persons, for Dante, are defined—and define themselves—in relation to 
others will be a recurring theme in this study. 
 
Pia, like Sapia, wants to be remembered on Earth, and turning to her 
example now, I show that Dante’s persons, even when they appear for just 
a few lines, are characterised, in addition to the attributes I sketched above, 
by their values and commitments. Says Pia, of her ‘unmaking’—a reference 
to her violent death at the hands of her husband: 
 
Siena mi fé, disfecemi Maremma: 
salsi colui che 'nnanellata pria 
disposando m'avea con la sua gemma. 
 
   Purgatorio V, 134-6 
Pia’s poignant narration of her life retains within it her absolute 
commitment to the sacrament of marriage. Her quiet judgement of her 
husband’s treachery makes him in her words the very opposite of the 
Creator. Such words may well be surprising for a person treated so 
terribly—there are no words of anger of a wronged wife, or of a creature 
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abandoned by her God—and so they speak of the values and commitments 
that Pia must have held when she was still living. And of course, it is these 
values and commitments which fundamentally structure the entire poem. 
That the whole edifice of Hell and Purgatory is built around the literal 
stratification of sin, vice and virtue means that it is impossible to view any 
of the characters within the poem unless from a perspective which calls in 
to question their values. These values not only tether these persons to a 
geographical location within the architectonic of the afterlife, as Dante 
describes it, but they are visible in the persons themselves through their 
actions and their words.   
 
A person’s values and commitments only become concretised when 
activated by will and desire. Folco’s desire—according  to him, a sexual 
desire which burned more than Dido’s—was renounced in old age by his 
own free will on Earth, and now in Heaven this desire has been 
transformed by something which beautifies. Will and desire can be seen 
throughout the poem, not least in the character of Dante-personaggio 
himself, as fundamental mental categories which constitute personhood. 
That free will is central to Dante’s conception of personhood does not 
differentiate him from many other Christian medieval thinkers. Indeed, it 
secures for him an orthodox position within the Christian tradition. 
Humans must take responsibility for their own actions and their own sins 
and, as Dante says in the voice of Marco Lombardo in Purgatorio XVI, 82-83, 
‘se ’l mondo presente disvia,|in voi è la cagione, in voi si cheggia’. 
 
Christian Moevs makes the point concisely: humans have the capability to 
recognise in themselves their absolute freedom from being in the power of 
any other thing. This freedom rains down directly from the Empyrean. The 
possibility that souls have for understanding themselves as free is drawn 
out by Statius in his speech on generation when the soul ‘sé in sé rigira’ 
(Purgatorio XXV, 75). Such self-knowledge, says Moevs, is the ‘power to 
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know all things as itself as (one with) the ground of all things’.3 And 
further, that ‘it is essential to realize that no matter what one’s […] 
characteristics and character may be, they in no way preclude the human 
soul from coming to self-knowledge’.4 
 
Such inwardness, self-knowledge, is at the centre of Dante’s vision for how 
as creatures we can understand ourselves in relation to God. In Dante’s 
poem, this inwardness takes on a particularly Augustinian character.5 It is a 
knowledge which will illuminate the reality of our own existence as 
persons, unaffected by our particular characters, values or physical make-
up. It is a failure of the will, and of the intellect, to see this clearly, and a 
failure which means sin will remain a barrier which keeps the human soul 
separate from participation in God, eternally. Both Dante-personaggio and 
Folco clearly show that Dante’s persons are defined, and define themselves 
in relation not only to their families and their civic ties, but to God. The 
entire cast of characters of the Commedia, sinners and redeemed alike, orient 
themselves either explicitly or implicitly towards or away from God, 
through their gestures, postures, words and actions. These souls retain 
their earthy personhoods: recognisably human in their ‘bodies’, with 
language and memory, with narratives to tell, top-full of values and desire, 
with a more or less imperfect understanding of what it means to be a 
human creature, dependent on God.  
 
What of these persons, then? What do they tell us about Dante’s priorities 
when it comes to understanding human beings and ourselves? It is a 
question which strongly connects the ontology of persons with the realm of 
moral action. Dante represents saved souls not as disembodied, pure 
                                                 
3 Moevs, Metaphysics, p. 127. 
4 Moevs, Metaphysics, p. 128. 
5 For a challenge to the view that Augustine’s account of conversion was centred 
on inwardness, see D. Aers, Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland and Fourteenth-
Century Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009). 
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intellect, able to leave behind their earthly identities to take up a place in a 
homogenous beatified order. They remain particular individuals with 
histories, memories, language, values and desires who are part of a 
community with which they interact. In the heavenly rose they each have 
their own place, a specific seat which is theirs alone. Even though the guilt 
associated with the memory of sin is now faded since the cleansing waters 
of the Lethe, these characters know who they are and can tell their 
particular stories. Folco can smile at the power that brought about his 
redemption, and does not worry about the sin which ‘a mente non torna’ 
(Paradiso IX, 104). But he knows what that sin was, and the part that it 
played in his own history, which forms part of his own self-conception.6 
 
This concrete filling-in of personhood enfolds within it a strong moral 
sense which takes as its starting position an individual’s particularity 
before God. Although this particularity might be so for the moral 
anthropology of all types of Christian—individuals must repent for their 
own sins, and nobody else’s—on this account, souls do not gain their 
perfection through divesting themselves of their bodies on their ascent 
towards truth: a Neoplatonic view this is not. That the soul is ontologically 
prior to the body does not mean that a full sense of personhood cannot 
include both body and soul: it is, to be sure, the intellect which looks to 
itself for understanding, but it is the body too which exists as part of 
humanity’s excellence and reflects in it something divine. Much closer, 
then, unsurprisingly, is Dante to the Aristotelian account of persons who 
can gain in excellence through the exercise and habituation of certain 
positive traits and the suppression of negative ones. Of course, this type of 
practice is acted out explicitly on the mountain of Purgatory, the realm in 
which shades can understand their moral position and do something to 
improve themselves. This understanding is furnished through both 
                                                 
6 In Chapter III, I suggest a way in which the waters of the Eunoë and Lethe might 
be problematic for Dante’s conception of paradisiacal personhood. 
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physical processes, for example, carrying heavy weights, or experiencing 
the sensation of hunger; and through psychological ones, in hearing and 
telling stories of damaging vices. 
 
Dante’s and Aristotle’s notion of perfection here is different, of course: the 
end to which Dante’s shades are heading in Purgatory is to become 
oriented in a proper way to God in order to be able to praise him, 
unhampered by vice. Like Aristotle, whose goal was to produce a well-
functioning community with members who had a shared object in 
eudaimonia, Dante’s community is one of harmony in paradise. This is, 
admittedly, a caricature of Aristotle’s moral theory, but it serves to remind 
us of the centrality of moral character and its necessity in the pursuit of the 
Good. Modern-day philosophers, Aristotelian in spirit, can help us further 
make sense of Dante’s persons. In the late twentieth century, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, building on strong Aristotelian foundations, famously 
constructed a conception of the Good which was able, in his view, to order 
the moral virtues within it. It was a picture of a self enmeshed in time, in 
community, inhabiting particular roles, and able to conceive of itself on a 
journey, telling its story in an attempt to light its way ahead and provide 
self-understanding. MacIntyre asks:  
 
In what does the unity of an individual life consist? [...] The unity of 
a human life is the unity of a narrative quest […] A quest is always 
an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in 
self-knowledge.7  
 
Understanding the ‘unity of a human life’ in this way, the individual 
person can come to know themselves better, and can come to see which 
virtues it will take to better enable their quest, and better understand the 
object of that quest itself. Charles Taylor agrees with MacIntyre that the 
                                                 
7 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 
1985), p. 219. 
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role of narrative is integral to how personhood is constituted. He fleshes 
out the possibilities that it provides even further: 
 
[N]arrative must play a bigger role […] what I am has to be 
understood as what I have become. [This] is inescapably so for the 
issue of where I am in moral space. I can’t know in a flash that I 
have attained perfection, or am halfway there. Of course, there are 
experiences in which we are carried away in rapture and may 
believe ourselves spoken to by angels; or less exaltedly, in which we 
sense for a minute the incredible fullness and intense meaning of 
life […] But there is always an issue of what to make of these 
instants […] how genuinely they reflect real growth or goodness. 
We can only answer this question by seeing how they fit into our 
surrounding life, that is, what part they play in a narrative of this 
life. We have to move forward and back to make a real assessment.8 
 
Both these accounts of personhood retreat from certain existentialist ideas 
of the self that regard narrative as distinctive of art alone, and not of 
human lives. Sartre, no doubt, would consider the move a hugely 
backward step.9 No matter: these re-formulations of an essentially 
Aristotelian schema can help us throw light on what Dante prioritises in his 
account of persons. This may sound like a topsy-turvy approach, because 
these accounts themselves are, in turn, informed by centuries of Christian 
stories and Christian art—most likely, including Dante himself—and are a 
response in part to secularism’s growing dominance by two avowedly 
Catholic philosophers. But I suggest that it is an approach which will yield 
results for understanding what is going on in the Commedia. Dante-
personaggio is undoubtedly on a quest which involves a development in 
                                                 
8 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 48. 
9 For accounts of personhood in the philosophical literature which engage with 
these debates, see: P. Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion and the Mind 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M.C. Nussbaum, Love’s 
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986); J. D. Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1973). 
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self-understanding as well as growing realisation about the ultimate aims 
of that quest. As a narrated journey, the poem is about how a person can 
come to know how he stands in relation to God. It is a story about learning 
what God is, and how to think about God and what the self is in relation to 
God; it is transformative in the sense that the individual must learn how to 
transform himself—how to orient himself to God, and how to re-order his 
values, desires and will—and be transformed by the power and the mystery 
of God, in order to take up his proper place in the universe.  
 
What does this brief sojourn into some contemporary debates about 
personhood and our discussion of Dante’s persons-in-general, tell us about 
the person of the theologian in the Commedia? It reminds us that the 
theologians and the theological positions which they might espouse are 
subsumed within a narrative that contains personal encounters between 
the pilgrim and other human persons. Theology is not represented as a 
series of treatises on doctrine, or as enfolded within a particular practice, 
but as embodied in the narrative poetry of fictional characters with whom 
Dante-personaggio can meet face-to-face and begin to understand as 
instances of God’s creative power. In the cases where the theologians do 
not appear explicitly, or have direct contact with Dante-personaggio, we can 
find traces of them and their works in the text itself and see that the 
narrator of the poem and its author remain in dialogue with those persons 
and ideas.  
 
Beyond the poem, too, we can use Dante’s understanding of persons to 
frame our questions about the real theologians as they were encountered in 
Florence in Dante’s time. This will require us to confront the long and 
distinguished debate which considers Dante’s theology as poetry, and 
poetry as theology, and perhaps offers new ways of thinking about both of 
those practices. One difference between the two, relevant to the over-
arching concerns of this project as a whole, connects our question of 
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personhood back to theology and to poetry. We have seen that the 
characters that make up the Commedia are drawn in such a way that a 
particular view of personhood emerges. But the concept of personhood has 
repercussion that move beyond the fictional characters themselves: it arises 
again in the relations between theologian or poet, reader and God. The 
relations will be different in poetry and theology, and in each individual 
text, but we start from the very simple position that reading theology and 
reading poetry are two different activities—or, at least, had been until 
Dante was writing—with different sets of relations between author, 
narrator, reader and God. 
 
The concept of personhood within theological texts, as well as in poetry, 
can thus be found within the wider Florentine context, where questions 
about individual theologians—how these persons were perceived and 
understood—remain operative. There are questions to be asked about 
reading personhood into the author of the text; the person of the narratorial 
voice, as it appears; the person who is addressed specifically in the subject 
of the text—the person before God, shall we say; the person of the reader; 
the personhood of God himself.  The relations between these persons are 
ripe for interpretation, because the relations themselves tell us much about 
theology and its perceived possibilities at any particular historical moment.  
 
Foucault famously considered some of these relations, and the hermeneutic 
pitfalls to which they give rise, in his essay, ‘What is an author?’. We do 
well to remember his lesson, particularly when we consider how it is 
inevitably our own psychological ‘projections’ that we might read into 
Dante’s texts. 
 
The third point concerning this ‘author-function’ is that it is not 
formed spontaneously through the simple attribution of a discourse 
to an individual. It results from a complex operation whose purpose 
is to construct the rational entity we call an author. Undoubtedly, this 
construction is assigned a ‘realistic’ dimension as we speak of an 
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individual's ‘profundity’ or ‘creative’ power, his intentions or the 
original inspiration manifested in writing. Nevertheless, these aspects 
of an individual, which we designate as an author (or which 
comprise an individual as an author), are projections, in terms always 
more or less psychological, of our way of handling texts: in the 
comparisons we make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the 
continuities we assign, or the exclusions we practice. In addition, all 
these operations vary according to the period and the form of 
discourse concerned. A ‘philosopher’ and a ‘poet’ are not constructed 
in the same manner; and the author of an eighteenth-century novel 
was formed differently from the modern novelist.10   
 
Our ‘way of handling texts’, when it come to Dante’s poem and the works 
of the theologians that this thesis considers, is inevitably determined by our 
own particular psychologies and the physical, temporal and cultural 
context which we inhabit. As I suggested in the Introduction, there is no 
way of perceiving what effect these may have. Even so, we are able to 
detect that Dante’s poetry plays with the nexus of relations (between 
reader, narrator, author, God) to which it gives rise—and may even seek to 
undermine their interpretation, ultimately. But our initial starting position 
is this: that the theologian as author, the historical person who takes up his 
pen, stands in relation to God, in the first instance, in a peculiar role: he 
takes on his shoulders a putative responsibility to God which places on him 
some kind of burden—whether to explain, to describe, to account for or to 
interpret, or even to become the scriba Dei—whereas there is no prima facie 
corresponding responsibility on the poet, even though he may well be 
devout, or deal in God-speak, or discuss the nature of truth—or, indeed, 
claim for himself the same salvific, rehabilitative or didactic commission.11 
 
                                                 
10 See M. Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ trans. by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry 
Simon, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by 
Michel Foucault ed. by D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1977), pp. 113-38 (p.127). 
11 For a book-length discussion of the creation of Dante’s authority, see Ascoli, 
Dante and the Making of a Modern Author. 
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Augustine says in the first lines of De civitate Dei that the book is a 
fulfilment of a promise which he had taken upon himself to write: 
Augustine cannot refrain from speaking and must relay his message to a 
world in peril.12 The weight of responsibility of this narrator is clear: both to 
God and to his readers. Gregory, too, in his epistle to Bishop Leander at the 
start of the Moralia, speaks of the responsibility he feels towards his 
readers, saying that whoever speaks about God must be careful to search 
out thoroughly that which furnishes moral instruction in their hearers.13 
We can see, even in these two very brief examples, that the author sets up 
and comments upon his relationship with God and with the reader. In 
doing so, he starts to create for himself an authoritative, authorial voice 
which speaks of the serious responsibility resting on his shoulders—but 
one which is sanctioned directly by God, and which is undertaken carefully 
and thoroughly to address the moral needs of his audience.  
 
I suggest there are two ways in which the transmission of a theologian’s 
personhood is important for Dante: firstly, because it provides a model in 
which theological authority is constructed, a model which Dante might 
adopt or reject, as we shall see below in Chapters II-IV. How Dante 
constructs an authority for his own work will form an essential strand in 
this study; it will by necessity include a consideration of how the poetic 
form must be different from the form of the theological treatise. This mode 
of thinking about personhood is structural: it provides a means for Dante to 
build an authority for himself which is not based on any particular way-of-
being, so to speak. The second reason why the transmission of the 
theologians’ personhood is important for Dante is because such accounts 
provide rich resources for understanding the qualitative nature of 
personhood itself: the virtues which a person might embody, the particular 
values to which a person might be committed, and how a person might 
                                                 
12 Augustine, De Civitate Dei, I. 
13 Gregory, Moralia, Ep. Ded. II. 
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conceive of themselves, in relation to these virtues and commitments, and 
in relation to others—and God.  
 
These two ways in which Dante reads the personhood of the theologians in 
this study, both structural and qualitative, will be necessary if we are to 
reach a deeper understanding of how Dante interprets them through their 
presence in late-medieval Italy, and how he then recreates them as 
characters (or not) within his own poem. Chapters II-IV will explore the 
features of personhood that Dante prioritises and how a consideration of 
the theologians can bring these into focus. Ultimately, these aspects of 
personhood in their different ways, will be essential in understanding how 
Dante thinks, as humans, we can approach the divine. But I begin, below, 
by considering the theologians with whom Dante would have been 
acquainted in Florence, and how their authority was communicated, and 
their personhood was transmitted, by their texts and by other means. 
 
2. The Theologians in Florence  
This section summarises, briefly, some of the ways in which Augustine, 
Gregory, Bernard and Aquinas were present in Florence during the late 
thirteenth century. Reconstructing the religious and cultural milieu of so 
distant a time and place has its difficulties, as I alluded to in the 
Introduction, but my purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive or 
definitive account of the Florentine context but to give a taste of the type of 
texts, practices, sights, and sounds that might inform an individual’s 
knowledge of the figures of the four theologians and their works. Dante 
records details of his own learning in Convivio II, xii, 7, when he says he 
attended, ‘le scuole de li religiosi e […] le disputazioni de li filosofanti’.14 
How thoroughgoing and systematic was his education within the walls of 
the convents remains unknowable.15 The library archives and the city itself 
                                                 
14 See Pegoretti, ‘Filosofanti’, especially p. 37. 
15 Indeed, as I highlight below, whether one could, strictly speaking, call it an 
‘education’ is still a matter of debate. 
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retain, today, some of the material culture of medieval Florence, which is of 
course tangible and visible; but less easy to grasp is the influence, or depth 
of penetration, of the theological ideas for which these four theologians are 
known, and further, to what extent a sense of their personhood was 
communicated alongside the transmission of their ideas. What we read into 
their texts now need not be the same—indeed, will almost certainly not be 
the same—as that which a medieval reader saw. Botterill’s attempt to read 
the Commedia at first sight as a contemporary of Dante’s is almost bound to 
fail and in ways which we cannot know. 
 
2.1 Texts and libraries 
Many of the canonical texts of the theologians were found in the convent 
libraries; by the end of the thirteenth century the houses of the mendicant 
orders in Florence had begun gathering biblical, philosophical and 
theological manuscripts. The library at Santo Spirito was likely the oldest of 
these, but according to Charles T. Davis, almost nothing is known about 
what it contained, or the teaching and reading habits of the friars, let alone 
whether the convent was accessible to an educated layman like Dante.16 Its 
existence can only be dated to the late thirteenth century because Santo 
Spirito was designated a studium generale in 1287, and so would have had, 
by necessity, an armarium and a scriptor.17  There is no surviving catalogue 
from Dante’s lifetime, although later catalogues show a picture which is 
congruent with our understanding of the Augustinian order: texts from 
their putative founder, together with those of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of 
Rome, his disciple, and ostensible intellectual leader of the order.  
 
                                                 
16 Davis, ‘Education in Dante’s Florence’, p. 420. 
17 D. Gutierrez, ‘La biblioteca di Santo Spirito in Firenze,’ Analecta Augustiniana, 
xxv (1962), 5-88 (p.6). 
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Of Santa Maria Novella and Santa Croce we know considerably more.18 
Recent work by Nicolò Maldina and Anna Pegoretti has revealed the ways 
in which manuscripts were housed, borrowed and read.19 Pegoretti, in 
particular, has done useful work on the borrowing practices of the friars, 
and the use of the nota di possesso—showing in whose keeping a particular 
codex might have been placed (a practice, in fact, which might well have 
precluded Dante from seeing a particular manuscript at all).20  
 
In Santa Maria Novella, then, at the end of the thirteenth century, we have 
evidence that the following of Augustine’s works were housed in the 
library: the Enarrationes in psalmos;21 De Doctrina Christiana; 22 De poenitentia 
(which has a disputed authorship);23 De corpora Domini24 and the Regula.25 In 
Santa Croce, a manuscript contained De Civitate Dei and De Trinitate (in a 
tabulated format, which is suggestive of the way in which it was put to 
                                                 
18 On the Franciscan and Dominican libraries, see: G. Brunetti and S. Gentili,‘Una 
biblioteca nella Firenze di Dante: i manoscritti di Santa Croce’, in Testimoni del vero. 
Su alcuni libri in biblioteche d’autore, ed. by E. Russo, in Studi (e testi) italiani, 6 (2000), 
21–55; Gabriella Pomaro, ‘Censimento dei manoscritti della biblioteca di S. Maria 
Novella’, in S. Maria Novella. Un convento nella citta. Studi e fonti. VII centenario della 
fondazione di S. Maria Novella in Firenze, 1279–1979, 2 vols (Pistoia: Provincia 
Romana Frati Predicatori, 1980), ii, pp. 325–70.  
19 See N. Maldina and A. Pegoretti and the outputs of the University of Leeds/ 
Warwick University AHRC project, Dante and Late Medieval Florence: Theology 
in Poetry, Practice and Society’. 
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/125117/dante_and_late_medieval_florence. 
20 On this practice more generally in the order, see Neslihan Senocak, ‘Circulation 
of Books in the Medieval Franciscan Order: Attitude, Methods, and Critics’, The 
Journal of Religious History, 28 (2004), 146–61. 
21 BML, Conv. soppr. 555; BML, Conv. soppr. 553. 
22 BNC, Conv. soppr. F.3.1126.  
23 BNC, Conv. soppr. F.3.1126. 
24 BNC, Conv. soppr. F.3.1126. 
25 BNC, Conv. soppr. G.3.451.  
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use—and perhaps often so—by the friars);26 Letter 148 to Fortunatianus;27 
the Sermons;28 and the Confessions.29 
 
The works of the other theologians in this study were also represented in 
the studia: we know that of Gregory’s texts, for example, the following were 
found in Santa Croce at the end of the thirteenth century:30 a collection of 
Excerpta, Dicta, Sententiae, Auctoritates;31 two copies of Moralia in Iob (one of 
them tabulated);32and the Homiliae in Evangelia.33 At Santa Maria Novella 
were more Excerpta, Dicta, Sententiae, Auctoritates; expositions on the 
canticles;34 plus two copies of the Moralia, one of which was tabulated.35  
 
Of the works of Thomas Aquinas, the Franciscans had copies in their 
library of the Summa theologiae;36 the commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics, de 
Anima, and the pseudo-Aristotelian de Causis.37 The Dominicans also 
                                                 
26 BML Pl. XX dext. 10.  
27 BML Pl. XXIII dext. 3. Letter 148 is interesting because it deals with a dispute 
over the meaning of the possibility of seeing God ‘face-to-face’, either in this life or 
the next. The letter is peace-making in its tone but unapologetic for its insistence on 
the fact that, given the Creator’s essential nature, humans will only ever be able 
‘see’ God with ‘spiritual eyes’, following the teachings of Ambrose and Jerome. It 
also dispenses with any false notion of anthropomorphism in as swift a way as 
Beatrice’s lesson on scripture’s ‘condescension’ at Paradiso IV, 44-5. 
28 BML Pl. XVIII dext.5. 
29 BML Pl. XIX dext.10. 
30 This research is based on the work of Anna Pegoretti, as part of the Leeds/ 
Warwick University AHRC project, ‘Dante and Late Medieval Florence: Theology 
in Poetry, Practice and Society’. Many thanks to Anna for sharing her work with 
me prior to its publication. There are many more of Gregory’s works, and some of 
Bernard’s, too, which cannot be accurately dated as being within the library at that 
time. Of those works which entered the library at an unknown date, Gregory’s 
included: BML Pl. XIX dext.6; BML Pl. XX dext. 9; BML Pl. XX dext. 1; BML Pl. XX 
dext. 2; BML Pl. XX dext. 4; BML Pl. XX dext.5; BML Pl. XX dext.11; BML Pl. XX 
dext.12. 
31 BML Pl. XVIII dext.8. 
32 BML Pl. XIX dext.2; BML Pl. XX dext.10. 
33 BML Pl. XIX dext.5. 
34 BML, Conv. soppr. 387. 
35 Biblioteca Riccardiana 817. 
36 BML Pl. XXIX dext. 3. 
37 BML Pl. XXIX dext. 10. 
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housed Thomas’s works in Santa Maria Novella, as one would expect, of 
course, but the evidence that we have shows that the number of texts 
during Dante’s time is rather sparse: another (tabulated) commentary on 
the Ethics38 and a copy of the Summa contra Gentiles.39 This is somewhat 
surprising, as Davis notes; he points to evidence from a later catalogue 
(Sardi’s of 1489) that shows at least one hundred manuscripts of Aquinas’s 
works, including many of his commentaries on Aristotle.40  
 
Bernard’s works, unsurprisingly, given the mystical-affective tradition with 
which the Franciscans were in sympathy, are well-represented at Santa 
Croce: De Conversione; two hundred and fifty-eight of his letters; the 
Sermones de diversis; Sermones per annum and the Vita Prima were all 
contained within one codex which seems to have been dedicated almost 
entirely to the Abbot of Clairvaux: his works, his life and his canonisation.41 
Further, a work named De tribus osculis, taken from his sermons, was 
                                                 
38 Biblioteca Riccardiana 817.  
39 BML, Conv. Soppr. 614. 
40 Davis, ‘The Florentine Studia’, p. 357. On the studia, see also, ‘The Early 
Collection of Books of S. Croce in Florence’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, 107 (1963), 399–414. 
41 BML Pl. XXI dext. 1. The biography of Bernard found in Santa Croce, the Vita 
Prima, was begun during Bernard’s own lifetime, and was authored by three 
different monks who knew him. Adriaan Bredero makes a strong case that the Vita 
should be read as cult-making hagiography, given the fact the Cistercians were 
desperate to get one of their number canonised. His argument is compelling when 
considering that the second edition of the Vita Prima was heavily redacted for re-
submission to the Curia after the Cistercians’ first request for Bernard’s 
canonisation was rejected. The fact that the Vita was primarily intended as 
evidence for Bernard’s saintliness is important when considering what type of 
character emerges from it. Even though it was written by his contemporaries, who 
knew much about his life and works, the authors of the Vita, and above all the final 
editor, Geoffrey, Bernard’s secretary, present a life that leaves out as much as it 
includes. For example, it is silent about much of Bernard’s involvement with the 
crusades. In fact, the tenor of the Vita is much less political than Bernard himself 
must have been, given the evidence that his own letters provide. What the Vita 
does attempt to show is that even before his birth there were reasons to suspect 
that Bernard was destined for sainthood, or at the very least, a career as an 
important preacher. The story of his mother’s vision whilst pregnant—that she was 
bearing a barking dog—is recorded as evidence that Bernard’s voice would 
provide a clarion call to the unconverted. See Bredero, Bernard of Clairvaux. 
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housed in Santa Croce.42 In Santa Maria Novella, Bernard’s texts are almost 
entirely absent, apart from some of his letters.43 A later catalogue from the 
second half of the fourteenth century, shows that his Sermones super Cantica 
canticorum were present, but when these were first acquired by the library 
cannot, now, be accurately estimated. 
 
These are the works that are recorded in the catalogues that are available to 
us today, but a definitive list of all manuscripts in a particular library at 
any one time is impossible to compile accurately. What this aggregation of 
facts and figures means for Dante studies remains a contested issue: 
 
The time has come for us as a community of scholars to converge 
around certain points which even if hypotheses, in light of the 
historical and textual evidence currently available, seem difficult to 
challenge: Dante is not alluding to Bologna in Convivio II. xii; he did 
not spend time reading in the Florentine mendicant libraries; 
indeed, to term these ‘libraries’ is a misnomer, since what we are 
actually talking about are books for the friars’ exclusive use that 
were kept in cells and armaria and not in monastic libraries; Dante’s 
knowledge of Aristotle before the exile was extremely restricted […] 
How we then use such historically and textually validated 
conclusions in our own work will of course be a matter of personal 
choice. What we should not do is cling to positions that, in light of 
the best available evidence, have been demonstrated to be 
unsatisfactory.44 
 
Barański is right to be concerned about the misuse of the contextual 
information that we have at our disposal. To reiterate the point I made in 
the Introduction, my aim is not to make any naïve claims about causal links 
between a particular manuscript in a library and Dante’s use of a particular 
theologian’s works or ideas. The point of this brief sketch of the literary, 
theological landscape of Florence, including the holdings of the ‘libraries’, 
is to give a sense of the intellectual milieu of late-medieval Florence and the 
                                                 
42 BML Pl. XXII dext. 7. 
43 BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.1.695.  
44 Z. G. Barański, ‘On Dante’s Trail’, Italian Studies, 72.i (2017) 1-15 (pp.14-15). 
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currency which each of the theologians might have retained. For now, I 
suggest, we can gain some idea of the relative importance of these texts 
given their number, and also because they contain within their fabric ways 
for understanding how the friars might have classified or prioritised 
particular aspects of the theologians’ works: through, for example, the use 
of tables and summaries. An idea of when an item in the library was 
borrowed and in whose possession a codex was kept gives further, if only 
suggestive, evidence of the transmission and penetration of a theologian’s 
works. It should also be noted here that there may well have been other 
sources either in the convent itself, or, indeed, elsewhere in the city—in 
private libraries and collections—which we cannot now trace but which 
would no doubt expand on this necessarily partial account. 
 
2.2. Teaching and preaching in Florence 
Beyond these works in the libraries, the lessons and sermons of the teachers 
and preachers in Florence at the end of the thirteenth century can help to 
illuminate the ways in which some of the theologians’ texts may have been 
put to use: here I only have space to gesture towards the educational 
programmes of the studia and of the sermons of the clergy and itinerant 
mendicant preachers.45 The careers of some of these teachers, such as 
Remigio de’ Girolami, and preacher-theologians, such as Giordano da Pisa, 
Joachim of Fiore, Peter John Olivi and Ubertino da Casale, are relatively 
familiar in the context of Dante’s Florence. Others, such as the Franciscan 
Servasanto da Faenza, may be less so, because they have only recently 
begun to be uncovered.46   
                                                 
45 For a general introduction, see D.R. Lesnick, Preaching in Medieval Florence 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012).  
46 On Olivi and Dante, see V. Stanley Benfell, ‘Dante, Peter John Olivi and 
Apocalypse’, in Dante and the Franciscans, ed. by Santa Casciani (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
2006), pp. 9–50; Alberto Forni ‘Dialogo tra Dante e il suo maestro. La metamorfosi 
della Lectura super Apocalipsim di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi nella Divina Commedia’, 
Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano, 108 
(2006), 83–122; Marian Michèle Mulchahey ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study …’. 
Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
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We know something of the educational environment at Santa Maria 
Novella, thanks in large part to some of the remaining lectures of their 
long-serving lector and preacher, Remigio de’ Girolami (d. 1319). Charles 
Davis claims that Remigio’s sermons and Prologues, which were lectures 
based mostly on scripture and on Aristotle, must have made use Aquinas’s 
commentaries—commentaries, found, as we saw above, in later catalogues 
of the library at Santa Maria Novella.47 We know that Remigio began 
teaching as early 1273 and continued for forty-two long years. He was 
greatly influenced by Aquinas, and may well have heard Thomas himself 
teach in Paris between 1269 and 1272. 48 The style of academic teaching that 
flourished in Paris and which was emulated throughout European 
universities had at its heart the quaestio format, wherein masters would set 
out the question for debate and interlocutors would, in turn, provide 
responses and replies. The standardised format of the scholastic method 
was, of course, epitomised in writing by Aquinas’s magisterial summae 
themselves. In the studia of Paris and throughout Europe this method 
would be heard daily in the disputations in the classrooms, and twice 
yearly in the more public spaces of the quodlibetal debates, which were open 
to members of the public before Christmas and Easter.49 It is my suggestion 
that even though university curricula had been shaped in the quaestio 
format before Aquinas was in Paris, or had written the summa, by the time 
Remigio was teaching in Florence, Thomas had already come to embody 
and stand for, through the huge influence of his written works, the 
scholastic method.     
                                                 
1998), pp. 384–96. On Servasanto, see Nicolò Maldina’s work as part of the Leeds-
Warwick project referred to above. On Remigio see C.T. Davis, ‘An Early 
Florentine Political Theorist: Fra Remigio de’ Girolami’, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 104, 6, (December 1960), 662-76. 
47 Davis, ‘The Florentine Studia’, p. 357. 
48 See Anto Gavrić, Une métaphysique à l’école de Thomas d’Aquin. Le ‘De modis rerum’ 
de Rémi de Florence (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2006), especially pp. 89–151. 
49 For more on the quodlibetal debates, see, Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in 
the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
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By 1289, Remigio was promoted to the lectorate in the provincial studium at 
Santa Maria Novella (it gained the status of studium generale in the early 
years of the fourteenth century) and he remained a prolific teacher and 
preacher, embodying the spirit of the order’s greatest intellectual master, 
and getting involved, too, with questions of governance of the city.50 
Although there is no single piece of evidence that connects Remigio with 
Dante, placing the poet inside Remigio’s classroom at Santa Maria Novella, 
the fact of their shared intellectual interests, Remigio’s celebrated preaching 
career in Florence, and his involvement in the polity beyond the walls of 
the convent, suggests that a meeting between the two was not unlikely.51 
 
2.3 Religious Orders and Rules 
An additional but important strand of inquiry concerns Augustine’s Regula, 
and how it structured the lives of those living under religious orders in 
Florence. I suggest that the Regula itself helps us to understand a sense of 
how the saint’s personhood was known to a layman in the city, if through a 
rather diffracting lens. 
 
Augustine is named in Convivio IV, xxviii, 9 and Paradiso XXXII, 35 amongst 
the founders of religious orders. For us, this might seem thoroughly 
conventional, but it was an issue pressing in Dante’s time. Even though 
there is some dispute over whether Augustine had established a religious 
monastic community as such, several of his texts—and in particular Letter 
211 to a community of nuns—were later taken as the blueprint for what 
would become the Augustinian Rule in major fraternities, specifically, the 
Augustinians, the Canons Regular, and the Dominicans. The Grand Union 
                                                 
50 M. M. Mulchaney, ‘Education in Dante’s Florence Revisited’, in Begley and 
Koterski (eds), Medieval Education, pp. 143-81. 
51 Davis says: ‘The Florentine government referred to [Remigio] as ‘prothorethore’ 
and as ‘foremost father of our university’. This last title is the best evidence that the 
studium of S Maria Novella was open to laymen; otherwise it is difficult to see why 
it should have been called ‘our university’, ‘Education in Dante’s Florence’, p. 430. 
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of 1256 had established the Order of Hermits of St Augustine (in Florence, 
they were housed at Santo Spirito) out of a number of heterogeneous 
groups who had no real common ground or vocation: some were hermits, 
some preachers, some shared property in common. So the union brought 
together a miscellaneous collection which needed some uniformity and 
unity for its own survival, a uniformity provided by the adoption of the 
Regula. From 1274 and the Second Council of Lyons, the Augustinians were 
required to prove their own legitimacy, but in 1298, Boniface VIII 
confirmed the Augustinians’ right to existence by overruling Lyons. 
 
Through stories of Augustine’s life and works, primarily through readings 
of Possidius’s Vita, Philip of Harvengt’s Legenda famosa, and chapter 120 on 
Augustine in Jacobus da Voragine’s Legenda Aurea, the Augustinians began 
to create stories of their own foundational heritage, centred squarely on 
making (spurious) claims about Augustine himself having established a 
distinct religious order (and some stories even claimed that he came to 
Tuscany after his baptism). These attempts brought the Hermits into 
tension with their opposite numbers in the Canons Regular, who were 
attempting a similar trick. The three biographical works, above, foreground 
different aspects of Augustine, and draw attention to different episodes in 
the bishop’s life. Possidius makes no mention of the Regula, but focuses on 
the qualities found in episcopal office; Philip lauds Augustine’s as an 
exemplary canonical life; Jacobus writes hagiography and ignores the 
monastic aspect of Augustine’s career in Hippo.52 Notably, the first 
Augustinian to construct one of these foundational stories was an 
anonymous friar in Santo Spirito, Florence, at some point between 1322 and 
1331.53  In 1287, Santo Spirito had been declared a studium generale and in 
1290, the Florentine general chapter had drawn up its Constitutiones which 
                                                 
52 Saak, High Way to Heaven, pp. 185-86. 
53 See Dunlop and Bourdua, (eds), Art and the Augustinian Order, pp. 1-17 and Saak, 
High Way to Heaven, pp. 185-90. 
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had prescribed the study of theology as central to their mission and, in 
particular, following their great teacher, Giles of Rome (who was himself, 
ironically, a follower of Aquinas).54 
 
The Dominicans in Santa Maria Novella also lived under the Rule of 
Augustine. Dominic had been a member of the Canons Regular who had 
adopted the Regula in the eleventh century, when the Rule of Benedict had 
been replaced. The reason for the Dominicans adopting it seems to have 
been one of pragmatism: the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, explicitly asked 
new fraternities to adopt an existing rule, in order to maintain some control 
over the proliferating mendicant orders. It is thus unsurprising that there is 
a copy of the Regula in the library at Santa Maria Novella in Dante’s time.55  
 
The Regula was derived from several of Augustine’s texts, but from Letter 
211, addressed to a community of nuns, in particular. The scripture at its 
heart is Acts 4: 32, which suggests shared property as a route to unity and a 
peaceful community:  
multitudinis autem credentium erat cor et anima una nec quisquam 
eorum quae possidebant aliquid suum esse dicebat sed erant illis 
omnia communia56 
 
There is thus more than one way in which the presence of the Augustinians 
at Santo Spirito, and the Regula (enacted there and at Santa Maria Novella) 
might have shaped Dante’s perception of Augustine, if in a way that 
diffracts both his texts and his image. Firstly, because of the way in which 
there is a prescribed focus on theological study in the convent studium 
which the friars carried out under Augustine’s name; and secondly because 
the Letter 211 to the quarrelling nuns, and subsequently the Regula on 
which it is based, so emphasises the peace-maker in Augustine, the leader 
                                                 
54 Dunlop and Bourdua, Art and the Augustinians, p. 10. 
55 BNC, Conv. soppr. G.3.451. 
56 ‘And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any 
one say that aught of the things which he possessed, was his own; but all things 
were common unto them.’ 
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of an (eventual) order who calls for unified community. What emerges in 
late-medieval Florence is an image of Augustine as a peace-making monk, 
and a patron of a community engaged in the study of theology—these two 
aspects taking up a position alongside the more familiar images of the 
towering auctor and the interpreter of scripture.    
 
2.4 Architecture, Art, Visual Culture 
The Florence of Dante’s early adulthood was a city of massive architectural 
endeavour.57 Works that were underway during this period included the 
new city walls (1284-1333), the government buildings of the Bargello (1255), 
and Palazzo della Signoria (1299), together with its piazza (1299-1362), and 
further urban space of the piazza around the baptistery (1296). The works 
on the rebuilding of the cathedral of Santa Reparata began in the last 
decade of the Duecento, around 1296, and would ultimately see its 
rededication to Mary in the early fourteenth century. The buildings of the 
great mendicant churches at Santa Maria Novella (begun in the 1270s) and 
at Santa Croce (begun in the 1290s) were also well underway by the turn of 
the century, the latter replacing an earlier Franciscan house.  
 
We have but little information about images, paintings and frescoes 
depicting the four theologians in Florence during this period, but Bernard 
does appear in a portrait which survives today, and which dates from 1300, 
in a Cistercian abbey just outside Florence, at Settimo. It is a painting on 
wood which faces a similar painting of Saint Benedict on the opposite side 
of the chapel. Here, Bernard is facing to the front, dressed in a white habit, 
tonsured and holding a crozier; his name appears in large letters written 
                                                 
57 See A. Marina, ‘Architecture and Urban Space’ in Barański and Pertile (eds), 
Dante in Context, pp. 427-47. 
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vertically on either side of his figure,58 demonstrating the Cistercians’ 
reverence for the erstwhile leader of their order.59  
 
The building of the great ecclesiastical centres of Florence brought about 
commissions for the decoration of the façades of the exteriors, and the 
chapels within. At Santa Reparata, works on the new sculptures and 
mosaics for the façade were designed by Arnolfo di Cambio in a classical 
style. At Santa Maria Novella, the building works of the basilica were 
underway by 1285, when Duccio completed a painting of Gregory 
enthroned in the Bardi chapel (then, in fact, the Chapel of Saint Gregory), 
which belonged, before 1336, to the Compagnia delle Laudi di Santa Maria 
Novella. The paintings in the chapel are now in a very poor state, but the 
image of Gregory can still be made out, between two palm-bearers. The 
size of Gregory’s image mirrors Christ’s, which faces it.60 Duccio’s more 
famous work, the so-called Rucellai Madonna, was also commissioned by 
the laudesi company for this chapel, and there is some debate about where 
the Madonna was sited—some critics have suggested that it was placed on 
the wall between the Saint Gregory and Ruccellai chapels, which are next 
to each other.61 
 
So Dante witnessed the beginnings of an ‘artistic revolution in monumental 
                                                 
58 See J. France, Medieval Images of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (Kalamazoo, MI: 
Cistercian Publications, 2007) p. 248. 
59 The Settimo badia is, like most Cistercian communities, beyond the city’s walls, 
and thus highlights the division between urban and rural monastic lives. However, 
there is evidence that the brothers at Settimo were involved in the fiscal and 
political management of the commune of Florence: from at least the 1250s, the 
friars were entrusted to be treasurers of the city’s financial records. See W. R. Day 
Jr., ‘The Cistercian Monk and the casting counter’ in Churchmen and Urban 
Government in Late Medieval Italy c. 1200-1450, ed. by F. Andrews and M.A. Pincelli 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 251-67 (p. 253). 
60 See L. Bellosi, ‘Il percorso di Duccio’, in Duccio. Alle origini della pittura senese, ed. 
by A. Bagnoli, R. Bartalini, L. Bellosi and M. Laclotte (Cinisello Balsamo (Milan): 
Silvana, 2003), pp. 118–45.  
61 See I. Hueck, ‘La tavola di Duccio e la compagnia delle Laudi di Santa Maria 
Novella’, La Maestà di Duccio restaurata: Gli Uffizi, Studi e Ricerche 6 (Florence: Gli 
Uffizi, 1990), pp. 33-46.  
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painting and sculpture’.62 Cimabue’s huge crucifix for Santa Croce was 
completed by 1288. Giotto’s crucifix was positioned on the rood screen of 
Santa Maria Novella by 1290. Each showed the crucified Christ in a more 
realistic mode, such that his body appeared to be really hanging, 
suspended by nails and tilting forwards, the reality of execution brought 
home for the congregation of worshippers. Giotto’s commission for the 
Saint Francis cycles in the Bardi chapel at Santa Croce in the 1320s, 
continued this evolution in the growing realism of the human figure, which 
he had earlier developed in the frescoes of the Arena Chapel at Padua, 
works which Dante might well have seen. Dante is sensitive to these artistic 
developments as they are happening, of course: the lineage of Giotto and 
Cimabue (and by extension, Duccio) is made explicit in Purgatorio XI, 94-96. 
This ‘revolution’ of the visual arts has a deep significance for this study—
beyond individual images of particular saints—in terms of the move 
towards a greater realism in the representation of the human body, the 
representation of encounters between those bodies, and their consequent 
relations to the viewer.  
 
2.5 Confraternities 
The growth in membership of the confraternities within Dante’s lifetime is 
important for understanding the ways in which the laity gained access to a 
new type of theological education. The companies of confraternities of 
Florence proliferated in the thirteenth century: twenty new companies were 
formed between 1224 and the end of the century.63 They were more often 
than not associated with or sponsored by one of the mendicant orders, and 
usually based at a chapel within a parish or monastery church (although 
the company of Orsanmichele met in the loggia at the grain market itself). 
The statutes and surviving records show that the makeup of their 
                                                 
62 L. Bourdua, ‘Illumination, painting and sculpture’, in Barański and Pertile (eds), 
Dante in Context, pp. 401-26, (p. 405). 
63 See R.F.E Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood (New York Ciy, NY: Academic Press, 
1982) pp. 43-44. 
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membership was drawn from a wide section of society and, as such, there 
could be significant social and commercial, as well as spiritual, benefits in 
becoming a member. Confraternities were primarily devotional in their 
function and divided, roughly, into two groups—the disciplinati and the 
laudesi; the former practiced self-flagellation as a form of devotion, usually 
whilst processing through the city. The most significant type of 
confraternity for my study are the companies of the laudesi. These groups 
sang laude, vernacular songs of praise to God, Mary, and the saints, which 
were performed publicly in procession by the companies once a month, 
and daily in the chapels of the confraternities of the city.64The laudesi also 
performed an important function for their members in funerary 
arrangements, in accompanying processions of biers, in performances of 
the Office of the Dead, and in prayers for the souls of the departed. The 
services of the laudesi also provide a locus in which the concept of 
Purgatory, growing in importance during this period, was worked out and 
elaborated.65 
 
It is important to note that the rise of the laudesi coincided with, or indeed, 
contributed to, an increasing devotion to the cult of the Virgin. One of the 
largest confraternities of laudesi, was the Compagnia delle Laudi di Santa 
Maria Novella, mentioned above, which was founded by Saint Peter 
Martyr in 1244. Its foundation was a response, in part, to the heretical 
theologies promulgated in Northern Italy, whose teachings, it was 
believed, undermined the Incarnation and the sanctity of the Holy Mother 
herself.66 
   
The lauda tradition provides another source whereby a sense of the 
theologians’ personhood might have been transmitted in Florence. Firstly, 
                                                 
64 See J. G. W. Henderson, Piety and Charity in Late Medieval Florence (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997) pp. 79-90. 
65 Henderson, Piety and Charity, p. 163. 
66 Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood, p. 46. 
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because an element of training was necessary for members to learn the 
laude themselves, an education which would deepen an individual’s 
knowledge of theology and of the saints. Secondly, because the songs, 
unlike the rest of the liturgy, were sung in the vernacular, and would 
therefore have been a way for this knowledge to have been transmitted to 
the general population who heard the laude in the streets of Florence.67 
Singing lessons were held for company members, including children; these 
lessons would have furnished the members with a level of vernacular 
theological or doctrinal training—or, perhaps, an education in 
hagiographical works—which would have been hitherto unavailable for 
laypeople.68 Indeed, John Henderson claims that there is evidence that the 
confraternities enjoyed a level of theological sophistication which outran 
the norm for laypeople.69  
 
The laude were illustrated and compiled in laudari belonging to each 
confraternity. A surviving Florentine laudario, now in the Biblioteca 
Nazionale in Florence (Banco Rari 18), belonged to the Augustinians of 
Santo Spirito.70 Within it are laude dedicated to ninety-six different 
individuals, among them the confraternity’s patron, Augustine, but also 
one to Bernard of Clairvaux. The laudario is illuminated and includes 
                                                 
67 The para-liturgical nature of the laude—the ways in which vernacular language 
was incorporated into and around the rest of the mass—offers, perhaps, a way of 
reading the Purgatorio as a mirror-image of the laudesi’s activities, where the liturgy 
itself is incorporated into the vernacular poetry of the Commedia. See M. Treherne: 
‘In his account of Purgatory, the very presence of liturgy marks an innovation with 
regard to the view of Purgatory that had emerged in late medieval culture. 
(According to Aquinas, for instance, the souls of Purgatory had no need to pray at 
all.) This innovation stands alongside a number of other strikingly original aspects 
of Dante’s Purgatory’; ‘Liturgical Personhood: Creation, Penitence and Praise in 
the Commedia’ in Montemaggi and Treherne (eds), Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as 
Poetry, pp. 131-60 (p. 132). 
68 Henderson, Piety and Charity, p. 83. 
69 Henderson, Piety and Charity, p. 89.  
70 I am grateful to Matthew Treherne for his help in studying this manuscript at the 
BNCF. For an English translation and the modern notation of the music of the 
lauda, see: H. J. Grossi (ed) The Fourteenth Century Florentine Laudario Magliabechiano 
(Doctoral thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1979). 
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musical notation; it may have been carried through the streets as part of the 
procession. It contains images of both saints: Augustine features in four 
separate illuminations, one of which occupies a three-quarter page 
depiction of the saint dressed in red, holding a book and surrounded by 
smaller figures of tonsured Augustinians in black habits. Augustine, here, 
is clearly represented as the leader of the order and also the author of 
important works. The lauda which accompanies this image refers to 
Augustine as ‘sommo doctore’ and the possessor of ‘profunda sapienta’. 
There is also a notable use of light imagery to designate the knowledge that 
Augustine fosters in the minds of his readers: ‘specchio e lume della nostre 
mente’.71  
Guadiamo tucti quanti 
Et facciam dolci canti 
Al be//ato Augustin sommo doctore. 
 
O alta et profunda sapienta 
O specchio et lume della nostre menta, 
O tu che se’ doctor per // excellentia, 
danne lumera che siam conoscenti 
accio che siam ferventi 
ad te, padre potente, 
al cui fervor siamo ragunati. 
 
A seconda lauda, with a smaller image of Augustine, this time dressed in 
blue, again holding a book, begins with the words, ‘Sancto Agostin 
doctore’. It goes on to describe the bishop, within a forceful rhyming 
pattern, as ‘confessor e pastore’, and again, using more metaphors of light, 
‘luminatore et doctore’. This lauda personalises the seemingly defensive 
work of Augustine’s oeuvre: it characterises him as someone standing 
guard over holy doctrine, as defending the faith, and as the destroyer of 
error.72 These images, I suggest, draw attention in particular to Augustine’s 
exegetical expertise: he is not only expert, he stands as an authority over 
how doctrine should be read and interpreted.  
                                                 
71 Lauda 71, folios 96v-97v. 
72 Lauda 72, folios 98r-99r. 
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Sancto Agostin doctor 
Confessor et pastore 
Et pien di sapientia si’laudato. 
 
Luminatore et doctore, 
della fe’ divina difenditore guardatore, 
colla sancta doctrina 
distrugitore d’ogne errore 
facesti gran ruina 
tutti di si gram sancto 
novel or facciam canto 
che nn’e sie degno et a lo ben meritato. 
 
In contrast with the light-bearing, warrior-like figure of Augustine, the 
lauda to the Abbot of Clairvaux’s first description of him is as loving 
(‘amoroso’). This lauda is also illuminated, with Bernard depicted as an old, 
bearded man in Cistercian white robes, holding a crozier, and in the other 
hand, a book. The words of the lauda hail him as a ‘giglio aulente’, an 
‘aquila contemplativa’, and a ‘nobile predicatore’. It also refers to the story 
which we saw above, from the Vita Prima, that his career was prefigured 
whilst in his mother’s womb.73 
 
Sancto Bernardo amor[o]so 
giglio aulente dilectoso.                         
 
Ançi che tuo fosti nato 
ti fosti prefigurato 
d’amore privilegiato, 
nobile predicatore.                                
 
O Bernardo, fresc’uliva, 
Aquila contemplativa, 
della Trinita divina 
fosti sommo comprenditore.             
 
In Chapters II and III, I return to some of the images of the saints found 
within the laude, especially the image of Bernard as a loving individual, and 
                                                 
73 Lauda 80, 110r-110v. I return to the depiction of Bernard as a contemplative eagle 
in chapters II and IV.             
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also as an eagle. Both these figurations, I will suggest, are important for 
Dante, although my claim is not that he was intimately acquainted with 
this particular laudario. Important too is the image of Augustine as an 
exemplary intellectual; one to whom Christendom is indebted for his 
ability to shed light on Holy Scripture. That he is also described as 
‘confessor’ underscores the transmission of his image found within the 
autobiographical Confessions. I return to Augustine as a narrator of his own 
selfhood, in Chapter III. For now, it is important to underline the fact that 
the existence and growing membership of confraternities in Dante’s 
Florence, demonstrates that the cult of the saint is of such importance that 
formal, constituted, societies provide the context in which the saints can be 
venerated and praised by lay people, and in the vernacular, too.  
 
It comes as no surprise that the Florentines, who were deeply self-
conscious about all types of inter-personal bonds, tended to 
conceive of their relations with the divine personages as they 
conceived of their relations with one another […] the imagery of 
patronage lay at the heart of Florentine systems of spiritual 
exchange.74 
 
The praise for these saints is particular to their characters; it is a 
characterisation which picks out certain qualities for which the saint is 
remembered. In this way, the relation between saint and singer is drawn in 
a more personalised mode, a mode which preserves elements of the saint’s 
earthly personhood, but now which looks to him as a heavenly patron.  
 
2.6 The significance of the Florentine context 
I have summarised some of the ways that the theologians were known in 
Dante’s Florence. Even this brief and incomplete picture provides a sense 
of how different aspects of the theologians’ works or person might have 
been foregrounded by diverse mediating forces. As theologian par excellence 
Augustine galvanises universal acclaim, bringing light to an ignorant 
                                                 
74 Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood, p. 47. 
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world: his texts circulate widely in late-medieval Europe, and are 
consumed in the studia of Florence first hand, certainly, and also second 
hand, through the likes of Bonaventure and Aquinas (and, of course, many 
others). Augustine’s contribution to the form that biblical exegesis should 
take—a contribution which would shape the engagement with scripture for 
centuries—dominates in the Middle Ages, in Florence as much as 
anywhere, and even seeps into the fibre of literary criticism more generally, 
as we see in Convivio II, i, when Dante uses a fourfold method to (partially) 
expound his own canzone.    
 
We see Augustine the peace-maker emerging from the hagiographic stories 
of the Augustinians, and yet it is Augustine the intellectual warrior that we 
hear in the songs of the laudesi. These images of the saint tell us much about 
the orders and organisations that claim him; the transmission of his image 
must necessarily be shaped by their political and spiritual preoccupations. 
This distortion, or less dramatically, colouring, of Augustine’s character 
might well have been abundantly transparent, maybe even in some cases 
comical, to those living in late-medieval Florence; alternatively, it might 
just as easily have been the case that these particular versions of the saint 
were taken at face value, as consolidations of the historical theologian’s 
personhood. Aquinas and Bernard, too, are subject to these same forces, so 
closely associated as they were with the Dominicans and the Cistercians, 
respectively. Something of the person of Aquinas was found in the daily 
practices of the order. The articulation of theology, the methods which 
were employed by the Dominicans both in their preaching and in their 
teaching, in the disputations and the more public quodlibetal debates, 
subsume characteristics that are to be found throughout Thomas’s written 
oeuvre: a rigorous examination of scripture, of ideas and of concepts, 
teasing out at length the ramifications of a particular claim and contrary 
claim. This is the case before one even considers the content of Aquinas’ 
own teaching, transmitted through his texts, and through people such as 
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Remigio de’ Girolami, at Santa Maria Novella.75  
 
Gregory’s stature as leader of the Church, first monk-Pope, was built into 
the very fabric of the new Dominican church: a chapel was dedicated to 
him and decorated by a master painter, depicting the saint almost as a 
Roman emperor, fanned by palm-bearers. Gregory’s authority is further 
underlined by the holdings in the libraries, where he is well-represented in 
both the Dominican and Franciscan studia.  
 
As for Bernard, his image and authority is important for the Cistercians, 
and the careful management of his legacy can be read in the biographies 
and hagiographies that are present in the convent libraries in Florence 
during this period. The reverence, and glorification, which began in his 
lifetime is still evident two centuries later, in the artworks commissioned 
by the Cistercian house at Settimo, where the figure of the wise, elderly 
pastor resembles the character found in the Paradiso. His notoriety as a 
contemplative theologian and his works on the Song of Songs are read in 
the words of the laude from the Augustinian confraternity. The preservation 
and circulation of his letters in the convent libraries suggest that something 
of the voice of the historical Bernard was preserved: more direct access, 
perhaps, to the personhood of the saint than any representations mediated 
by the order to which he belonged.    
 
This chapter has introduced the concept of personhood as it emerges in the 
Commedia, by way of examples of characters from the poem itself. My claim 
                                                 
75 This format of university debate pre-dates Aquinas, of course. The Arts and 
Theology faculties of Paris made use of disputations in their courses on Aristotle 
and Peter Lombard, courses which, in turn, were based on earlier writings in 
quaestio format. My claim—hardly new—is that Thomas’s Summae present the 
culmination of such Scholastic practices and crystalises their form. For a fuller 
discussion of Aquinas and the Summa’s relation to Dominican method, see: J. 
Marenbon, ‘Method’ in The Cambridge Companion to the ‘Summa Theologiae’, ed. by 
P. McCosker and D. Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) pp. 74-
84. 
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is that it is a conception which must necessarily include certain features 
which Dante goes to some length to highlight: features which retain their 
significance throughout each cantica, and which will obtain even after the 
Last Judgement. These features, as I will explore in Chapters II-IV, will 
have deep significance for theology: how we, for Dante, as individuals, 
understand our place in God’s universal order. The second half of this 
chapter introduced the ways in which the four theologians of this study 
were found in Dante’s Florence, in the last two decades of the thirteenth 
century. This exploration showed that the works of the theologians, their 
intellectual inheritance, were traceable in Florence, but so, too, were other 
characteristics of the theologians’ personhoods, transmitted by institutions, 
teachers, preachers, lay orders and artists or, indeed, by their own hand. I 
suggested that Dante’s reading of the theologians has both a structural and 
a qualitative significance: structural, because the creation of theological 
authority is important for Dante as he constructs his own poema sacro 
(Paradiso XXV, 1); qualitative, because certain features of personhood that 
emerge in the image of the theologians contain qualities that Dante will 
endorse in his poem. In Chapters II and III, I will show how and why some 
of these characterisations are important for Dante: how he reads the 
personhood of the theologian and recasts them for his own purpose; and 
how he constructs for himself an authority learned, in part, from 
theologians in this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Virtuous Theologian 
 
1. Theology emerging from the shadows 
This chapter explores some of the sources of Dante’s idiosyncratic 
engagement with theology in the Commedia. In Convivio II, xiv, the subject 
of theology is God, which ‘non soffera lite alcuna d’oppinioni o di sofistici 
argomenti’. As we saw in the Introduction, Dante thinks that theology is 
practiced by everyone who reads and responds to scripture—but it is also 
practiced in a different sense by those authorities who are divinely inspired 
by the Holy Spirit when they write their exegeses. What can and cannot be 
said of God, what can and cannot be understood, is contained within the 
‘God-speak’ of the theologians. And of course, despite Dante’s certaintly 
about its subject, arguments raged over the limits of theology’s proper 
range. This chapter, then, examines the characters of Bernard of Clairvaux 
and Thomas Aquinas in the poem, and deconstructs them in light of their 
known, historical counterparts, against a background of their theological 
texts and portraits from elsewhere. It asks how Dante recasts them as 
characters, and provides readers with further opportunity to read them and 
their theologies again, backwards this time, from narrative poem to 
theologian and works. How does Dante’s reconstruction of these 
theologians help us understand the other characters in the poem and, 
indeed, the poem as a whole and its relation to Dante’s own theology?  
 
Dante’s imaginative act presses the language and action of the historical 
theologian into a narrative which enables him to demonstrate something 
about theology itself. In Giuseppe Mazzotta’s words, poetry, for Dante, is 
‘the necessary presupposition for critical thought’, because the poetic 
imagination is able to provide the ground in order that the ‘shadowy 
discourses of history’ coalesce. 1 Below, I show how the person of the 
                                                 
1 Mazzotta, Dante’s Vision, p. xi. 
  88 
historical theologian—the person who appears from the shifting ground of 
the works, of history and its interpretation— comes to embody their own 
theology, standing for a set of values and beliefs that are an intellectual 
shorthand for how both Dante, in the medieval period, and now modern-
day readers understand those theologians. By writing poetry Dante enables 
the characters to emerge from those ‘shadowy discourses’, and transforms 
them for his own end, his own epic narrative, whilst at the same time 
transforming that historical discourse itself.  
 
The chapter serves, then, as an answer to questions about theological 
language, given that written works are mostly what remain of these 
theologians’ portraits (although, indeed, as we saw in Chapter I, some 
visual sources will play a minor role). Such language, no matter the topic, 
fixes within itself keys for deciphering the commitments and beliefs, the 
judgements of value and orders of priority, the emotional terrain and the 
moral imagination of the theologians, all of which can unlock something of 
the virtue and personhood of the writer. 
 
In his essay, ‘Poetry and Theology’, Albert R. Ascoli claims that, ‘Dante 
repeatedly affirms that theology is, finally, necessarily, poetic’.2 Dante’s 
conception of what theology is, and what poetry is capable of, builds on the 
work of those authors—poets, theologians, scribes of the Bible—with 
whom he came into contact: this much at least, is a truism. In this chapter, I 
show how both Bernard’s and Aquinas’s theologies, each in their particular 
ways, inform Dante’s conception of what theology is; he endorses, adopts 
and adapts aspects of what has gone before, whilst at the same time he 
rejects, replaces or constructs something wholly new, from the vestiges of 
those theologians’ inheritance. The most obvious rejection—of treatise, of 
sermon—in favour of poetry, as Ascoli reminds us, is fundamental. It is 
                                                 
2 Ascoli, ‘Poetry and Theology’, p. 42.   
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through the choice of the genre, the epic rather than the lyric, and in 
writing a poem overflowing with characters, with persons, that Dante’s 
theology emerges.  
 
The chapter then goes on to sketch case studies of virtue, vice and 
theological language from the Commedia, in light of a reading some of 
Bernard’s sermons and, in particular, his letters: Francesca and Ugolino in 
Hell; Manfred and Buonconte da Montefeltro in Purgatory. This chapter 
proposes that the Commedia—replete as it is with fully-rounded characters, 
each on their own very personal journeys—has at its core a distillation of a 
set of values which can be found in a reading of the historical Bernard’s 
personhood, and which is reiterated and repossessed by Dante not only 
through Bernard the character, but through the characters of other actors in 
the poem. I argue that Dante finds in his reading of the historical Bernard 
something that accords with Dante’s own view of persons and of God. 
Indeed, it is a reading that is so central to Dante’s conception of theology, 
that any of the case studies below could very well be replaced by others 
that would serve to make the point just as well: that persons are key. 
Understanding God is inseparable from understanding the nature of our 
own createdness; and that therefore the concept of understanding itself is 
not an intellectual activity alone but must include within it the notions of 
being and participation: who we are, how we live, what we do.  
 
But the chapter goes on to complicate this picture by comparing a reading 
of key texts of Bernard and Aquinas, alongside an analysis of how each of 
their characters is figured in the poem. This reading takes as its starting 
point the theological methodologies that each theologian would have been 
known for in Dante’s Florence: Bernard’s mystical contemplation and the 
rather more workaday constructions of Aquinas’s rigorous intellectualism. 
In Bernard’s description of the vision of God available on Earth—an 
experience of love, understood through human love—joy is palpable; in 
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Aquinas’s intellectual zealotry, his hunger for understanding, for clarity, is 
paramount. Both theologians offer Dante a view on how to approach God 
and also how to write about that approach; Dante takes these lessons and 
creates his own unique response. The chapter ends by suggesting that 
although Bernard’s heart beats throughout the poem, and is necessary for 
any adequate human response to God, it is Aquinas’s intellect which, in the 
end, must complete for Dante, the final vision.       
 
2. Bernard’s Authentic Heart 
Stephen Botterill suggests that the first terzina of Paradiso XXXII—lines 
which introduce Bernard’s speech describing the ranks of the blessed—tells 
us most of what we need to know about why Dante chose St Bernard of 
Clairvaux as his final guide. According to Botterill, the lines show us: 
 
Bernard as devoted to Mary […] as contemplative […] and, for the 
first but not the last time, as eloquent; and it seems far from 
unreasonable to conclude that this combination of factors, all three 
of which the Bernard of Trecento culture and the Bernard of the 
Commedia have in common, goes a very long way indeed towards 
explaining why Bernard appears in the poem at all, why he appears 
where he does, and why his words and actions in the text take the 
form that they do.3 
 
The character we find in the Commedia is on this reading fit for purpose for 
his role in Paradise, given what we know of his historical biography: he is a 
devotee of Mary; he is known for his affective, contemplative theology, a 
theology not based on huge written treatises of doctrine, but on an 
experiential mysticism; and he is remembered for his skills with language, 
both as a preacher— his medieval moniker was Dr. Mellifluous—but also 
in his written works, in conveying his experiences of God, for example, in 
his sermons super Cantica canticorum, which are so direct and immediate in 
their vibrancy that it is almost impossible not to be moved by them. This is 
                                                 
3 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, p. 93.  
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the Bernard who seems to fit rather nicely into his role in the last three 
cantos of Paradiso; when Dante-personaggio, too, is experiencing God, 
encountering God through the intercession of both Bernard and Mary and 
who, like Bernard, must later write those experiences down and 
communicate them to the world.   
 
Not only is Dante purportedly doing something akin to the historical 
Bernard, in writing about a personal and direct experience of God, but he is 
also placing the character of Bernard right in the middle of Dante-pilgrim’s 
experience of the divine. So we are reminded here that others have written 
about the experience of God too and are left wondering what Dante is 
asking of us in setting up this juxtaposition between past and present 
works. Not only this but, as Dante does not give us any of historical 
Bernard’s actual words,4 we have the further task of reading the character 
through the actions and words that Dante does gives him, set against the 
backdrop of what we know of him from elsewhere. That tension between 
the two Bernards, or rather between multiple Bernards, opens up rich 
sources for interpretation. 
 
The first question about Bernard’s character, which I address below, 
connects his mystical experience of God with the language that he is able to 
use. Within his own lifetime, and certainly by the thirteenth century, 
Bernard is already famous for his articulacy and eloquence. This 
eloquence—the beautiful theological language that he uses in order to write 
and speak about the nature of God—can, I argue, be understood as one 
product of Bernard’s authenticity. It is an authenticity that arises from his 
complete desire for God, his ardour, his dedication to experiencing God on 
Earth. It is for this reason, I suggest, among others, that the historical 
Bernard provides a model for Dante. Bernard writes: 
                                                 
4 This is a pattern that is often repeated in the poem with other characters who are 
based on real people. 
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Si non desideraveritis, non perfecte amabitis. 
 
  Epistola XVIII to Cardinal Deacon Peter5 
 
Luceat lux vestra coram hominibus, ut tamen et coram Deo ardeat 
dicaturque etiam de vobis:  ille erat lucerna ardens et lucens. 
Alterum vobis, alterum vestris necessarium est. Bene lucet qui de 
propria accenditur igne. Quanti non suo lumine lucent; hypocritae 
lucere cupiunt, ardere nolunt. Expedit autem e duobus ardere sine 
lumine quam absque igne lucere. 
 
  Epistola DV to Baldwin, Archbishop of Pisa6 
 
Beatum dixerim et sanctum, cui tale aliquid in hac mortali vita raro 
interdum, aut vel semel, et hoc ipsum raptim, atque unius vix 
momenti spatio experiri donatum est. Te enim quodammodo 
perdere, tanquam qui non sis, et omnino non sentire teipsum, et a 
teipso exinaniri, et pene annullari, coelestis est conversationis, non 
humanae affectionis. 
     De diligendo Deo, X, 277 
 
This ardour for experiencing God, and the desire to ‘shine’ for those that 
read his works or hear his sermons, transforms into the eloquence for 
which he is known. As a preacher on fire for God, he able to convert large 
numbers of people to the Church. In his sermon on the anniversary of 
Bernard’s death—a sermon which is found in Santa Croce during Dante’s 
                                                 
5 Sancti Bernardi Opere, ed. by J. Leclerq and H. Rochais, 8 vols (Rome: Editiones 
Cistercienses, 1957-77), VII, p. 92. ‘If you do not desire God ardently, you will not 
love him perfectly.’ (19), The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, translated by B. S. 
James (Stroud: Sutton), 1998, p.53. James’s edition of the letters uses a numbering 
system that does not correspond to that of the critical edition by J. Leclerq and H. 
Rochais. The James numbering is indicated in parantheses. 
6Bernardi Opere, VIII, p. 463. ‘For your own good it is necessary that you should 
burn, and for the good of those that look to you it is necessary that you should 
shine. He shines well he who is lit by his own fire. Those who do not shine with 
their own light, shine as hypocrites with a borrowed light, not being on fire 
themselves.’ (115), Letters, p. 172. 
7 Bernardi Opere, III, p. 142. ‘I would count him blessed and holy to whom such 
rapture has been vouchsafed in this mortal life, for even an instant to lose yourself, 
as if you were emptied and lost and swallowed up in God, is no human love; it is 
celestial.’ On Loving God, translated by E. Stiegman (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian 
Publications, 1995), pp. 29-30.  
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life there—Geoffrey of Auxerre says of Bernard that ‘Ignitum ejus 
eloquium vehementer’.8 What do they see and hear and respond to, if not 
that ardour itself: the authenticity of a man who burns day and night for 
the God that he loves? In eloquence there is power, and it a power that 
derives from an authentic heart.  
 
When Dante comes to figure Bernard in the Commedia, he retains this aspect 
of Bernard’s character. It is Bernard’s burning desire which we see in 
Cantos XXXI and XXXIII, in the presence of which, Dante-personaggio can 
learn how to approach the vision of God. Bernard’s fire is for God, but 
here, in the last canto of Paradiso, it also an ardent desire that the pilgrim 
should experience God’s fullness too. Dante responds to Bernard’s ardour 
and consequently is able to turn his gaze again towards Mary, and 
ultimately towards God. We see this with the repeated use of the words 
ardere, ardente, and caldo which both Bernard and Dante embody. Paradiso 
XXXI, 139-142, shows us Bernard’s desire and Dante-personaggio’s response: 
 
 Bernardo, come vide li occhi miei  
nel caldo suo caler fissi e attenti,  
li suoi con tanto affetto volse a lei,  
che ' miei di rimirar fé più ardenti.  
 
Paradiso XXXI, 139-142 
 
It makes sense that this ardour motivates Bernard’s actions, and that these, 
in turn, demonstrate this virtue of authenticity that I am suggesting 
underpins Bernard’s character, as we perceive it, in his written works. But 
although we might have a gut feeling about the notion of authenticity—its 
meaning and its value—it is not by any means conceptually innocent or 
straightforwardly simple. It is as theoretically difficult and value-laden as 
the concept of virtue itself—but, I think, that should not make us jettison it 
as somehow contaminated before we have considered its application here. 
                                                 
8 PL, CLXXXV, 573. 
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As a first pass, we might say that being authentic means in some way being 
true to oneself—and immediately, of course, the problems that this definition 
suggest become clear. There is a long-rehearsed and well-trodden history 
of questioning what such a virtue might even mean given that it sounds 
rather suspect that there could be some ontically prior being with which 
you could act in accordance; whether it has any moral value in and of itself; 
and if it is still worthy a virtue of defending today. Charles Taylor has in 
the twentieth century attempted a retrieval of the concept of authenticity 
from what he has seen as a flattening of the term, a slide to subjectivism in 
contemporary culture: an ideal that puts self-fulfilment above all else.9 
 
I am not suggesting that Bernard’s authenticity is motivated by this type of 
inward turn, to the satisfaction of the self’s desires above all else. Quite the 
contrary. Not only would such a criticism feel anachronistic, but it 
undermines the essence of what I want to pick out by the term, anyway. 
The authenticity that the historical Bernard embodies is outward-facing, 
always beyond himself towards God, and for the glory of God. His actions 
and his language are determined by a love for God that possesses his heart, 
such that everything which flows from it has the stamp of a unifying faith 
and a desire for greater union with his maker. His character, his 
personhood, is defined by this love and it is in this sense that being true to 
oneself means being authentic. That authentic heart of Bernard’s has other 
products, besides the desire for an immediate experience of God. It is able 
to see and respond to other human beings, too. As I show below, it values 
human relationships and is able to understand how and why these are 
amongst God’s most important creations. Where, if anywhere, would a 
Florentine like Dante find evidence of Bernard’s authentic heart?  
 
Botterill notes that there are works of Bernard in the libraries in Dante’s 
Florence, but they are surprisingly thin on the ground, and they are not the 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Sources of the Self. 
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works for which he is famed. How he was present, the depth and 
penetration of his works, how he compares with other theologians or 
appears in their works, and which aspects of his character were celebrated 
can be recovered, to some extent, by looking again at the holdings of the 
convent libraries, as we saw in Chapter I. Santa Croce housed the most 
works of Bernard in Florence during our period, but even here, those that 
are considered his major works were missing. The Sermones super Cantica 
canticorum and Bernard’s other major treatises, De diligendo Deo, De 
Consideratione and De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio are notable by their absence. 
Of course, what we have to go on here are the surviving library catalogues, 
which can only show us what was present, and cannot prove beyond doubt 
what was not.  What is present is largely contained within one very 
interesting codex now at the Laurenziana.10 We know that this codex was in 
the keeping of Illuminato Caponsacci, thanks to the nota di possesso written 
inside the front cover, and thus would have been unlikely to have been lent 
to anyone else. But it at least must have formed part of the story of the 
cultural transmission of Bernard’s character during Dante’s lifetime. Within 
it are Bernard’s Sermones per Annum and his long sermon-treatise, De 
Conversione. The Vita Prima is also present. In addition, there is a sermon by 
Bernard’s biographer on the anniversary of his death, and four letters by 
Pope Alexander III on Bernard’s canonisation. There are also, most 
interestingly, two hundred and fifty-eight letters by Bernard himself. In 
Santa Maria Novella, only Bernard’s letters are listed in the catalogues from 
the 1280s and 1290s.11 
 
These letters paint a rich and vivid portrait of the historical Bernard and 
provide tantalising insights into his life, his works and his character. In 
total, the surviving letters of Bernard number in their hundreds. Estimates 
about the actual number that were written do not stop short of thousands. 
                                                 
10 BML Pl. XXI. 
11 BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.1.695. 
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What do they, available as they were to readers in the thirteenth century, 
reveal about his character? And how does this knowledge of medieval 
understandings affect our reading of the last three cantos of the poem, 
today? The letters themselves give one an idea of the huge weight of 
responsibility that Bernard bore in his varied and hectic career—as abbot, 
as preacher, as crusader, and as counsellor to popes and kings. It is thus 
unsurprising that the tone of the letters is often rushed: time short, work 
calling. That such a volume of words was written at all is impressive, 
before one considers the number of different individuals with whom the 
Abbot of Clairvaux corresponded.  
 
So it is even more striking, then, that although the tone betrays the pressure 
of his other commitments, the letters are uniformly personal in their nature, 
whatever the situation or the rank of the recipient. Many of the letters are 
not so much about transacting Church business, but about the state of a 
person’s well-being, usually the state of their soul. Bernard’s concern for 
his fellow man and woman positively leaps from the page: the letters are 
clearly written in love. Fearful for the soul who does not fully embrace 
God’s Word, Bernard wants his reader to understand the dangers of 
leaving the path of righteousness. But it is a concern that is for a unique, 
specific individual, rather than for the situation of souls in general. Even 
when writing to a stranger, Bernard seems fully apprised of the relevant 
details of a person’s life such that he can write to them with a power, with a 
force of rhetoric, that cannot have left the recipient unmoved.  
 
Genus clarum, corpus aptum, forma elegans, ingenium velox, 
eruditionis utilitas et honestas morum, gloriosa quidem sunt, sed ei 
a quo sunt. 
Epistola CIV to Walter of Chaumont12 
 
                                                 
12 Bernardi Opere, VII, p.261.  [N]oble birth, lithe body, comely appearance, a 
distinguished bearing are great acquisitions, but the credit of them belongs to him 
who gave them […] (105) Letters, p.152. 
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The words of his letters are lively, warm, encouraging, humane, poetic, 
coaxing, at times admonishing, full of scripture—both quotations and with 
words of scripture enfolded within his own phrases. Always time is 
pressing: he is concerned about his own business, his works on Earth, and 
his inability to meet with all the people to whom he is writing (sometimes 
he sends others in his place—see letter 171 to Richard at Fountains Abbey). 
But providential history too, is pressing—the thief in the night might be 
coming tonight—and this urgency is palpable. Run to the light! Take up an 
attitude, one and all, and direct your actions towards the eternal state of 
your soul. Bernard’s loving concern is evident even in anger and 
disappointment when his correspondents’ actions have fallen short of the 
mark.  
 
Ut quid enim hactenus nonna et sanctimonialis vocitata es, quae sub 
sanctitatis nomine, tam non sancta conversata es? Cur velum in 
capite mentiebatur reverentiam, sub velo petulans oculus exhibebat 
impudentiam? Caput siquidem gerebas velatum, sed elatum; sub 
signo verecundiae sermo resonabat inverecundus. Risus 
immoderatior, incessus lascivior, vestitus ornatior, wimplatae magis 
quam velatae congruerent… 
 
Epistola CXIV to a nun13 
 
Elsewhere, he reassures the parents of a young convert who has joined the 
monastery at Clairvaux, Epistola CX: ‘At fortassis metuitis corpori eius vitae 
asperitatem, quod nimirum tenerum nostis esse ac delicatum.’14 These 
letters of love—letters written in love and about Love—contain within 
them questions about the nature of the written word which Bernard must 
have found vexed. On the one hand, his huge output demonstrates how 
                                                 
13 Bernardi Opere, VII, p.293. ‘Why have you been hitherto called ‘nun’? [W]hen 
under the cover of your holy habit you were living a life that was not holy […] 
Why did you feign by the veil on your head a gravity that your impudent glances 
belied? The veil you wore covered a haughty brow […] saucy tongue [...] 
unrestrained giggles […] wanton bearing [...] (117) Letters, p. 179. 
14 Bernardi Opere, VII, p.282.  ‘[k]nowing that he is tender and delicate, perhaps you 
are afraid for his health.’ (112) Letters, p. 169. 
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important and powerful he thinks the written word actually is, but at the 
same time Bernard’s repeated refrain is of wanting a personal presence, a 
face-to-face communion with the individual, rather than having to make do 
with written correspondence.  
 
Si quae tamen recompensatio est de nobis ad vos, libenter vos 
legimus, libentius haberemus. Utinam numquam abessemus nobis. 
Verum id quidem desperatum: utinam vel rarum vestram 
praesentiam mereremur.  
Epistola CV to Baldwin15 
This need for close contact speaks, at times, to an out-and-out distrust of 
the power of the written word, whilst at others to the power of the directly-
spoken encounter and the need for human connectedness. His distrust fits 
within the wider framework of his theological conservatism. He says, in 
Epistola IV, to Arnold, a monk who brought shame on the Cistercian Order 
for having run away from the monastery: ‘Revera autem prae dolore fateor, 
non potui, cum, etsi pro certo scirem ubi te opportune invenissem, ipse 
potius venissem quam has misissem, effecturus fortasse per meipsum quod 
nullis litteris possum.’16 It is difficult to say whether Bernard’s presence for 
poor Arnold would have been amenable or intimidating, but we see at least 
that Bernard thinks that his written words alone do not suffice. Elsewhere, 
in a long letter to Prior Guy (Epistola XI), Bernard distances himself from 
his own verbosity, saying, ‘Quia pudet loquacitatis.’17 
 
When it comes to trusting other people’s words, we have a notable and 
very public example of the way in which words can be dangerous for 
Bernard. His defence of orthodoxy in the affair with Peter Abelard results 
in Bernard’s feverish letters to fellow monks, bishops and the Pope, 
                                                 
15 Bernardi Opere, VII, p. 462.  ‘I read your letter […] and would have had even 
greater pleasure in your presence […] I wish that we could always be together […] 
or at least […] we could see each other from time to time.’ (115) Letters, p. 172. 
16 Bernardi Opere, VII, p. 25. ‘I would come in person rather than write to you, 
perhaps to achieve more by my presence than I could by letter.’ (4) Letters, p. 20. 
17 Bernardi Opere, VII, p.60. ‘I am ashamed of my wordiness.’ (12) Letters, p. 48. 
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beseeching all to read Abelard’s writings and join with him in condemning 
him as a heretic. Bernard writes of Abelard:  
 
Iniquitatem in excelso loquitur; integritatem fidei, castitatem 
Ecclesiae corrumpit. Transgreditur terminos quos posuerunt Patres 
nostri, de fide, de sacramentis, de sancta Trinitate disputans et 
scribens, singula pro sua voluntate mutat, auget et minuit... Homo 
est egrediens mensuram suam, in sapienta verbi evacuans virtutem 
crucis Christi.  
Epistola CXCIII18 
This quote, taken from a letter to Cardinal Ivo, and which is representative 
of the many letters that Bernard wrote about Abelard, is interesting on two 
counts: firstly, because Bernard’s inherent conservatism is striking. The 
landmarks placed by our Fathers should not be breached. Theological 
thought, discussion and writing should be contained within the parameters 
set out by the Church Fathers. Not only that but, secondly, we hear that 
clever words are suspicious for Bernard, and not merely because one risks 
falling in to the sin of pride when over-reaching oneself and moving 
beyond the sphere of theological discussion laid down by the fathers of the 
church. It is worse than that: there is serious danger that such clever words 
may undermine Christ’s work on Earth. They are powerful weapons in the 
wrong hands, as Bernard tells us in the case of Arnold of Brescia, a pupil of 
Abelard, who also receives his condemnation in a letter to the Bishop of 
Constance:  
  
Molliti sunt sermones eius super oleum, et ipsi sunt iacula.  
Epistola CXCV19  
 
                                                 
18 Bernardi Opere, VIII, p. 45. ‘He corrupts the integrity of the faith and the chastity 
of the church. He oversteps the landmarks placed by our Fathers in discussing and 
writing about faith, the sacraments and the Holy Trinity […] He is a man who does 
not know his limitations, making void the virtue of the cross by the cleverness of 
his words.’ (241) Letters, p. 321. 
19 Bernardi Opere, VIII, p. 50. ‘His words are smooth as oil, but they are very 
weapons of destruction.’ (250) Letters, p. 330. 
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A picture of Bernard begins to emerge that enhances and qualifies the 
portrait of him as the writer of eloquent sermons and powerful letters, and 
as the monk who desires union with God on Earth, but who wants never to 
forget his connections with fellow humans. Indeed, Bernard’s relationship 
with language, its power and range of proper use—particularly in 
reference to theology—is conflicted. He clearly loves language, and sees in 
it the possibility of communicating God’s love; he understands the power 
that can be deployed through the judicious use of the written and spoken 
word, whether in letters about earthy human matters, or indeed in sermons 
about the most mystical: the beatific vision itself. His whole output is 
possessed by a desire for better communicating what God means. And yet, 
with this knowledge he worries that words might be put to ill use; that they 
have the capacity for seduction, for turning souls towards sinfulness. And 
he can be shamed by his own words, too: verbosity might well be the 
ground in which pride, or judgement, or anger, can take hold. 
 
This brings us back to the question of what Dante is doing in choosing and 
using such a theologian to be his final guide. What can we understand 
when Dante describes Bernard’s words and speech in the Commedia as 
parole sante (Paradiso XXXII, 3) and a santa orazione (151), given what we 
know of historical Bernard’s relationship with language? Ultimately, 
Dante’s words (or so he tells us) are unsuccessful in describing the vision 
that he sees. Historical-Bernard’s ardour in life had resulted in a mystical 
experience of God which he communicated through speech, via his works 
and sermons. Dante-poeta celebrates Bernard’s powers by putting the 
beautiful prayer to Mary in his mouth, and by presenting him as the model 
by which he and we learn how to gaze at God’s light. Dante’s self-
conscious disavowal of the power of his own speech belies the fact that he 
has achieved something similar to Bernard: a way of thinking about what 
our approach to God—and others—should consist in.  
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3. Bernard’s Heart in the Commedia: three case studies 
In Sermon XXVI of his sermons super Cantica canticorum, Bernard laments 
the death of his dear brother, Gerard. The sermon itself is a powerful piece 
of prose, and through it we can see, again, the authenticity of Bernard-the-
man brought out in eloquent fashion: the strength and the fragility of the 
human being is communicated directly and speaks to us across centuries. 
Whether it was delivered as a sermon by Bernard himself, or whether it 
was created only as a written work for circulation, those who heard or read 
it cannot fail to have been moved. Grief pours from the page.  
 
Bernard looks to both the Old and New Testaments to help him come to 
terms with the contradictions of death: how to celebrate a life which is now 
in Glory, and how to cope with the hopelessness he feels in being bereft. 
‘Non sum, fateor, insensibilis ad poenas, mortem horreo meam et meorum. 
Meus Girardus erat, meus plane.’ 20 The sermon exhorts his congregation to 
look at Biblical examples of grief for lessons on how to be human: David 
grieves for Saul and for Absalom, though neither seem particularly worthy. 
Jesus weeps for Lazarus. Bernard censures himself for not being true to his 
own feelings immediately following Gerard’s death, when he had hidden 
his anguish from his fellow brethren. It is not weakness to weep:  weeping 
is not a sign of a lack of faith, it indicates the human condition, says 
Bernard. He highlights Christ’s humanity, by reminding us that Jesus was 
fully human in his grief for his friend, but at the same time urges us to be 
Christ-like, too, with all else that that entails. The portrait of his much-
missed brother—which celebrates Gerard’s uniqueness and remembers his 
individual qualities—is personal and specific. 
 
                                                 
20 Bernardi Opere, I, Sermon XXVI, 9, p.177. ‘To think that I shall die, that those who 
are mine will die, fills me with dread. And Gerard was mine, so utterly mine.’ On 
the Song of Songs, I-IV in The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux, trans. by K. Walsh and I. 
Edmonds, 4 vols (Kalamazoo, MI: Kalamazoo Publications Inc., 1971-81). 
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Memories of, and love for, individuals; tears in the face of pain and death; 
the imitation of Christ: these are all important themes in the Purgatorio. The 
cantica is full of characters who are orientated in some way to the virtues 
that the historical Bernard embodied. As a model of virtue, of authenticity, 
shall we say, Bernard provides a backdrop against which to read these 
characters and provides a means for understanding them more fully.  
 
3.1 Buonconte and Manfred’s authenticity 
In Ante-Purgatory, the preoccupations of Bernard’s authentic heart can be 
seen at play both in the words and actions of named characters and in the 
behaviour of the anonymous souls who interact with Dante-personaggio. 
Manfred and Buonconte da Montefeltro are two characters, both late 
repenters, found in Purgatorio III and V respectively, who exemplify 
something of Bernard’s authenticity.21 We find that memories of their 
character matter to those they left behind, but also that being remembered is 
important to the shades themselves (Purgatorio III, 142; V, 89); that tears are 
indeed vital, and crucially so (Purgatorio III, 120; V, 107); that although their 
lives may not have been characterised by Bernard’s loving desire for God, a 
re-orientation to the divine is possible even in the final moments of a life 
(Purgatorio III, 121; V, 101; 126-7). 
 
In Canto V, a group of rather startled shades accosts the pilgrim and 
question him about the shadow that his body casts on the ground. The 
shades themselves cast no shadow, and will not do so until they are 
reunited, at the Second Coming, with their now-glorified bodies. The 
importance of bodies—both their weaknesses, their vulnerabilities, and 
their demonstrative power—begins here a theme that I wish to return to 
throughout this section. For, ultimately, the ‘vera carne’ (Purgatorio V, 33) 
                                                 
21 For a useful discussion of Buonconte, see: D. Pietropaolo, ‘The Figural Context of 
Buonconte’s Salvation’, Dante Studies, 102 (1984), 123-34. 
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which Virgil says Dante-personaggio is blessed with, invites us to read these 
episodes in Ante-Purgatory with a Christological lens, and in the light of 
that other Truth that became flesh.  
 
The shades continue their hectoring of the pilgrim and beseech him to look 
at them, in lines 49-51, to see if he recognises any individuals amongst 
them, ‘sì che di lui di là novella porti’ (50). Dante claims not to see anyone 
he knows, and so is unable to take up the commission. There are two things 
that I want to flag up here which Bernard himself might well have 
endorsed: firstly, the importance of seeing individuals for who they are, or 
at least, making an attempt to see them. That is, understanding that in 
God’s sight, even after souls have been saved, the importance of the 
identity—the constitution—of individual human beings, remains intact. 
Secondly, that the memories of those now-dead individuals are important 
to the loved ones that they leave behind on Earth, as we saw so movingly 
with Bernard and his brother, but also, at least according to Dante, to the 
souls themselves in Purgatory. Prayers and memories for those in the 
afterlife have real power. As Manfred says, at Purgatorio III, 141 and 145, 
prayers can shorten the length of time that the souls spend on each terrace, 
or, in his case, in Ante-Purgatory, for having been excommunicated: he 
wants the pilgrim to take news back to his daughter and ensure that he is 
remembered as having repented at the last, even though his sins in his life 
had been ‘orribil’ (III, 121). Later in the cantica, Forese thanks the prayers of 
his wife Nella, for his swift progression up the mountain. In Canto V, we 
find that Buonconte da Montefeltro is downcast because his own wife, 
Giovanna, has seemingly forgotten him (V, 89). 
 
But Buonconte can seek help elsewhere: he is able to see the pilgrim as an 
individual, too, just as his own individuality is foregrounded at Purgatorio 
V, 88 (‘Io fui di Montefeltro, Io son Bonconte.’) and he can recognise in 
Dante the desire for God that he now feels himself. This, indeed, is his 
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opening address to Dante and underlines how desire must be at the centre 
of our relationship with God, just as it was for Bernard. “…[S]e quel disio | 
si compia che ti tragge a l’alto monte, | con buona pïetate aiuta al mio!” 
(85-87). The shades had already explained to Dante and his guide, that they 
exited life, with desire in their hearts to see God. 
 
Noi fummo tutti già per forza morti, 
e peccatori infino a l'ultima ora; 
quivi lume del ciel ne fece accorti, 
sì che, pentendo e perdonando, fora 
di vita uscimmo a Dio pacificati, 
che del disio di sé veder n'accora. 
 
Purgatorio V, 52-57 
Buonconte recounts how he was wounded in the throat before he died at 
the Battle of Campaldino. The report he makes of his violent death shows 
how his re-orientation to God did not need the eloquent words of a 
preacher to bring it about, had he even been able to articulate them. One 
word, spoken by Buonconte himself, is enough to secure his salvation: 
‘Maria’ (101); when language fails him, one tear, ‘una lagrimetta’ (107), can 
give voice to a repentant heart; and in his dying body, as his arms become 
the shape of the cross (126), he can imitate Christ crucified, and show how 
his desire for God brings with it an understanding of the love that 
overcomes death. 
 
Buonconte cries out to Mary and she intercedes on his behalf for his eternal 
salvation. Of course, Bernard, too, was a devotee of Mary and Dante 
reminds us of this fact at the end of the Paradiso, when the Abbot of 
Clairvaux prays to the Virgin, his sponsor, for Dante-personaggio’s soul. It is 
not just any prayer: it is an expression of Dante’s own linguistic prowess in 
recognition of the historical-Bernard’s eloquence (and perhaps, as it does 
not contain any of the saint’s actual words, it can even be read as Dante’s 
repossession of Bernard’s eloquence); it is a celebration of the Virgin’s 
power, as the mother of Christ, to close the wound, ‘la piaga’ (Paradiso 
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XXXII, 4), of the sin that Eve first brought upon humankind, and as such it 
is the exposition of a theological position which highlights how Bernard’s 
Marianism brings with it a focus on individuals, on affective rather than an 
intellectual desire for God, and on the very human virtues which Mary 
exemplified, and with which Dante illustrates the terraces of Purgatory. 
Buonconte needs his wounds closing, although his throat is pierced beyond 
earthly help. His heart turns towards Mary.   
 
And so with one word and with one tear, he repents. Bernard’s tears were 
for his dead brother, and perhaps, for himself: a demonstration of his 
inability to reconcile the glory which Gerard now enjoys and the misery he 
experiences at his brother’s loss. But this is human, Bernard tells us, and 
shows how we are imperfect creatures—but creatures who love and who 
therefore understand, to some extent at least, the wonder of creation. 
Buonconte’s tear is human too: it is the outward sign of a creature who 
recognises himself before a loving God, and sees that his pride had kept 
him from enjoying that Love which would have been available to him had 
he just asked.      
 
Buonconte’s conversion at the point of death is dramatic, and even though 
his body becomes the demonstrative vessel for what his heart now 
understands, being pierced as it is with desire for God, there is no one here 
to witness that demonstration, only the angels and demons wrangling over 
his soul. This is a portrait of a conversion which is utterly personal; 
Buonconte is entirely alone at his death, and so there is nothing about his 
utterance or his actions which can be misconstrued: this is an authentic 
heart.  
 
The words of the Psalmist, which Buonconte sings in Purgatory, describe a 
similar heart: ‘cor mundum crea mihi Deus’.22 Buonconte’s bleeding body is 
                                                 
22 Psalms 50:12. ‘Create a clean heart in me, O God.’ 
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washed along in the deluge of the Archiano, cleansed and rebaptised too, 
as the fury of the demon takes hold. Above all, though, Psalm 50 is about 
one person’s relation to God: have mercy on me; create a clean heart in me; 
blot out my iniquities; cast me not away from thy face. The preoccupations 
of Bernard return: one individual, face-to-face with another, this time the 
created and Creator. Buonconte’s body becomes the shape of the Cross, as 
he recognises the truth about his createdness. The morphological 
significance of his body demonstrates the truth that his personhood has 
changed too: face-to-face with his Creator, he understands now that he is 
himself part of the love that is God, that his identity must be constituted by 
a dialogical relationship with God, and that only through the grace of 
Christ crucified is this now possible. 
 
Manfred is another late repenter, in Purgatorio III, whose body becomes 
Christ-like. His body retains the wounds, in Purgatory, that it suffered 
during life. Manfred’s introduction to Dante-personaggio follows the same 
pattern that we see with Buonconte in Purgatorio V: a group of shades is 
puzzled or afraid by the shadow that Dante’s body throws on the ground, 
and then the pilgrim is asked to look at (one of) the shades to see if he 
recognises them. It is Manfred who does the asking: and again, he wants 
Dante to really look, even whilst they are walking, ‘volgi ’l viso’ (104). As in 
the later episode, Dante denies that he can recognise the face, here the task 
made more difficult because ‘l’un de’ cigli un colpo avea diviso’ (108). But 
Manfred is not deterred, and invites Dante-personaggio to inspect another 
wound, una piaga, on his chest. Then, seemingly smiling at his own broken 
body, or perhaps at his now-happy situation, he identifies himself. ‘Poi 
sorridendo disse: Io son Manfredi’ (112). 
 
This scene of invitation and of identification, has obvious echoes of the 
episodes in the Gospels in which the risen Christ appears to his disciples 
and shows the wounds of his crucifixion. In particular, one is reminded of 
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John 20:24-9, when Christ invites Thomas to not only look at his wounds, 
like Manfred, but to touch them as well: ‘infer digitum tuum huc et vide 
manus meas et adfer manum tuam et mitte in latus meum et noli esse 
incredulus sed fidelis’. So in Manfred’s gesture we are reminded of Christ’s 
outstretched arms to Thomas and his command to Thomas to have faith. At 
line 118, Manfred, like Buonconte, weeps at the moment of his death, and 
in doing so gives himself up to the God whose arms are so large that they 
can encompass any wrongdoing, even though: 
 
Orribil furon li peccati miei; 
ma la Bontà infinita ha sì gran braccia 
che prende ciò che si rivolge a lei 
 
Purgatorio III, 121-123 
 
Manfred is concerned with his memory back on Earth, too. In a reversal of 
the fate of Buonconte’s father, Guido da Montefeltro, in Inferno XXVII, it is 
erroneously believed that Manfred has been damned. He is an 
excommunicate, and even his family, including his daughter Constance, 
believes he now resides in Hell. But the poet rectifies this mistaken belief 
and shows us a Manfred to whom God has given his rightful, eternal 
salvation. Manfred is keen that the record be set straight: his heart turned, 
instinctively at the last, and he recognised the risen Christ, like Thomas, 
almost too late. In Hell, Guido mistakenly thinks that Dante-personaggio has 
no means to return to Earth to tell his loved ones that he is in fact damned. 
Although he had given the appearance of contrition by changing his life, 
there had been no authentic conversion to God, and the fact that he was 
seemingly tricked by Boniface demonstrates that his understanding of 
God’s love and grace was woefully lacking.  
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3.2 Francesca and her words of love  
Much has been written about the forever-tormented figures of Francesca da 
Rimini and Paolo Malatesta, in Inferno V. Restless lovers, swirling amidst a 
flock of other famously lusting sinners, they are as attractive to us as they 
are to Dante-personaggio. The scene in which they appear opens with 
pilgrim and guide watching the whirlwind of lovers, Virgil naming 
particular individuals, and Dante-poeta admitting that he is already moved 
by pity before he even speaks with Francesca.  Dante-personaggio picks out 
Francesca and Paolo at line 74, and asks Virgil if he can talk with them. 
Francesca is happy to oblige: she has the pilgrim in her sights when she 
uses her seductive language to justify the acts which placed her in Hell. 
Bernard’s warnings about Arnold and Abelard could equally be applied to 
Francesca, too: her words are indeed smooth as oil, and contain within 
them the seeds of destruction. As readers of poetry we are susceptible to 
her language, just as she herself was, and thus, she tells us, we and the 
pilgrim are right to pity her fate. In being selected by Dante-personaggio, 
Francesca presumes that her story is worthy (‘…poi c’hai pietà del nostro 
mal perverso’; V, 93), that her acts are blameless, even though the evident 
facts of the matter must speak to the contrary, and that she can, from her 
place of never-ending pain, explain her way out of Hell. Even now, she 
says, the king of the universe is unfriendly, as though he has 
misunderstood something about the nature of love. Thus she betrays her 
wholesale misunderstanding of the nature of God, starting from the 
ground up. 
 
It has been noted that the words which Dante gives to Francesca in order to 
describe her infernal fate, are voiced almost entirely in a passive register, 
such that all sense of the agency that she had in life falls away. Martha 
Nussbaum eloquently summarises Francesca and Paolo’s problem:  
 
The sense we have is of people who cannot see the individuality 
and agency in one another, because they have insufficient respect 
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for their own. They do not regard life as something involving 
agency or deliberation at all, because they are captivated by the idea 
of surrender to the forces of passion.23 
 
There was simply nothing that they could have done to resist love when it 
seized them. And indeed, for Francesca herself, this fact shows just what a 
gentile heart she must have had: a heart attuned to love, to human emotion, 
to beauty and literature—all these good things. Francesca seems to believe 
that she embodied a virtue that now deserves pity, and is confused by the 
fact of her damnation: her current state of wretchedness must be due to 
some mistake. Indeed, her gentle heart—seemingly but superficially so like 
Bernard’s—can extend even to Dante. She wants to pray for his peace, but, 
she confesses, she has no means at her disposal to do this effectively, being 
permanently shut out from God’s light.  
 
Francesca’s seeming innocence strikes one as disingenuous, to say the least. 
The mirror starts to crack at around line 90, where she suggests that her 
sins have actually stained the world blood-red. So not totally unaware, 
after all. Of course, what we can see perfectly clearly, and what Francesca 
only refers to obliquely, is that this is not a love story at all, but one of lust. 
Hers is a misdirection of the will; reason is abandoned in favour of a 
capitulation to bodily and aesthetic sensuality.  
 
Submitting the will to reason is just one way you might think to order 
moral behaviour and, indeed, this method could well prevent one from 
committing the sin of adultery. But Francesca fails morally, more seriously, 
in other ways beyond mere governance of her will. Yes, her lust causes her 
to abandon her marital vows, but it is in her failure to understand what it 
really means to love another individual that her moral life remains forever 
and catastrophically impoverished. It is this fact that means she will never 
                                                 
23 M. C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 566. 
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know what God is; or understand how her createdness is an expression of 
His love; or that the Incarnation itself was the ultimate act of love; or that as 
creatures of God our will and desire should at the last join with his will in 
praising him. Her language of love is antithetical to what love really is: her 
theology is wholly absent. 
 
Dante gives us a clue about this failure through Francesca’s seeming 
inability to utter her lover’s name. Of course, the naming of individuals is a 
powerful device which the poet uses deliberately and sometimes 
devastatingly throughout the narrative, and as I suggested in Chapter I, I 
think it is integral to understanding Dante’s conception of personhood.24 
Here, poor Paolo’s name is lost in perpetuity. The impression we are left 
with, as readers, is that it could have been any (albeit handsome, book-
loving) man that was at the root of Francesca’s damnation: his identity, his 
name, does not matter, because it was not the individual that mattered to 
Francesca. What matters to Francesca is being caught up, like a generic 
character in a courtly love poem or in a romance, by blind passion. She 
does not see and does not love the individual, in the way that Bernard so 
clearly does. Her unseeing-ness means that she does not understand that 
Paolo—and, indeed, Francesca herself—are particular expressions of the 
infinite power of God’s love; that in creating unique human individuals 
with free will, with agency, God’s creation reaches its zenith. Nussbaum 
suggests that understanding this fact fully means that loving an individual 
requires a ‘respect for agency’ and a requirement of reciprocity. ‘This 
distinguishes [Christian love] from (mere) erotic, courtly love…’ so that: 
 
[o]nly in the context of Christian salvation […] does the will have 
full integrity. But this means that it is only in the context of 
salvation that two people can love one another with full respect for 
subjecthood and agency.25 
 
                                                 
24 I return to the theme of the importance of naming in Chapter IV. 
25 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 564. 
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Francesca’s proclivity to misconstrue love, to surrender the will to lust, to 
break a vow, is nurtured by her reading poor literature, poorly. The 
philosopher, Peter Levine, makes the point succinctly: 
 
[B]ad fiction contains clichés and stereotypes that get in the way of 
thinking and judging accurately […] the moral of Canto V is to use 
stories for moral guidance, but only good stories, well and carefully 
read.26 
 
So with Francesca, Dante not only warns us against the irrevocable dangers 
of misunderstanding romantic love, and consequently, misunderstanding 
the nature of God’s love itself, but he warns us about literature too. In 
Dante-personaggio’s response to the lovers’ fate we see that a sympathetic 
reaction is understandable, and in some senses noble: it is a response to the 
pathos of a death which was brought about through a lover’s heart. We 
should not be so quick to dismiss Francesca and Paolo’s folly because it is a 
danger that we all might be guilty of. Francesca’s so-called gentile heart 
shows her disposition to be attuned towards the good and the beautiful, 
and yet it is wholly misdirected: she is paying attention to the wrong 
things, and in the wrong way. She should have been able to see that the 
type of literature that she had become obsessed with does not provide a 
model for virtue, and therefore should not be emulated; nor does it allow 
readers to understand what it means to be human in the light of God’s 
grace. Literature at its best is ‘finely aware and richly responsible’, in 
Henry James’s words.27 For James, it should be perceptive enough to pick 
out the concreteness of persons in all of their uniqueness and say 
something meaningful about them, rather than deal in cliché and in generic 
stock characters; and it should be responsible to an ideal beyond the merely 
aesthetic or sensual. On this view, language and literature brings with it a 
                                                 
26 P. Levine, ‘Why Dante Damned Francesca da Rimini’, Philosophy and Literature, 
23.2 (1999), 334–50 (p. 349). 
27 H. James, The Art of the Novel (Chicago: Uniiversity of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 62. 
  112 
moral responsibility on the part of the author and the reader: it is a lesson 
that Dante takes seriously.  
 
3.3. Ugolino’s silence  
For Dante, that lesson requires both an understanding of the potentiality of 
the language of poetry, and of language itself. As in Bernard’s face-to-face 
encounters, for Dante, language is a means for responding to the needs of 
another. The dialogical character of language, human to human, is an 
opportunity to understand what God’s love consists in, or, in Vittorio 
Montemaggi’s words, to ‘be the love which God is’28 in human 
relationships: 
 
[T]he Commedia [is not] one individual’s attempt to understand and 
conceive of and present an objectively accurate […] picture of God, 
or experience of God, or the relationship between humans and God 
[…] For Dante, a theology so conceived a priori fails to grasp the 
basic distinction between creature and Creator, between that which 
can be spoken of and that which is the ground of human speech and 
existence. Rather […] truth rests on the ability to recognize that 
one’s understanding of truth is defined and constantly redefined by 
one’s readiness to respond in love to the will and needs of another.29 
 
This readiness to respond, this being alert to the needs and the will of 
another, is by its very nature a readiness to change and develop one’s self. 
So it is the definition of one’s own personhood that is up for grabs, through 
being open and responsive and ready to love—not in an attempt to gain 
knowledge, as though by loving one can become a vessel to receive some 
encyclopaedic theological truth—no, rather, by being ready to ‘be the love 
that God is’ one’s understanding of truth develops as one’s very selfhood 
develops. In our lives on Earth, just as in Purgatory, it is a learning process 
which takes time, takes effort and, crucially, takes place in dialogue with 
                                                 
28 V. Montemaggi, ‘In Unknowability as Love: The Theology of Dante’s ‘Commedia’’ 
in Montemaggi and Treherne (eds), Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as Poetry, pp. 60-
94 (p. 62). 
29 Montemaggi, ‘In Unknowability as Love’, p. 87. 
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other human beings.  The culmination of this effort, happily, becomes no 
effort at all in Paradise; it is the state of being at peace in God’s will, as 
Piccarda (after Augustine) so famously asserts.  
 
When Ugolino introduces himself in Inferno XXXIII, through a form of 
words which deliberately recalls Francesca’s speech in Canto V, he says 
that he will tell his story to the pilgrim in such a way that it will cause him 
to speak and to weep, ‘parlare e lagrimar’, if this will bestow further 
infamy on his traitorous enemy. Speaking and crying frames this pitiable 
story and, as we shall see, Ugolino’s narrative is even more full of the 
pathos which characterised Francesca’s. He tells his tale eloquently, even 
though his mouth is somewhat occupied in devouring the head of the 
unfortunate Archbishop Ruggieri, who provides Ugolino with the constant 
repast for his gnawing revenge.  This grisly meal does not seem to inhibit 
the beautiful way in which he tells his story, and again, as readers, we are 
susceptible to Ugolino’s oily words. Does the poet dare us to remain free 
from tears, as Ugolino suggests Dante-personaggio is (lines 40-43), one 
wonders? In the face of Ugolino’s eloquence—that is, in the face of Dante’s 
literary prowess—how can we be unmoved when we hear things such as 
‘Quivi morì; e come tu mi vedi/ vid’io cascar li tre ad uno ad uno…’(70-71)? 
 
That speaking and crying should be highlighted at the start of his speech 
not only connects Ugolino with Francesca, whose misunderstanding of the 
nature of love we saw above, but further, throws into relief the fact that 
although the story of his and his family’s incarceration and ultimate demise 
now causes him ‘disperato dolor’ (5), the speaking and weeping were 
altogether missing within the sad story itself. Ugolino’s entire emotional 
life is caught up in outrage over the treachery that was dealt him and now 
in the desire for revenge that consumes him, just as he consumes Ruggieri. 
Such blinkered rage pushes out all understanding of his own sin and 
speaks of an absolute dereliction of responsibility and duty to his family. 
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For in the content of his narrative itself, there is no speaking and no 
weeping, none at all, for his own sons. At every opportunity, Ugolino tells 
us of his silence in reply to their cries, and his dry-eyed response to their 
own tear-soaked terror. Ugolino’s explanation as to why this is the case 
remains unconvincing—to save his sons from further pain and the 
knowledge about their imminent deaths—and so what we are left with is a 
portrait of a hellish locked chamber in which the sounds of children’s cries 
echo against the stone wall of an impenetrable heart (49).   
  
So the dialogic relationship that Ugolino should have nurtured, through 
language, with members of his own family, indeed, with his very own 
sons, is altogether missing. In responding to their needs, their fears, their 
cries, Ugolino is silent. Dante repeats again and again words describing his 
silence throughout the narrative, as Ugolino tells it. At line 48, ‘sanza far 
motto’; line 52, ‘né rispuos’ io’; line 64, ‘Queta’mi allor’; line 65, ‘stemmo 
tutti muti’; and then, at line 69, in response to Gaddo’s Christ-like wail to 
his father for help in the face of certain death, there is nothing at all: not 
even a word to describe Ugolino’s unresponsiveness, or an explanation for 
his silence, just a total absence of words. Such a reaction to those he is 
supposed to love is shocking, inhuman. That he cries no tears underlines 
the point.  The eloquence that he displays in the afterlife is fuelled by the 
venom in his heart that he retains for his captors and for those who 
betrayed him and who caused his death; but within his lifetime, the paucity 
of his language bespeaks the misunderstanding of the love that might have 
secured him ever-lasting life. It is a language which contrasts sharply with 
the eloquent language that Bernard used to preach the Gospel, to reach out 
in love to those hearing his sermons, or reading his letters.  
 
For Montemaggi, it is clear that it is Ugolino’s sons who embody the truth 
that human personhood is ‘ontologically closer to love than death’.30 For 
                                                 
30 V. Montemaggi, ‘In Unknowability as Love’ p. 90. 
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they are able to understand that within the essential nature of human 
relationships there exists the capacity to understand—or be—something of 
God’s love. Their cries to their father, offering up their own bodies so that 
he might live (62), demonstrate for Montemaggi that human 
communication and language cannot possibly be only instrumental in its 
nature: it is constitutive of what persons are, created in and through love. 
That same lesson is something that the letters of Bernard so vividly 
communicate: it is the dialogical, the fraternal—above all else a person 
embedded in community—that we hear in those letters of love. The 
historical Bernard responds in love to his own family and his brethren—
and with anybody, in fact, who will listen—and so demonstrates in his own 
life a truth which Dante endorses: that any theological understanding can 
only be constituted by human creatures as they respond to the will and 
needs of other humans. It is as the theologian Janet Soskice says, ‘we must 
ask who we love, what we attend to, in order to know who we are and 
should be.’ 31 
 
4. Bernard and Aquinas: Loving and Knowing 
A more complicated picture of the historical Bernard emerges, however, 
when one considers not only the letters, and his lament for his brother, but 
his other sermons and treatises too. We have no record now of copies of the 
sermons super Cantica canticorum or of De diligendo Deo being housed in the 
libraries of Florence (it goes without saying that the record may be 
incomplete), but Dante undoubtedly would have known something of the 
Bernard that emerges from those works, if only via other sources, for 
example, the Vita Prima or the unusually long entry on Bernard in Jacobus 
de Voragine’s Legenda Aurea, or by the Franciscan textbook of Alexander of 
Hales, Summa Theologica, or by sermons preached in local pulpits by 
Dante’s contemporaries, or stories simply handed down within a 
devotional domestic sphere. So if not the letter, then certainly the sense of 
                                                 
31 J. M. Soskice, The Kindness of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 8. 
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the Bernard of those works might well have been established currency in 
Dante’s Florence. The first line of Paradiso XXXII refers, indeed, to ‘quel 
contemplante’, a description which points to Bernard’s fame as a mystic 
and echoes the lines of a near-contemporary Florentine lauda to Bernard, 
which described him as an ‘Aquila contemplativa’.32 
 
That sense of flight, of ascent, that is brought to mind by the image of a 
contemplative eagle, is important for this discussion, I think. Because the 
ascent to God which Bernard describes—steps and ladders being common 
tropes within Patristic and medieval writings on theology, of course, and 
found within Bernard’s De diligendo Deo and De gradibus humilitatis et 
superbiae—is a journey which leaves behind the sense of human selves that 
we find in his letters. Indeed, the cares of daily life, of communicating with 
brethren, of dealing with the vexations of illness, all seem to have been 
thrust off in a moment of mystical experience of celestial joy:  
Beatum dixerim et sanctum, cui tale aliquid in hac mortali vita raro 
interdum, aut vel semel, et hoc ipsum raptim, atque unius vix 
momenti spatio experiri donatum est. Te enim quodammodo 
perdere, tanquam qui non sis, et omnino non sentire teipsum, et a 
teipso exinaniri, et pene annullari, coelestis est conversationis, non 
humanae affectionis. Et si quidem e mortalibus quispiam ad illud 
raptim interdum ut dictum est et ad momentum admittitur, subito 
invidet saeculum nequam, perturbat diei malitia, corpus mortis 
aggravat, sollicitat carnis necessitas, defectus corruptionis non 
sustinet, quodque his violentius est, fraterna revocat charitas.33 
 
De diligendo Deo X, 27 
                                                 
32 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, Magliabechiano 11, 1, 122 (Banco Rari. 
18) f. 110r. 
33 Bernardi Opere, III, p.142. ‘I would count him blessed and holy to whom such 
rapture has been vouchsafed in this mortal life, for even an instant to lose yourself, 
as if you were emptied and lost and swallowed up in God, is no human love; it is 
celestial. But if sometimes a poor mortal feels that heavenly joy for a rapturous 
moment, then this wretched life envies his happiness, the malice of daily trifles 
disturbs him, this body of death weighs him down, the needs of the flesh are 
imperative, the weakness of corruption fails him, and above all brotherly love calls 
him back to duty.’ On Loving God, translated by E. Stiegman (Kalamazoo, MI: 
Cistercian Publications, 1995), pp. 29-30.  
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The movement of the soul upwards towards an experience of God is here 
described as a loss, as an emptying, as being swallowed up. These are 
metaphors of rapture where selfhood is subordinated to the experience of 
the divine and ultimately disappears: lost, emptied, consumed. A similar 
ecstatic experience is described in the sermons super Cantica canticorum, and 
here, of course, it is couched in the language of the erotic, through the 
metaphor of the consummation of the Bride and Bridegroom. In Sermon 23, 
Bernard says: 
 
In hoc arcanum et in hoc sanctuarium Dei si quem forte vestrum 
aliqua hora sic rapi et sic abscondi contigerit, ut minime avocet aut 
perturbet vel sensus agens, vel cura pungens, vel culpa mordens, 
vel ea certe, quae difficilius amoventur, irruentia imaginum 
corporearum phantasmata; poterit quidem hic, cum ad nos redierit, 
gloriari et dicere: Introduxit me rex in cubiculum suum (Cant. I, 3).34 
 
Sermon XXIII, 16 
In this case, the movement of the soul is less on an upward trajectory, an 
ascent, but is moving into a secret place, a bedroom, the cubiculum, of the 
Song. Again, and most importantly, it is a place removed from the 
everyday, from the cares of daily life, and the distractions of the senses and 
imagination.  
 
Of course, an ascent towards a vision of God, and an experience of the 
divine, is what the narrative of the Commedia most obviously and literally 
describes. As a poem it necessarily employs the art of metaphor (and all 
other poetic devices, too), just as the Song does, and just as Bernard does, in 
an attempt to say something true about a journey toward God. But there 
are differences in the role of the self for Bernard and Dante, here: 
                                                 
34 Bernardi Opere, I, pp. 149-50.  ‘If it should ever happen to one of you to be 
enraptured and hidden away in this secret place, this sanctuary of God, safe from 
the call and concern of the greedy senses, from the pangs of care, the guilt of sin 
and the obsessive fancies of the imagination so much more difficult to hold at bay 
— such a man, when he returns to us again, may well boast and tell us: ‘The King 
has brought me into his bedroom’.’ 
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substantive differences about how the self understands itself in relation to 
God, and therefore what it means for humans to know God, which I take 
up in my discussion below.  
 
The monastic tradition’s preoccupation with the Song of Songs has been 
well-documented. Denys Turner’s study, Eros and Allegory, throws light on 
what might seem strange exegetical territory for supposedly chaste, 
cloistered men.35 The transformation from the literal love-song—hymn to 
sensuality and sexuality—to allegory for the love of God, for the potential 
experience of the divine on Earth, had become in the medieval period 
uncontroversial. Bernard’s many sermons on the Song, like Origen’s and 
Gregory’s before him, create a rich and complex lesson in how humans can 
come to approach God.  His choice of the Song as a means to express truths 
about the nature of God itself suggests a predisposition to favour what 
might be called an affective theology: an understanding of the nature of the 
divine that depends upon human affective responses—in this case 
responses to words of sensuality, sexuality and human ecstasy.  Whatever 
the allegory a theologian might read into the Song, the reader and the 
congregation hearing the lesson must first know what it means to 
understand those words literally, in order that they understand well the 
allegory. It makes no sense to sidestep the fact that the Song of Songs is a 
work ostensibly about sexual love, even when the sermon that is derived 
from it replaces the erotic with the divine. In the extract from Sermon 23, 
above, Bernard suggests that the cubiculum is a place where the 
imagination no longer holds sway over the soul, but it is, in fact, indeed the 
work of the imagination that Bernard calls upon to understand the allegory 
he describes.  As Marguerite Chiarenza states: 
 
 
                                                 
35 See D. Turner, Eros and Allegory. 
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The imagination reaches concretely, personally, historically toward 
God’s love which, without it, can never be conceived except as 
rational abstraction […] Senses make it possible for the soul to 
imagine and thereby desire God.36 
   
This imagination fills out the metaphorical lesson of the sermon with data 
from its own concrete, personal, historical perspective, and by doing so it 
can conceive of an experience of God through human sensuality. The 
ultimate end, for Bernard, is the contemplation of God; the Song of Songs 
provides an approach that deploys a very human route.  
 
Bernard’s description of the experience of God that is possible on Earth—
his mystical experience—is, in the sermons on the Song of Songs, couched 
in the language of the erotic, as we have seen, but also in a language that is 
provisional and tentative.  
 
Volo dicere, nam et hoc pactus sum, quomodo mecum agitur in vos, 
meam insipientiam consolabor; si non, meam insipientiam 
confitebor. Fateor et mihi adventasse Verbum, in insipientia dico, et 
pluries. Cumque saepius intraverit ad me, non sensi aliquoties cum 
intravit. Adesse sensi, adfuisse recordor, interdum et praesentire 
potui introitum ejus, sentire nunquam, sed ne exitum quidem. Nam 
unde in animam meam venerit, quove abierit denuo eam dimittens; 
sed et qua vel introierit vel exierit; etiam nunc ignorare me fateor… 
 
Sermon LXXIV, 537 
 
                                                 
36 Chiaranza, ‘Solomon’s Song’, p. 204. 
37 Bernardi Opere, II, p. 242. ‘I want to tell you of my own experience, as I promised. 
Not that it is of any importance [...] I admit that the Word has also come to me—I 
speak as a fool—and has come many times—But although he has come to me, I 
have never been conscious of the moment of his coming. I perceived his presence, I 
remembered afterwards that he had been with me; sometimes I had a presentiment 
that he would come, but I was never conscious of his coming or his going. And 
where he comes from when he visits my soul, and where he goes, and by what 
means he enters and goes out, I admit that I do not know even now…’ 
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Earlier in Sermon XXIII, 9, Bernard had said, ‘Iam ad cubiculum veniamus. 
Quid et istud? Et id me praesumo scire quid sit?’.38 He thus casts into some 
doubt what he had already confirmed to be the case—that is, it is in the 
bedroom, in the cubiculum, that the Bride and the Bridegroom can finally 
find peace in their consummated love. The account that Bernard provides 
of his own mystical experience, then, is at times tentative, and its claims to 
knowledge are seemingly hesitant or provisional. What we are left with is 
an understanding of the saint’s theology that relegates intellectual 
knowledge of God to an experience of God that is open to interpretation. 
There are echoes here of the epistemological hesitancy of Saint Paul, in his 
second letter to the Corinthians, concerning his rapture to the third 
Heaven: 
 
scio hominem in Christo ante annos quattuordecim sive in corpore 
nescio sive extra corpus nescio Deus scit raptum eiusmodi usque ad 
tertium caelum.39 
 
But as we have seen, Bernard’s account, whilst suggesting an experience of 
God, at the same time describes a loss of selfhood. Bernard’s wish that he 
were emptied and lost and swallowed up in God does not speak of man 
becoming one with God (that way heresy lies), but rather of the self 
somehow dissolving into the Divine experience. This dual experience, of 
finding God but losing self—of presence and absence— seems prima facie 
full of contradictions.40 The presence of God is experienced as a kind of 
ecstasy, the ecstasy of an experiencing selfhood complete with an 
imagination capable of understanding the metaphors of human sensuality. 
                                                 
38 Bernardi Opere, I, p. 144. ‘Do I presume to know what it means to advance to the 
bedroom?’. 
39 II Corinthians 12. 2 ‘I know a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in 
the body, I know not, or out of the body, I know not; God knoweth), such a one 
caught up to the third heaven.’  
40 ‘The paradoxical necessity of both presence and absence is one of the most 
important of all the verbal strategies by means of which mystical transformation 
has been symbolized’. McGinn, The Presence of God, p. xviii. 
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And yet that selfhood is lost in God itself. This absence of self, the absence 
of being able to experience anything but God, lends force to the argument 
that intellectual knowledge of God is not what Bernard’s theology is 
ultimately concerned with. Both he and Paul write as ‘fools’: they make 
only provisional claims to knowledge. Bernard’s knowledge, such that it is, 
seems framed as affective experience, rather than intellectual 
understanding.  
 
However, despite this language of loss, and the language of provisionality, 
this is, indeed, a way of describing an encounter with God which is 
cataphatic in nature. That is, for Bernard, the language of ecstasy—of eros, of 
affective experience—which he finds in contemplation, succeeds in saying 
something true about God. This is a fact that must underpin all else in 
Bernard’s theology. Loving God in contemplation can mean knowing 
something of God, even whilst still on Earth. What does Dante make of 
Bernard’s cataphatism? Is this the kind of theology that Dante endorses in 
the Commedia?  
 
My contention, which I argue for below,41 is that Dante’s final vision of God 
is an ineffable one; indeed, ‘lo primo e ineffabile Valore’ is how God is 
described at Paradiso X, 3. Dante’s is a thorough-going apophatic theology, 
in contrast to Bernard’s cataphatic one. What is strange and tantalising, 
though, given this substantive difference, is that the two share similarities 
in how they write about their respective approaches to God (Bernard’s non-
fictional one, and Dante’s supposedly-non-fictional one). Because, like 
Bernard, Dante-personaggio, too, seems somehow to dissolve in the final 
lines of the poem, taking up his place in the divine universal order. The 
ardour for experiencing God is the same for theologian and for Dante. As 
we have seen, the character of Bernard burns for the sake of the pilgrim’s 
soul, at Paradiso XXXIII, 28-36, when he prays to the Virgin that Dante 
                                                 
41 See, especially, Chapter IV and Conclusion. 
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receive the ‘sommo piacer’—which sounds very much like something from 
his own oeuvre—the affective, ecstatic rapture that we saw in De diligendo 
Deo, above. And the curious lines which follow, asking Mary to preserve 
the vision and its affects, in order that the pilgrim can tell of them, offers 
another correspondence with the historical Bernard: for is not this exactly 
what the Abbot of Clairvaux has done, too, in his own written works? 
 
Ancor ti priego, regina, che puoi 
ciò che tu vuoli, che conserve sani, 
dopo tanto veder, li affetti suoi. 
 
Paradiso XXXIII, 34-36 
 
The delicate balancing act which Dante must pull off is one in which he 
must tell enough about his own ascent as a pilgrim: tell enough to do 
justice to the job that he wants to do, as prophet and poet, as scriba Dei, that 
is, in telling those on Earth just what he has seen on his journey through the 
afterlife, and what he has learned, whilst at the same time retaining his 
commitment to the ineffability—the apophaticism—of the Godhead. Theirs 
is a similarity which is misleading, then, because what the rest of the poem 
teaches is that what is required in the face of eternity is not a negation of 
self, a loss of self in an ecstatic moment, but rather a fully-elaborated 
personhood. A self that is ‘selfed’ to the maximum; that is, understanding, 
in the light of God’s grace, what createdness means for humans: for oneself 
in particular, in relation to other human persons, and in relation to God. It 
is an intellectual knowledge, but it is a knowledge that springs from a type 
of participation in being-human. The example par excellence, of course, is 
Christ. 
 
Christ’s human perfection, and Dante’s portrayal of the supposed author of 
the Song of Song himself, King Solomon, are linked in the Heaven of the 
Sun. Because it is somewhat surprising to find Solomon, in amongst the 
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theologians, described in terms that one might expect (as does the pilgrim) 
to be more fitting of the second person of the Trinity. Dante’s 
representation of Solomon places front and centre the issue of the 
sinfulness of all that carnal enjoyment in the Song of Songs, the 
uxoriousness for which he had become known, and the question mark 
which hung, in the Middle Ages, over his salvation.42 Importantly, it is the 
character of Thomas Aquinas, at Paradiso X, 109, who identifies the king of 
Israel for the pilgrim, confirming his salvation, and further explaining that 
Solomon is in fact the light ‘più bella’ among the dancing theologians. 
Three cantos later (XIII, 46-111), Aquinas explains to a puzzled Dante-
personaggio why it is the case that Solomon is so venerated, ‘come costui fu 
sanza pare…’ (89). For Pamela Williams, the portrayal of the wisdom of the 
Solomon who appears here concerns ‘the interdependence of loving and 
knowing […] two essential and complementary aspects underlying […] the 
Heaven of the Sun’.43 For Peter Dronke, Solomon is ‘the peerless 
embodiment of the unity of love and knowledge’.44 
 
Of course it is no coincidence that it is Thomas Aquinas, that paragon of 
knowing, who introduces Solomon the lover, Solomon the poet, Solomon 
the wise. In a typically Thomist way, indeed, using a scholastic vocabulary 
and latinisms throughout, he puts to bed the questions the pilgrim might 
have had over the use of such exalted language about the king. When 
Aquinas finishes his lesson with a warning to Dante-personaggio about how 
to proceed with rational enquiry—slowly and with leaden feet—(112), the 
poet shows us a Thomas that reaches almost caricature proportions. And 
yet, whilst in some senses the style of his overt scholasticism verges on the 
comical here, what, in fact, does the character of Aquinas say of Solomon’s 
                                                 
42 For explorations of the character of Solomon, his significance, and the Song of 
Songs, see: Nasti, Favole d’Amore; Pertile, La punta del disio. 
43 P. Williams, ‘Dante’s Heaven of the Sun and the Wisdom of Solomon’, Italica, 82 
(2005), 165–79 (p. 165). 
44 P. Dronke, Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), p. 94. 
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wisdom? Close attention to his words shows us a character that is at odds 
with such a cartoonish version of Thomism: 
 
    entro v’è l’alta mente u’ sì profondo 
saver fu messo che, se ’l vero è vero, 
a veder tanto non surse il secondo. 
 
 Paradiso X, 112-114 
  
Se ’l vero è vero, then of course no wiser king than Solomon rose up. Se ’l 
vero è vero, then there is no question that such a soul would now reside in 
Heaven.  The commentary tradition has, on the whole, read this line as a 
reference to God’s words to Solomon, in I Kings 3:12, when He says, ‘ecce 
feci tibi secundum sermones tuos et dedi tibi cor sapiens et intellegens in 
tantum ut nullus ante te similis tui fuerit nec post te surrecturus sit.’ ‘Il 
vero’, then, refers to the Bible, and specifically to God’s word. But why 
frame the phrase as a conditional statement, when all of God’s word, all of 
the Bible, must be unconditionally true—must be Truth—by its very 
nature? One reason might be that this line can be read in two ways: the 
first, yes, calling to mind the fact that God has already pronounced 
Solomon as wise and unsurpassed. But an alternative interpretation, in 
light of who is speaking the phrase here, might help alert readers to the fact 
that Dante’s is a peculiar characterisation of Thomas Aquinas, peculiar for 
reasons that I shall explore below. So, begins Aquinas, the arch-rationalist, 
the maker of water-tight syllogisms, ratiocinator-extraordinaire, if truth be 
true…surely this is the strangest form of words from someone so 
committed to the logical demonstration of truth? 
 
Is truth true? Is this the level at which Dante the poet wants (some of) us to 
interrogate our use of language? Are we to question whether Solomon is 
indeed saved, is indeed wisest amongst kings, and the più bella of the 
Heaven of the Sun? Must we further ask in what ways are the Heaven of 
the Sun, and the Commedia as a whole, themselves a kind of make-believe? 
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Must we subject the knowledge that we think we have about God, the 
Truth, to the same scrutiny?  We surely must, but, as Dante warns us in his 
address to the reader at the beginning of Paradiso II, it is not an undertaking 
to take lightly. What can we rely on, and where is our solid ground, as 
readers, as creatures, if we are to start worrying about the entire edifice of 
language and rational enquiry, of faith and reason, which the historical 
Aquinas helped to shore up?  
 
And where does that leave our interpretation of the writer of the Song of 
Songs in the poem? On the one hand, there is high praise here for Solomon-
the-king—and it would not be unreasonable to think that such praise 
would extend to his purported written works too. On the other hand, there 
is anxiety over poetic meaning and, indeed, meaning itself. I would 
suggest, then, that what is represented by this odd-speaking Aquinas, is 
not only a qualified endorsement of the Solomon of the Bible; what is 
presented, is an opportunity to question the limits of poetic endeavour, and 
ask how in creating characters like Aquinas, who both fulfil and challenge 
our expectations, Dante can create a mode of language in which the 
‘interdependence of loving and knowing’ can be adequately expressed.  
 
Because the theological argument about the primacy of the intellect, which 
is what the episode in the Heaven of the Sun raises, is one key to 
understanding how Dante is closer in crucial respects to the historical 
Aquinas, than he is to Bernard. That it is the character of Aquinas who 
introduces the supposed author of the Song—Aquinas, who, for all we 
know, did not write a commentary on the canticles, although his other 
exegetical works are indeed important—shows that Dante wants us to be 
thinking about ‘loving and knowing’ at the same time: that one without the 
other will get us nowhere in our search for meaning. It might be the case 
that the intellect is able, through God’s grace, to have a taste of that angelic 
bread that the Convivio attempts to describe so vividly, (I, i, 7-8), but it is in 
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loving too that we come to fulfil our promise as persons. The symbols of 
Saints Dominic and Francis, cherubic in wisdom and seraphic in love, 
(Paradiso XI, 37-39) respectively, embody Dante’s demonstration of this 
interdependence; but it is through the speaking presence of the characters 
like Thomas and Bernard, real persons in Dante-personaggio’s journey into 
the afterlife, that theories of loving and knowing must be brought together. 
‘All this’, says Kenelm Foster, ‘takes place against the backcloth of the sun, 
both light and fire’, both intellect and love. 45 
 
Those strange words about Solomon in line 113 of Paradiso X are far from 
the only unexpected utterances that issue from the character of Aquinas. 
His first words in that canto predict the pilgrim’s now near-guaranteed 
salvation, but employ the metaphorical language of ascent and mystical 
contemplation. The pilgrim, says Aquinas, must climb ‘quella scala’ (line 
86): an ascent which has led, and which will lead, God-willing, to the court 
of Heaven. The language of stairs and of ascent mirrors the imagery found 
in Bernard’s four-fold progression in De diligendo Deo. Echoes of the Song of 
Songs and its commentaries resound here too. Now there are two female 
lover figures: la sposa, the Bride of Christ, at X, 140 (and also in Paradiso XI, 
31) and Beatrice, whom Aquinas describes as ‘la bella donna’ (93): she who 
gives the pilgrim the strength to climb the stair.  
 
In contrast to this upward trajectory, flawed philosophical arguments will 
only make your wings flap downwards, ‘quei che ti fanno in basso batter 
l'ali!’ (XI, 3). Moreover, these words could be read as explicitly critical of 
the type of philosopho-theology that the historical Aquinas had helped to 
reinvigorate. When Thomas himself speaks of Solomon in Paradiso XIII, he 
says that in order to be the wisest of kings, there was no need for Solomon 
                                                 
45 K. Foster, 'The Celebration of Order: Paradiso X', in The Two Dantes, pp. 120-36 
(p. 122). My italics. 
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to know the answers to questions about, for example, the Primum Mobile 
and first causes, or ‘se necesse | con contingente mai necesse fenno…’ (98-
99). But as we know, such questions fulfil absolutely critical logical and 
substantial functions within the works of the historical Aquinas.  
 
So the portrait of Saint Thomas that begins to emerge in the Heaven of the 
Sun, even in just the few lines that we have seen above, which calls to mind 
the works of other theologians and other traditions, challenges the 
expectations that readers may have had of the character. Of course there is 
little value—none at all, really—in saying, for example, that ‘Dante was a 
Thomist’ or ‘Dante was a mystic’. That drive towards over-simplification 
must be avoided in order to do justice to the richness and subtlety of the 
poem; such binary thinking, so easy and attractive, must be held at bay in 
order to be able to get a grasp of the ‘intellectual eclecticism’46 of the poet. 
But in any case, even before we fall prey to those easy labels, here in the 
case of the character of Thomas, Dante has already begun to upset them.  
 
For as readers—both medieval and modern—we might have expected 
certain hallmarks of a Thomist scholasticism to be present in any 
representation of Aquinas, particularly in the style of the words that he 
uses. It might have been reasonable to expect a commitment to clarity in 
the use of language; a careful, modest and methodical approach in drawing 
distinctions; perhaps a propensity to use example and counterexample, 
argument and counter-argument, rebuttal and rejoinder; above all, a type 
of language that removes any sense of the author or speaker: a 
depersonalised language, a language that seems to arrive at its audience as 
if from no-where and from no-one. Denys Turner says that in Aquinas 
there is an ‘almost ruthless literary self-denial’: Thomas’s is a disappearing 
                                                 
46 Gilson, ‘Dante and Christian Aristotelianism’ p. 72. 
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act.47 In his two great Summae, at least, he could not be farther from 
Bernard’s beautifully eloquent, loving, and personal writing.  
 
A negation of the self, then, occurs in both Bernard and Thomas, in two 
very different ways: Bernard narrates his loss of selfhood within a body of 
work which contains an abundance of selves, a preoccupation with person-
to-person interaction, and a very personal relationship with the Divine. 
Bernard, as we have seen, burns with an ardour for God that transmits, in 
the writing, his authentic self, just as he writes of losing it. Aquinas’s loss is 
at the level of the textual: an authorial effacement. This writing is no less 
dramatic and no less authentic, in its way, than the mystical story that 
Bernard tells, and it has, inherent its very structure, an absolute dedication 
to unveiling the truth that is available to creatures on Earth. Thomas’s 
authenticity can be read in his disappearing: he is not present in his text, 
and yet this absence of self belies his own very personal, very humane, 
dedication to unclouding the minds of sinners, and to equipping those of 
his order to preach to that end too. In his measured way he lays out the 
argument in the workaday constructions of his architectonic, such that any 
person, schooled in Latin, should be able to follow: it is a body of work into 
which any self can be inserted.   
 
Both these disappearances have consequences for how we think about 
Dante’s writing, about his project, and about his claims for what the 
pilgrim-poet experiences in the Paradiso. Because, what this chapter has 
attempted to show, is that at on some level, Dante’s writing has all the 
appearance of a Bernard-style personality, the same commitments to 
persons and their relationships, an eloquence and beauty in language 
seemingly capable of unlocking or revealing something true about 
humanity and its relationship with the Creator. But Dante-personaggio’s 
journey to God is not a journey towards loss; in the Commedia, it is a 
                                                 
47 Turner, ‘How to do things with words’ p. 294. 
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journey towards a finding of self, and understanding what it means, truly, 
to be. In the final lines of the poem, we are not given knowledge about what 
God’s nature consists in—this is still beyond our ability to express—but 
Dante’s journey teaches us, at least, that as creatures we can participate in 
the eternal universal order. Dante’s didactic commitment, then, is also 
Thomas’s, although they employ very different genres and registers. The 
range of their vision is delimited by the same insight: that God must 
remain unknowable. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas famously 
makes the point explicit: 
 
Est igitur triplex cognitio hominis de divinis. Quarum prima est 
secundum quod homo naturali lumine rationis, per creaturas in Dei 
cognitionem ascendit. Secunda est prout divina veritas, intellectum 
humanum excedens, per modum revelationis in nos descendit, non 
tamen quasi demonstrata ad videndum, sed quasi sermone prolata 
ad credendum. Tertia est secundum quod mens humana elevabitur 
ad ea quae sunt revelata perfecte intuenda.48 
 
As I showed above, Dante does, in fact, at times, give us the type of a 
Thomas that we might have expected. At Paradiso XIII, 88-90, Aquinas 
seems to want to prompt Dante-personaggio to configure his questions into 
the format found within the Summa:  
 
 Or s’i’ non procedesse avanti piùe, 
‘Dunque, come costui fu sanza pare?’ 
comincerebber le parole tue. 
 
This lesson in how to construct a sound methodology in thinking, seems to 
bring us back to a figuration of Aquinas which is familiar to any reader of 
the theologian’s works, because raising questions and suggesting responses 
                                                 
48 SCG IV, 1.5. ‘There is, then, in man a threefold knowledge of things divine. Of 
these, the first is that in which man, by the natural light of reason, ascends to a 
knowledge of God through creatures. The second is that by which the divine 
truth—exceeding the human intellect—descends on us in the manner of revelation, 
not, however, as something made clear to be seen, but as something spoken in 
words to be believed. The third is that by which the human mind will be elevated 
to gaze perfectly upon the things revealed.’ 
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is exactly what the saint does throughout his oeuvre. What is interesting, 
and somewhat amusing, in this scene, is that Aquinas raises the objections 
on the pilgrim’s behalf. The tenor of this exchange seems to be, let me order 
your thoughts in a more rational way, Dante, so that the truth that I (Thomas) am 
telling you, will be self-evident.  
 
Our difficulty as readers when we encounter the character of Thomas 
Aquinas in the poem is to reflect on our expectations of what we think 
Aquinas would do and say, whilst responding to Dante’s own creation. In 
actual fact, of course, Dante uses the characterisation of Thomas in the 
poem to critique Thomism itself, in both positive and negative ways, and 
further, sets up a dialectic between the theologian’s position and his own, 
via back-and-forth intellectual play, first satisfying and then confounding 
our expectations about the character. Our reading is never divorced from 
the theoretical assumptions that we have already made and applied: the 
interpretive act that we attempt both endows the poet and poem with a 
supposed theoretical position prior to attempting to extract it from any 
particular character. The background beliefs, about Aquinas or about 
Dante’s apparent Thomism, that the reader brings, allow access only 
through a prism, as it does in all hermeneutical or intellectual activity, 
which might be more or less transparent to the reader themselves. Dronke 
describes the difficult intellectual task of interpreting Dante’s poetry 
beyond that which he has ‘supplied us’ as ‘a matter of colouring our own 
Dante-portrait […] The colours we bring to it are primarily our own 
intellectual and moral preconceptions’.49 
 
With that methodological hazard in mind, I sketch, below, a very brief 
overview of the critical terrain germane to the question of Aquinas’s 
intellectualism, as it contrasts with Bernard’s affective theology: some of 
the currents and trends in how Dante studies have responded to Dante’s 
                                                 
49 Dronke, Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions, p. 79. 
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relationship with the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Simon Gilson has asked 
whether there is a ‘systematic oppositional structure in the poem’, and in 
doing so reminds us that Dante does not just appropriate theory from 
elsewhere, he constructs his own trenchant responses to these theological 
debates, in new and dazzling ways.   
 
In the early twentieth century, for scholars such as Mandonnet, Busnelli 
and Vandelli, Dante was clearly, obviously, a Thomist, ‘delighting to 
reason, even in verse, about form and matter, act and potency.’50 The 
philosophical content for these critics, that is, the substance of Dante’s 
theoretical position in the Commedia, was handed down by the saint, almost 
unaltered. That picture, of Dante as Aquinas’s pupil, has a long history, 
made explicit in the commentary tradition at least as far back as Jacopo 
Della Lana, in the 1320s, who writes about the Dominican extensively. 
Etienne Gilson presented a study of the poet which widened his pool of 
theological sources beyond only Aquinas, to include especially Albert, and 
even Siger.51 Bruno Nardi, too, challenged the earlier one-dimensional 
reading of the poet, demonstrating the points of difference between Dante 
and Aquinas, and finding that in significant ways Dante could not be called 
Thomist in any strict sense; in fact, Nardi can be credited with bringing into 
focus Dante’s distinctive syncretism: ‘egli non è averroista e neppure 
tomista; non esclusivamente aristotelico, né soltanto neoplatonico, o 
agostiniano puro’.52 He particularly emphasised the Neoplatonistic 
elements in the poet’s thought and demonstrated how substantive issues 
such as the role of angels and the creation of matter, were treated 
differently by theologian and poet.53 Kenelm Foster, although agreeing 
                                                 
50 K. Foster, ‘St Thomas and Dante’, in The Two Dantes, pp. 56-65 (p. 56). 
51 E. Gilson, Dante et la Philosophie (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939). See 
especially, pp. 223-79. 
52 B. Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante nella Divina Commedia e le fonti della filosofia di Dante 
(Spianate: presso l’autore, 1912), p. 69. 
53 Nardi’s many essays relevant to these topics are collected in Saggi di filosofia 
dantesca, 2nd edn (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967); Dal ‘Convivio’ alla ‘Commedia’ 
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with Nardi’s view on most of the substantial points of difference he had 
highlighted, suggested that a more nuanced way to read Dante and 
Aquinas together sees them share a commitment to ‘discrezione’ and ‘the 
need for and the beauty of rational discrimination, measure and sobriety of 
judgement’.54 An important point of agreement in the substance of Dante’s 
and Aquinas’s theoretical position concerns, as we have seen above, and as 
Foster also underlines, the primacy of the intellect over the will. At Paradiso 
XXVIII, 109-111, Dante makes this Thomist point explicit:  
 
   Quinci si può veder come di fonda 
l’esser beato ne l’atto che vede, 
non in quel ch’ama, che poscia seconda. 
 
Angela Meekins has argued that the language that the character of Thomas 
uses throughout his appearance in the Heaven of the Sun, but especially in 
his encomium to Saint Francis, is a language that one might expect from his 
fellow scholastic, and opposite number in the Heaven of the Sun, 
Bonaventure.55 Meekins suggests that the character of Thomas that the poet 
creates is a ‘corrected’ one, who ‘expresses his thoughts to the pilgrim in 
the language of poesia [and] now favours the intellectual system most 
compatible with poesia: the Christian Neoplatonism of Bonaventure.’56 We 
saw above that there are, indeed, rather unexpected utterances from the 
Dominican theologian: in particular, I have highlighted the mystical 
language of ascent at Paradiso X, 86, which I suggested echoes the metaphor 
found within Bernard’s oeuvre. In fact, the character of Thomas’s language 
is fully wrought in metaphor: his opening address to the pilgrim, in just the 
first twelve lines, 82-93, contains a mix of at least six different images and 
                                                 
(Rome: Nella sede dell’Istituto, 1960); Nel mondo di Dante (Rome: Storia e 
Letteratura, 1944). 
54 Foster, ‘St Thomas and Dante’, p. 63. For other important contributions to these 
debates see: Mazzotta, ‘The Heaven of the Sun’; Barolini, The Undivine ‘Comedy’, 
pp. 173, 203–06; Moevs, The Metaphysics, of Dante’s ‘Comedy’, pp. 12-13, 86, 108-11. 
55 A. Meekins, ‘Reflecting on the Divine: Notes on Dante’s Heaven of the Sun’, The 
Italianist, 18 (1998), 28–70. 
56 Meekins, ‘Reflecting’, p. 56. 
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metaphors: the rays of grace; a love which is kindled; the stairs climbed; the 
wine which slakes the pilgrim’s thirst; the water not descending to the sea; 
the plants in the garland which bloom, and so on. Such flowery language 
from so sober a theologian is indeed noteworthy.   
 
And so when Zygmunt Barański writes that the character of Thomas ‘fails 
to speak in a manner which is in keeping with his customary style of 
writing’,57 it is undoubtedly true. Barański’s conclusion is that Thomas’s 
use of language in the Heaven of the Sun is a clue in deciphering Dante’s 
doctrinal allegiances, or ways of knowing, which for Barański are inherited 
from the ‘symbolic-exegetical’ lineage of Plato, Augustine and 
Bonaventure, rather than from Aristotle and Aquinas. 
 
[Dante] favoured symbolic-exegetical epistemologies over 
intellectual systems [and] within symbolism he privileged poetry—
his poetry—as the most effective way of catching a glimpse of the 
divine hidden signs. Knowledge and the means to achieve 
understanding are key themes […] Our human limitations and the 
debts we owe to God make it an absolute necessity […] that we 
recognize and follow that epistemology which is most likely to 
yield a sense of creation and its Maker.58 
 
Such a reading seems to make much of the chimeric qualities in the 
character of Aquinas; I hesitate, along with Simon Gilson, to draw the line 
so sharply in Dante’s supposed theoretical commitments and sources, but it 
must be the case that in giving Aquinas-the-character an at times 
distinctively un-Thomist voice, Dante makes a comment on the theology 
itself. Dante may not have had, actually, says Gilson, a ‘precise idea of 
competing ideologies’, but the syncretism for which he has now become 
celebrated does indeed provide rich veins for interpretation, and this is 
                                                 
57 Z. G. Barański, ‘Dante’s Signs’ in Dante and the Middle Ages: Literary and Historical 
Essays, ed. by J.C. Barnes and C. Ó Cuilleanáin (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
1995), pp. 139-180 (p. 158). 
58 Barański, ‘Dante’s Signs’, p. 167. 
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what such characterisations highlight. What does it mean, though, when 
Barański claims we must, with Dante, ‘recognize and follow’ an 
‘epistemology’, when the poet is, like Aquinas, committed to God being 
unutterable, ineffable? All human descriptions of God must fail, no matter 
if we talk in metaphor or in syllogisms, symbols or formal logic. And thus 
there is no way for symbols to ‘catch a glimpse of’ God, because all signs 
are equally blind; when it comes to God-speak, our ways of knowing, our 
epistemologies, have no way of converting their insights into language. 
Aquinas’s position is stronger still: God is not only unutterable, or 
ineffable, for us on Earth, he is fundamentally unknowable too (‘licet per 
revelationem gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei 
quasi ignoto coniungamur.’) 59 
 
The ‘customary style’ that we find in the historical Aquinas, the slow and 
plodding writing, the exhaustive and exhausting question and reply, is 
significantly different from poetry, of course, significantly different, even—
in most places—from the humble metaphor. And there has been some 
agonising within Dante studies about the status that Aquinas accords to 
metaphor, and by extension, poetry, as ‘infima inter omnes doctrinas’,60 
whether something like the Commedia can ever, according to his lights, be 
called a doctrina, let alone the poema sacro, as Dante would have us believe 
it.61 This is the debate which Denys Turner resuscitates in his essay, ‘How 
to do things with words’, concluding that, in fact, for Thomas, metaphor 
might be considered ‘one of the ways of talking truthfully about real 
events’. Turner’s point is that metaphor—and hence also poetry—is lowly 
only in the sense that it is demotic, and thus, ‘closest to our ordinary ways 
of groping towards the unutterable’.62 
                                                 
59 ST Ia.xii.13.ad1: ‘In this life we do not know what God is, even by the grace of 
faith. Hence, by grace we are made one with God as to somewhat unknown to us.’  
60 ST Ia.i.9.1. [‘[…] the least of all sciences.’ 
61 See T. Barolini, Dante’s Poets: Textuality and Truth in the ‘Comedy’ (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 281. 
62 Turner, ‘How to do things with words’, p. 304. 
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I gestured, above, to the workaday nature of the historical Aquinas’s 
writing: how it can be read—strangely, in its learned way—as accessible to 
all rational creatures. We can follow the way along the road that Aquinas 
treads ahead of us: most are capable, although it is often a hard road and 
requires intellectual graft. In that sense it is not unlike what Dante 
demands of (some of) his readers, the ones who follow in the little barks 
after his ship; the epic tale is a hard one to write and to read, and although 
Dante’s poetry is written in an accessible vernacular, it remains difficult, 
subtle, even opaque, to readers who do not study well. Dante writes 
poetry—not, perhaps, ‘groping towards’—but nonetheless keenly aware of, 
the ‘unutterable’ and the limitations of being human. It appears that what 
the narrative of the Commedia suggests—if readers are to take seriously 
Dante’s claims to truth—and what the audacity of his poetry seems to 
evoke, is that an encounter with the Divine really did happen and, as in 
Bernard’s case, it gave rise to an unrivalled eloquence capable of capturing 
something truly other-worldly. Robin Kirkpatrick notes that this is a 
familiar and yet perhaps misguided characterisation of the nature of 
poetry, or artistic endeavor more generally. Poetry is not suited uniquely to 
giving us the ‘world transfigured’ in epiphanic moments, ‘when the 
lighting-effects of eternity seem to break through our temporal gloom’. 
Such epiphanies, both in life and in poetry, might not be what they seem: 
 
[T]here are reasons—some of them theoretical, some of them 
specifically Dantean—to wonder whether the incandescent swoop 
of lyrical vision may sometimes be a camera-trick, or, less 
skeptically, whether such moments are all that poetry can 
encompass […] Dante […] understands very well that, as human 
beings, we live most truly when we live on a comically small scale, 
within the limits of our human lineaments.63 
 
 
                                                 
63 R. Kirkpatrick, ‘Polemics as Praise’ in Montemaggi and Treherne (eds) Dante’s 
‘Commedia’ Theology as Poetry, pp. 14-35 (p. 18). 
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Kirkpatrick’s point is that Dante’s poetry, as well as leading us upwards, 
with Bernard, towards a vision of God, indeed, through an ‘incandescent 
swoop of lyrical vision’, can also lead us back to ourselves, to the comedy 
of our ordinary lives, to a better knowledge of our ‘human lineaments’. 
Poetry can encompass this too and demonstrate the wonder and the awe in 
the prosaic, the everyday, revealed through hard work, perhaps, or by 
simply connecting with other human individuals. And that is an insight 
which Thomas can offer too: we must work with what he have, and strive 
to know more and to know better, in our earthly life. Our limitations and 
errors—and our capacity to understand them—is a theme that I take up in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III 
Narrating Turning Points 
 
1. Changing personhood 
This chapter considers the nature of error for the theologians in this 
study—Augustine, Gregory, Bernard and Aquinas—and shows how 
turning points structure either their historical lives, or their significance in 
the Commedia. In the case of each of the four theologians, turning points are 
present either in their biographies, or in the poem: Augustine’s conversion, 
communicated so vividly in the Confessions; Gregory’s error concerning 
angelology in the Commedia; Bernard’s experience of the beatific vision; and 
Aquinas’s vision and subsequent re-evaluation of his scholastic method. 
The chapter will focus especially on Augustine in Part One, and Gregory 
and Aquinas in Part Two. A consideration of analogous errors for Dante-
pilgrim will be considered alongside the theme of error more generally and 
its importance for the conception of personhood within the poet’s theology. 
 
1.1 ‘Birth into the light of time…born into the light of eternity’1 
The souls the pilgrim meets in Purgatory, of all the characters in the 
Commedia, are those which are undergoing change. Purgatory is the cantica 
of the death of vice, and the birth of virtue, a turning point which allows, 
through the formation of character—through learning, through 
habituation, in time, in place, and in community—the entrance of the souls 
to communion with God in Paradise. The process of purgation corrects the 
errors with which the souls were afflicted when they lived on Earth. In 
Virgil’s words, sin and error are the result of ‘amore […] d’animo’, which 
results in human love being directed at the wrong object—some evil—or at 
                                                 
1 Confessions, IX, viii (17). All quotations in Latin from the Confessions are taken 
from the critical edition of the text by J.J. O’Donnell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992). All English translations of the Confessions are quoted from the edition by 
Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Both use the same 
chapter and paragraph numbers. 
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the right object, but in the wrong degree, either with an excess of vigour, or 
lack thereof:  
 
‘Né creator né creatura mai’, 
cominciò el, ‘figliuol, fu sanza amore, 
naturale o d’animo; e tu ’l sai. 
 
 Lo naturale è sempre sanza errore, 
ma l’altro puote errar per malo obietto 
o per troppo o per poco di vigore.’ 
 
     Purgatorio XVII, 91-96 
 
The liminal spaces and time of Purgatory present theological questions 
about salvation and virtue more generally, questions whose answers have 
consequences for the status of error amongst the saved. This is the case 
because confession of sin, and conversion through Christ, are not yet 
enough for these individuals to enter the kingdom of Heaven, even though 
they have already been granted the grace of salvation. And so they find 
themselves caught on the terraces of vice that defined them as persons on 
Earth; caught here, seemingly, for years and years —far longer, in some 
cases, than the time such vices defined their earthly deficiencies. For 
example, Statius tells the pilgrim of his five hundred years purging 
prodigality and his four hundred purging a lack of religious zeal. And here 
on the mountain the souls replay and replay the corresponding virtue, like 
good Aristotelians (EN 2.1), until those virtues are habituated and become 
those souls themselves, become their very personhoods. 
 
Such, then, is the nature of Dante’s Purgatory: the replaying of a turning 
point, over and over; a turning point from vice to virtue which was 
unrecognised by them on Earth as essential for becoming Christ-like, even 
though these souls, by necessity, were repentent. Teodolinda Barolini calls 
Purgatorio ‘the most Augustinian’ of Dante’s three cantiche, so structured as 
it is by time, by the focus on replacing desire for certain earthly goods with 
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desire only for God, by ‘recuperating and redeeming the past’.2 On the 
mountain, in real time and in real space, the souls learn about the impact 
that their vicious characters had in life, and indeed, in the afterlife, and the 
price that now must be paid in order to correct that vice with virtue.3 It is a 
price that the souls apparently pay willingly and joyously. For example, at 
Purgatorio XVIII, 115, the penitent slothful say, ‘Noi siam di voglia a 
muoverci sí pieni’. Atop the mountain awaits the Earthly Paradise and 
their entrance to Heaven.  
 
Indeed, the Mountain of Purgatory literally delivers them up to Heaven, it 
quakes and cries like a labouring mother. The poet compares the trembling 
of the mountain to the earthquakes of Delos, where another mythical 
mother gave birth:  ‘Latona in lei facesse ‘l nido | a parturir li due occhi del 
cielo’ Purgatorio XX, 131-32. Earlier in the canto, Dante-personaggio hears a 
shade cry out the name of Mary, ‘come fa donna che in parturir sia’ 
(Purgatorio XX, 19-21). This shade sounds like a woman giving birth and 
simultaneously celebrates the Nativity, the Virgin birth, and here in 
particular, Mary’s poverty and lack of avarice. Once the mountain delivers 
up its soul to Heaven, the audience of penitent souls rejoices at the safe 
birth by shouting, “Gloria in excelsis Deo!”, just as ‘i pastor che prima udir 
quel canto’ (Purgatorio XX.136-40), at Christ’s birth. 
 
The fact of the Incarnation, a birth into time—indeed, the ‘ontological 
event’4 that structures time itself—provides the ground for any human 
turning point to take place, through grace.  Birth, then, is a fitting metaphor 
for the journey that the penitent souls and the pilgrim make from 
Purgatory to Paradise, because they cross from one realm of existence to 
                                                 
2 Barolini, The Undivine Comedy, p. 101. 
3 Lino Pertile, in La Punta del disio, describes the process of purgation thus: ‘un 
processo di rieducazione e conversione del desiderio terrestre in desiderio celeste’, 
p. 37.   
4 Harrison, The Body of Beatrice, p. 61. 
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another. Once they have completed their penance and all vices are erased, 
just as the Ps on Dante-personaggio’s forehead are erased, their personhood 
is renewed and ready for the next life. As Peter Hawkins has made explicit, 
it is also the case that this final turning point has parallels with the turning 
points—or conversions—on Earth: 
 
Dante draws a connection between two rites of passage: just as on 
Earth the newly baptized cross over into the Body of Christ, so the 
souls in Purgatory also move in exitu, out of sin’s dominion, and 
across the threshold of their sanctification.5 
 
These conversions are, of course, in Christ’s very own words, considered to 
be as births too: ‘respondit Iesus amen amen dico tibi nisi quis renatus 
fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu non potest introire in regnum Dei’ (John 3:5),6 and 
conversion as birth is a theme that Augustine takes up and elaborates in 
narrating the multiple turning points of the Confessions. How Dante’s 
conception of personhood is informed by Augustine’s narration of his own 
conversion and, specifically, the Augustinian self that undergoes this 
journey to rebirth, will form the focus of Part One of this chapter. 
Augustine’s account of conversion, like Dante-personaggio’s story, is a 
journey out of the darkness and into the light; Augustine calls his own 
earthly birth one ‘into the light of time’, his conversion to God, a birth ‘into 
the light of eternity’.7 On their journeys from the dark wood, or, in 
Augustine’s case, the wooded summit, to the homeland of peace, the 
kingdom of Heaven, Augustine and Dante are pilgrims beset by 
ambushes—moral and psychological, from outside of themselves and from 
within—which they must navigate and then retell, as writers 
commissioned by God. But it is approaching cliché, now, to claim that Saint 
Augustine invented, in his Confessions, the genre of autobiography. Cliché 
                                                 
5 Hawkins, Dante’s Testaments, p. 257. 
6 ‘Jesus answered: Amen, amen I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water 
and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.’ 
7 Confesssions, IX, viii (17). Chadwick, p. 166. 
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aside, it is important to have a grasp of the kind of template for life-writing 
that Augustine created and handed down; the creation, that is, of a ‘self’ 
character, and also the creation of a ‘self narrator’ character, these 
characters standing apart, one seemingly able to reflect on the state of the 
other.  
 
Dante the author, of course, uses and adopts this model in his creation of 
Dante-personaggio and Dante-poeta in the Commedia, essential devices that 
structure the narrative of the epic poem; that embody its central theological 
lesson; and that fulfil the prophetic call of the narrator of the poema sacro.8 
At the most fundamental level, in both Augustine and Dante’s works, the 
self entity which these twin characters create, once fused together —
developed over time, one giving birth to the other, and vice versa—is at its 
core the story of an inner self; a self which is painfully aware that its will 
and desire are in dynamic tension with its intellect; a self slowly coming to 
the knowledge of its createdness and dependency on God, and its salvation 
through Christ. Augustine as a character is almost entirely missing from 
the story of the Commedia, but as a model for writing about an inner self, a 
self turned inward in its search for God, he ‘functions as an extensive, even 
an informing presence within the text itself’.9 
 
[For Augustine] the goal of human life is defined epistemologically 
(wisdom and understanding), the road is defined in ethical terms 
(virtue and purification), and the whole process must be 
understood psychologically (as a turning and journey of the soul).10 
                                                 
8 ‘The stories within Dante’s story invite ironic interpretation and critical debate, as 
do the tales told by prisoners protesting their conviction. But in Dante’s 
autobiographical story, he is at once the prosecution and the defense. There are 
two Dantes, just as there are two Augustines in the Confessions. Italian editors of 
the latter work take pains to distinguish “Agostino narrato” from “Agostino 
narratore” in their commentaries. In Dante studies, the distinction between the 
pilgrim and the poet serves the same purpose. In a conversion narrative, the 
distinction creates the temporal illusion of an experience retrospectively 
recounted.’ J. Freccero, ‘The Portrait of Francesca’, p. 13. 
9 Hawkins, ‘Divide and Conquer’, p. 472. 
10 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p. 72. 
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Augustine’s so-called inward turn, sketched in Books I-VIII of the 
Confessions, begins as the story of a baby, a child, and then a young man, 
whose restless soul cannot find satisfaction in earthly desires. The 
narrator’s prayer to God casts the young Augustine, an adolescent seduced 
by his own sexual appetite, as a wanderer adrift, in exile, (II, ii (4)), another 
Ulysses, walking the streets of Babylon (II, iii (8)), and at the bottom of the 
abyss (II, iv (9)). The vice of lust continues to plague Augustine, of course, 
for years, according to the narrator, and it is the sticking point which his 
intellect comes up against again and again as he matures.  
 
But in the early years of Augustine’s prayer, not only does the narrator 
consider his physical body the locus of abomination, the life of his mind is 
similarly error-struck. Book III tells of his noble turn towards philosophy, 
via the works of Cicero. Augustine the narrator recalls how in youth he 
longs for wisdom: ‘viluit mihi repente omnis vana spes, et inmortalitatem 
sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili, et surgere coeperam, ut 
ad te redirem’ (III, iv (7)).11 This turn towards philosophy is the first step, in 
the narrator Augustine’s mind, towards God: the young Augustine cannot 
see at this point that it is knowledge of God that he desires, but he knows 
that it is a desire for knowledge nonetheless. A subsequent early re-
introduction to the Bible does nothing to impress him, because what began 
as a noble turn, according to his own lights, transforms into the proud 
vanity of loquacious men, men who are purporting to teach the truth, but 
who are peddling falsehoods (III, vi (10)). 
 
Thus the first eight books of the Confessions tell of Augustine’s slow and 
painful journey toward Christ. But this is not a story slow in the telling: 
                                                 
11 Confessions, p.25. ‘[I] longed for the immortality of wisdom with an incredible 
ardour […], impressed not by […] the literary expression but by the content.’ 
Chadwick, p. 39. 
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indeed, although it contains many digressions along the way—studied, 
plotted digressions, of course—the tension that builds towards the 
climactic conversion scene in Turin in Book VIII is paradigmatic of a 
dramatic narrative. There are recurring tropes within Augustine’s story of 
self—of slippery words and of longed-for truths; of walks in gardens and 
of discussions with friends; of lives mirrored in other lives, in books read, 
or in books heard of read: these combine to create a cohesive whole, a sense 
that the reader is being moved, ineluctably, toward a glorious end. But 
what, overwhelmingly, stitches this plot together is the ringing narratorial 
voice praying to his God, haranguing the younger self; the voice lamenting 
the time lost, the vices strengthening, the sins committed; the voice that 
now, years later as venerable bishop, can speak so directly of the agonies of 
the desiring body, and of the desiring mind.  
 
The young Augustine inches towards a conversion in Christ: first realising 
that his sexual desire is misplaced and corrupting, and yet unable to 
control it; later, understanding that his mind needs intellectual and 
spiritual sustenance. Good fortune brings him towards philosophy and the 
Platonists, but his spiritual life gets hijacked, seemingly, by the untruths of 
the Manichees. The story as told, is one of a mind refusing to accept the 
source of the truth of all the other truths that he has by now accepted. The 
narrator writes of this as wilful error, until the final relief—the truth of the 
Word—becomes irresistible.  
 
It is a story of knowing: a self known to itself, and yet refusing to see the 
truth that is before it. The turn to philosophy is not a wrong turn, indeed, 
Augustine explicitly states that he could not have become the Christian that 
he did, without such a grounding in truth-seeking. And that sliver of 
intellectual knowledge, the Platonist Good, that he enjoys in Book VII—the 
light of knowledge, indeed—comes, tellingly, before his full conversion to 
Christ: ‘et pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus’ (VII, xvii 
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(23)).12 Janet Martin Soskice notes that although this is often characterised 
by critics as a failed conversion, it is nonetheless successful in making clear 
to Augustine that there is more to see with the intellect than is available 
through philosophy alone.13 The so-called failure of the vision delineates a 
world of truth, throws it into relief; it will be available to Augustine only 
through Christ. When he falls back into sin from this heightened state, the 
pain is even more acute: ‘quid patimur?’, he cries in desperation, to his 
friend, Alypius (VIII, viii (19)).14 
 
So the labour that Augustine must endure is long and hard, the birth pangs 
difficult to bear, the fight against his own will a struggle: ‘quae illa 
tormenta parturientis cordis mei, qui gemitus, deus meus!’.15 Augustine is 
not alone in his agonies. He narrates a story that Ponticianus tells about his 
friend, who converted to Christianity whilst reading of St Antony: ‘dixit 
hoc, et turbidus parturitione novae vitae reddidit oculos paginis’.16 These 
births, these conversions, cause pain and suffering; and they give rise, in 
the individual, to a seemingly dissociative state. 
 
tu autem, domine, inter verba eius retorquebas me ad me ipsum, 
auferens me a dorso meo, ubi me posueram, dum nollem me 
adtendere; et constituebas me ante faciem meam, ut viderem, quam 
turpis essem, quam distortus et sordidus, maculosus et ulcerosus.17  
 
                                                 
12 Confessions, p. 84. ‘…in the flash of a trembling glance.’ Chadwick, p. 127. 
13 Soskice, ‘Monica’s Tears: Augustine on Words and Speech’, New Blackfriars, 83 
no. 980 (2002) 446-58. 
14 Confessions, p.96.  ‘What is wrong with us?’ Chadwick, p. 146. 
15 Confessions, VII, vii (11), p. 79.  ‘What torments my heart suffered in mental 
pregnancy, what groans, my God!’ Chadwick, pp.119-20. 
16 Confessions, VIII, vi (15), p. 95. ‘So he spoke, and in pain at the coming to birth of 
new life, he returned his eyes to the book’s pages.’ Chadwick, pp. 143-4. 
17 Confessions, VIII, vii (16), p. 95. ‘Lord, you turned my attention back to myself. 
You took me up from behind my own back where I had placed myself because I 
did not wish to observe myself […] and you set me before my face […] so that I 
could see how vile I was.’ Chadwick, p. 144. 
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But—crucially for my discussion of the souls in Dante’s own journey 
through the afterlife, below—Augustine’s narrator self sees this psychical 
split as merely the complex of will and intellect that is nothing other than 
one individual person:  
 
ego cum deliberabam ut iam servirem domino deo meo, sicut diu 
disposueram, ego eram qui volebam, ego qui nolebam: ego eram.18 
 
Not only is this akratic self, this divided self, in actual fact one whole self— 
that is, the sinner in Augustine is no less Augustine than he who wishes to 
be rid of sin—it is, at this point in the text, identical too with the narrator: 
the two selves, young Augustine and the narrator bishop, here in this 
moment of self-proclamation, ‘It was I’, become one. And this is important, 
because although Augustine’s overall project is to show that what matters 
is the state of one’s immaterial soul and that soul’s love of God, here we see 
that the whole person, for Augustine, must be characterised as the one who 
errs, who wills wrongly, and the one who chooses correctly. The person 
who is converted to Christ remains the same person who erred in his 
former life: the sinner gives birth to the convert; the convert reclaims that 
former self, as he writes of his journey. That is, he gives birth to the sinner 
again, in the writing. Thus the journey itself, all of the journey, is necessary: 
a person’s life is worthy of the telling. Memories of an earlier self are 
recuperated and redeemed by the healing work of Christ, but that earlier 
self is not annihilated, it is transformed. 
 
1.2 Dante’s Augustinian Journey 
The echoes with Dante’s biography are obvious, and have been noted by, 
amongst others, John Freccero: 
 
                                                 
18 Confessions,VIII, x (22), p. 98. ‘The self which willed to serve was identical with 
the self which was unwilling. It was I.’ Chadwick, p. 148. 
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The extraordinary parallelism between [Augustine’s] spiritual 
experience and Dante’s, at roughly the same age, even with 
comparable erotic distractions, would be exact had it been 
Neoplatonists rather than Aristotelians who led Dante to the 
overweening confidence in philosophy.19 
 
In Dante’s own telling of his spiritual journey from dark wood to Paradise 
there is, of course, the surface-level appearance of a coincident authorial 
development, tracking his writerly journey from youthful love poet, to the 
auto-critic of the Vita nova’s prosimetrum and its turn toward praise poetry, 
to the would-be philosopher of the Convivio, to the poet—the scriba Dei—of 
the Commedia.20 But there is a gap, of course—a space between the texts and 
reality, between the word and thing—that must be assessed critically. And 
indeed that body of criticism, as it grows, inexorably, contains within its 
limits further texts which recapitulate Dante’s interpretation of his own 
texts, some confounding the story that Dante tells, or otherwise finding 
reason to believe that prima facie reading. In this way, Dante’s authorial 
development and his spiritual journey will remain a forever open-ended 
question, but it must be true to say that there is no knowing whence the 
author of the Commedia heard the call to write, nor what were his motives: 
an examination of Dante’s heart is forever off-limits. And so when Freccero 
says of Augustine, that one cannot know ‘whether the conversion 
experience is the cause or the creature of the narrative that we read’ the 
same is true, too, of Dante’s works. 
 
That would seem, I would suggest, a rather pessimistic way in which to 
approach the poem, and risks closing down avenues of interpretation that 
offer rich possibilities, both for scholarly study and, perhaps, for our own 
lives (although it is of course misleading to suggest that these two realms 
are distinct, despite the efforts of years of scientism within some 
humanities disciplines). The richest and most transformative readings of 
                                                 
19 Freccero, In Dante’s Wake, pp. 14-15. 
20 See, for example, Paradiso X, 27. 
  147 
the poem as theology in recent years have been grounded on the fact that 
we should take Dante at his word: that his praxis as poet and his 
foregrounding of, and preoccupation with, persons, are instantiations on 
Earth of what he truly believed his call from God to be: that he saw how his 
own life, and his own words, could be—could be—the love which is God. 
His faith took him that far. Further, Peter Hawkins and Vittorio 
Montemaggi, amongst others, have argued powerfully that we can, in both 
our encounters with and through the text, and in our encounters with other 
individuals, embody that same truth.21  
 
Augustine prays, ‘Domine deus meus, quis ille sinus est alti secreti tui et 
quam longe inde me proiecerunt consequentia delictorum meorum’ (XI, 
xxxi (41)).22 Both he and Dante present journeys back to God, through 
Christ, which human sin has made necessary. Augustine’s sinners grapple 
in the dark, surrounded by noise, just as Dante-personaggio begins his 
journey in darkness, and onward through the strange noises—the 
tumulto—of Hell (Inferno III, 28): ‘defluxi ad ista et obscuratus sum, sed 
hinc, etiam hinc adamavi te [...] audivi vocem tuam post me, ut redirem, et 
vix audivi propter tumultus impacatorum’ (XII, x (10)).23 
 
For both Augustine and Dante, sins are to be enumerated and personalised. 
Augustine offers his confessions as praise towards God. The sins he writes 
about are only ever his own and they are spelled out in meticulous detail, 
and even in confessing, Augustine is at risk of sinning again through pride 
(X, xxxviii (63)). The life that Augustine represents in the Confessions is 
                                                 
21 See P. S. Hawkins, Dante: A Brief History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) and 
Montemaggi, Reading Dante’s ‘Commedia’ as Theology. Montemaggi’s is a book-
length demonstration of this transformative and sustaining power.  
22 Confessions, p.164. ‘Lord my God, how deep is your profound mystery, and how 
far away from it have I been thrust by the consequences of my sin.’ Chadwick, p. 
245. 
23 Confessions, p.168. ‘I slipped down to the dark and was plunged into obscurity 
[…] I heard your voice behind me calling me to return. And I could hardly hear 
because of the hubbub of people who know no peace.’ Chadwick, p. 251. 
  148 
particular and intimate. It is a book too close for comfort; Augustine 
himself asks what edification a reader might gain from it. As disingenuous 
a question as this sounds—here the veneer between narrator and author is 
apparently at its thinnest—it is a question we might ask anyway, in spite of 
Augustine’s self-conscious worry. The Confessions presents an active, 
dynamic conversation between Augustine and God, seemingly a personal 
prayer of offering to a personal redeemer. But is inevitable, too, that we 
read the Confessions as a very public entreaty, a warning even, to members 
of the flock at Hippo and beyond, to do what Augustine does, and 
prostrate themselves before God. 
 
Dante casts his pilgrim downward too: in Purgatorio XXX and XXXI the 
author recreates the sinner in Dante-personaggio, gives birth to him again—
another painful labour. The pilgrim becomes a pitiable, broken and 
weeping character in confession to his beloved Beatrice, who wields her 
accusation as a sword that makes him fall back down to the Earth. Dante-
personaggio has come so far; when he reaches the Earthly Paradise, he is on 
the threshold of purification and of sanctity: the joy of Heaven awaits. 
Having completed his journey through Hell and climbed up the terraces of 
Purgatory, successfully having removed the marks of his sin and vice from 
his brow, his upward trajectory invites optimism and hope. But now, here 
in the garden, Dante must confess his sin, and in doing so he is thrown 
down, no longer in Eden but back down in the dark wood, amongst his 
‘memorie triste’ (XXXI, 11) and his ‘errore’ (44). He gives voice to his errors 
and hears in her response Beatrice’s own characterisation of Dante-the-
sinner, and of his turn to the ‘via non vera’ (XXX, 130); the blow of 
Beatrice’s sword is so painful that it causes Dante to faint.  
 
The scene remains, on each re-reading, so powerfully affecting, so full of 
pathos—the portrait of the stammering pilgrim so utterly desperate—that 
the narration of these two turning points, the first one in which Dante-
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personaggio tells of his turn towards ‘Le presenti cose’ (34) after Beatrice 
died, and the second one in which Dante-poeta tells of his turn back 
towards Beatrice in the Earthly Paradise in the acceptance of her saving 
grace, cannot be interpreted as anything other than the hinge around which 
the entire poem turns. The author replays here, again, as he had done in the 
Convivio II, xii, the autobiographical motif of his infidelity with the ‘gentil 
donna’ of the Vita nova XXIV. 2, who perhaps, after all, was something akin 
to Boethius’s Lady Philosophy.24 Beatrice is at once a spurned lover but also 
a person who adopts a maternal role, acting on behalf of the holy mother 
herself. 
 
After her death, Beatrice says, she loses her lover’s attention: he turns away 
from her and finds comfort elsewhere. As a would-be lover, she cannot 
transform him through love; and as a would-be mother, she cannot deliver 
him up to God.25 The overt eroticism of the ‘adult confrontation’26 between 
Dante-personaggio and Beatrice is made explicit by references to her once 
‘belle membre’ (XXXI, 50); by the potential temptations of other ‘serene’ 
(45); by the trembling in his body, and, of course, by the recognition of the 
‘antica fiamma’ (XXX, 47). But Dante’s character is a child too, described in 
infantilising terms: ‘quali fanciulli’ (64), ‘il fantolin’ (XXX, 44), a character 
who says of Beatrice, ‘così la madre al figlio par superba | com’ella parve a 
me’ (79-80).27 And it is as a mother and as intercessor that Beatrice’s role 
mirrors that of Monica, Augustine’s mother, in the story of his conversion. 
In light of Beatrice’s accusation, however, Dante’s turn to philosophy—if 
                                                 
24 For a book-length discussion of Dante’s representation of the other women—
whether human or allegorical, or both—in his works, see Holmes, Dante’s Two 
Beloveds. See also, P. Dronke Dante's Second Love: The Originality and the Contexts of 
the Convivio (Oxford: Routledge, 1997). 
25 I return to both of these themes—the maternal and the erotic in Beatrice—in 
Chapter IV. 
26 See the notes in Durling and Martinez (eds), The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, 
II, p. 540. 
27 Beatrice is described as a mother bird at Paradiso XXIII, 1-9; by extension, Dante-
personaggio is one of her ‘dolci nati’. 
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indeed this is what is here being castigated—cannot be considered as a turn 
to the same fertile intellectual ground that it was for Augustine. He 
claimed, as we saw above, that it foreshadowed the way to his salvation; 
Dante cannot do the same, as I explore below, because ultimately the two 
have different accounts of what an intellectual knowledge of God consists 
in. 
 
Monica is a teary presence throughout the Confessions. In Book IX we get to 
hear Augustine’s potted biography of her, which verges on the 
hagiographic: of her childhood, and then of her early troubles with alcohol 
and her ultimate rejection of that vice (IX, viii (18)); of her life with her 
abusive husband, and his subsequent conversion through her to Christ (IX, 
ix (22)). Monica had been converted to Christianity before Augustine’s 
birth, and thus as an infant, Augustine says he had imbibed the name of 
Christ: ‘in ipso adhuc lacte matris tenerum cor meum pie biberat et alte 
retinebat, et quidquid sine hoc nomine fuisset’ (III, iv (8)).28 In Paradiso 
XXIII, 121-122, we see the souls flame upwards towards the Virgin mother, 
‘come fantolin che ’nver’ la mamma | tende le braccia poi che ’l latte prese’. 
In both cases, the sustenance derived from the mother’s body is Christ, but 
Augustine, we hear, does not fully digest it until much later. During 
Augustine’s Manichee period, the narrator claims that Monica wept for 
Augustine more than mothers grieve for their dead children: ‘cum pro me 
fleret ad te mea mater, fidelis tua, amplius quam flent matres corporea 
funera.’ (III, xi (19)).29 She thus very nearly embodies the Virgin again, as 
she is depicted at John 19:25.30 As a mother close to losing her son, she is 
endowed with a power of authorship over his spiritual conversion:  
                                                 
28  Confessions, p. 26. ‘[…] piously drunk in with my mother’s milk.’ Chadwick, p. 
40. 
29 Confessions, p. 31.  ‘[…] wept for me […] more than mothers weep lamenting 
their dead children.’ Chadwick, p. 49. 
30 ‘stabant autem iuxta crucem Iesu mater eius et soror matris eius Maria Cleopae 
et Maria Magdalene.’ ‘Now there stood by the cross of Jesus, his mother, and his 
mother's sister, Mary of Cleophas, and Mary Magdalen.’ 
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sed non praeteribo quidquid mihi anima parturit de illa famula tua, 
quae me parturivit, et carne, ut in hanc temporalem, et corde, ut in 
aeternam lucem nascerer.31 
Confessions, IX, viii (17) 
 
In Confessions IX, the narrator tells of another turning point, the peculiar 
experience that both Monica and Augustine undergo at Ostia—the so-
called vision. The narrator describes how, whilst looking down upon yet 
another garden, mother and son were in conversation about the mysteries 
of Paradise—specifically, and importantly, I think, what kind of life the 
saints will enjoy in Heaven—then find themselves rising upwards, past 
physical objects, climbing upwards past the sun, moon and stars: ‘erigentes 
nos ardentiore affectu in idipsum, perambulavimus gradatim cuncta 
corporalia et ipsum caelum, unde sol et luna et stellae lucent super 
terram.’32 Through internal reflection and dialogue the two enter into their 
own minds (‘et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando et loquendo’33), 
but then travel beyond themselves into timelessness, and into an 
experiential state wherein the soul finds unfailing plenty: ‘venimus in 
mentes nostras et transcendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis 
indeficientis’. Such an effort takes all the concentration of the heart 
(‘modice toto ictu cordis’) (IX, x (24)).34 
 
This vision at Ostia is a description of a soul which desires unmediated 
access to God, one which wants to know what it means to ‘enter into the 
joy of the Lord’. But what is notable, of course, is that Augustine narrates 
this experience as two individuals in dialogue: Monica and the younger 
                                                 
31 Confessions, p. 110. ‘I shall not pass over whatever my soul may bring to birth 
concerning your servant, who brought me to birth in her body so that I was born 
into the light of time, and in her heart so that I was born into the light of eternity.’ 
Chadwick, p. 166. 
32 Confessions, p.113.  
33 Confessions, p.113. 
34 Confessions, p.113. 
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Augustine are side by side, and their attention is turned towards one point, 
both literally and spiritually. Both, apparently, experience the same thing; 
they each ascend upwards toward the vision, through inward reflection 
and dialogue. It is as though their relationship itself, their shared love, their 
attentiveness to one another, and to God, somehow acts as a spiritual 
ratchet which propels them upwards. What begins as conversation—in 
language and in sound—must end in silence, because it is in silence, even 
unto itself, that the soul, says Augustine, must hear his word (IX, x, (25)).     
 
The episode is framed, in the Confessions, by the fact that Monica dies soon 
after enjoying this mystical experience: Augustine mentions the fact of his 
mother’s death in the paragraph immediately before the vision scene, and 
then tells of the details of her dying in the four paragraphs which follow it. 
Thus the author provides a portrayal of his mother’s life, and of her death, 
and also what might be called a portrait of her after-life, given that in 
authoring this mystical encounter, he effectively writes her into Heaven, 
into the very joy of the Lord.  
 
It is what Dante does for the now-dead Beatrice, when he writes of her in 
the Vita nova and in the Commedia, and what he does for himself—just as 
Augustine does—by writing of a first-person encounter with the sublime. 
The narrative that plays out in Dante’s account of his climb up the 
Mountain of Purgatory, his entry into the Earthly Paradise and on into 
Heaven itself, is an extended version of this Ostia episode: language and 
dialogue define it until its ultimate end, when language must fail. The 
ascent of the souls up the mountain, and then metaphorically up through 
the heavens, past the moon, sun and stars and on towards the Empyrean, 
track the upward ascent of Augustine and Monica, step by step, past 
corporeal objects. At each stage of the journey, Dante-personaggio is also in 
dialogue, not just with Virgil, Beatrice and Bernard, but with the gamut of 
other souls that he comes across in the afterlife, souls who teach him, along 
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with his guides, how to understand himself, his inner self, in light of his 
creator. We see that Augustine provides the ‘informing presence’35 for 
Dante: the structural similarities of their narratives are telling. 
 
When the dialogue ends, when sound ends, and when the final procession 
of images takes over from Paradiso XXXIII, 77 onwards, to the end of the 
poem, the apotheosis for both Dante and Augustine is some kind of 
experiential flash, ‘un fulgore’ for Dante,36 the ‘rapida cogitatione’ for 
Augustine and Monica, which delivers them to the ‘aeternam sapientam’ 
itself, free of any mediating word, sound or image (IX, x, (25)).37 In 
Augustine’s earlier ‘failed’ conversion, around the time of his first reading 
of the Platonists, the weakness of his eyes could not bear strength of God’s 
rays, and he found himself back ‘in regione dissimilitudinis’38: still adrift, 
failing to imitate Christ, in a world which could not express in language 
what Augustine had the capacity to know in his soul; in a world in which 
meaning was exiled from language, just as Augustine was exiled, like the 
Prodigal Son, from his heavenly father (VII, x (16)). 39 At Ostia, sighing, 
mother and son fall back into the world of time and sound and return to 
human speech, where sentences have beginnings and endings: ‘et 
suspiravimus et reliquimus ibi religatas primitias spiritus et remeavimus 
ad strepitum oris nostri, ubi verbum et incipitur et finitur’ (IX, x, (24)).40 
 
Sentences, with their beginnings and endings; language with its finitude 
and limitation, will form the focus of the second part of this chapter. In this 
last section of Part One, I return to another question about Augustinian 
                                                 
35 Hawkins, ‘Divide and Conquer’, p. 472. 
36 XXXIII, 141. 
37 Confessions, p. 114. ‘[…] flash of mental energy […] eternal wisdom.’ Chadwick, 
p. 172.   
38 Confessions, p. 82. ‘[…] in the region of dissimilarity.’ Chadwick, p. 123. 
39 See Freccero, The Poetics of Conversion and In Dante’s Wake; Lombardi, The Syntax 
of Desire.  
40 Confessions, p. 113. ‘[…] the noise of our human speech where a sentence has both 
a beginning and an ending.’ Chadwick, p. 171. 
  154 
time, its recuperation and redemption, and its consequences for how we 
think about Dante’s Purgatory. The Ostia episode shows vividly that the 
Heaven which Augustine conceives must be timeless: according to 
Augustine, this is a product of God’s nature itself (XII, xi (13)). That 
concentration of the heart concentrates time too, to a point of timelessness; 
un punto—for Christian Moevs—is Dante’s way of capturing the simplicity 
of God prior to attributes such as time and extension.41 Towards the end of 
the Confessions, in Book XI, there is an extended rumination on the nature of 
time, but before that, in Book X, Augustine grapples with memory: 
 
Magna vis est memoriae, nescio quod horrendum, deus meus, 
profunda et infinita multiplicitas; et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse 
sum. quid ergo sum, deus meus? quae natura sum? […] transibo et 
hanc vim meam, quae memoria vocatur, transibo eam, ut 
pertendam ad te, dulce lumen. quid dicis mihi? ego ascendens per 
animum meum ad te, qui desuper mihi manes, transibo et istam 
vim meam, quae memoria vocatur volens te attingere, unde attingi 
potes, et inhaerere tibi, unde inhaereri tibi potest. […] transibo ergo 
et memoriam, ut attingam eum, qui separavit me a quadrupedibus 
et volatibus caeli sapientiorem me fecit. transibo et memoriam, ut 
ubi te inveniam, vere bone et secura suavitas, ut ubi te inveniam? si 
praeter memoriam meam te invenio, inmemor tui sum. et quomodo 
iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui?42   
Confessions, X, xvii (26) 
The possibility of passing beyond memory in a journey towards God is a 
critical question in the Purgatorio too. The process of purgation, and the 
                                                 
41 See C. Moevs, ‘Il punto che mi vinse: Incarnation, Revelation, and Self-
Knowledge in Dante’s Commedia’, in Montemaggi and Treherne (eds), Dante’s 
Commedia: Theology as Poetry, pp. 267–85.   
42 Confessions, p. 129. ‘Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my 
God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And this is mind, this is I 
myself. What then am I, my God? What is my nature? […] I will transcend even 
this my power which is called memory. I will rise beyond it to move towards you, 
sweet light. What are you saying to me? Here I am climbing up through my mind 
towards you who are constant above me. I will pass beyond even that power of 
mind which is called memory, desiring to reach you by the way in which it is 
possible to be bonded […] As I rise above memory, where am I to find you? My 
true good and gentle source of reassurance, where shall I find you? If I can find 
you outside my memory, I am not mindful of you. And how shall I find you if I am 
not mindful of you?’  Chadwick, pp.194-5. 
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action that takes place in the Earthly Paradise, make the nature of error and 
imperfection in saved human beings a live question, and raises particular 
theological questions about the nature of personhood. Passage through the 
Lethe and the Eunoë rivers (Purgatorio XXVIII, 127-30; XXXIII, 91-96), first 
removing memories of sin and then restoring memories of goodness, 
creates a soul worthy to rise to Heaven. At Purgatorio XVI, 31-32, the 
pilgrim says, ‘O creatura che ti mondi | per tornar bella a colui che ti fece.’  
But what kind of soul, what kind of person, do these cleansings, these 
baptisms create? Because this is, is it not, a kind of distortion, even if the 
soul that emerges from the Eunoë imitates Adam and Eve in their 
prelapsarian state? Such a person has learned to direct her love correctly 
and has thus changed for the good, has oriented herself away from the 
evils that bedevilled her earthly life, and curbed her excesses of love or 
rectified her deficiencies, in light of the examples found on the terraces of 
the mountain; and yet, a psychological or psychical manipulation is still 
somehow warranted of this person: even the memory of sin and vice must 
be removed; the memory of goodness increased. Any self-knowledge that 
these souls have acquired through their journey of conversion from sinful 
to redeemed, and from vice-ridden to ‘bella’, is surely lost; the image of 
their own selfhood is seen through a now-distorted mirror. It is a 
discomfiting thought in some ways: when characters in Paradise speak of 
their old sinful selves it necessarily sounds odd to readers who do not 
enjoy that same perspective of eternity. Folco, for example, can smile at the 
power that brought about his redemption, and does not worry about the 
sin which ‘a mente non torna’ (Paradiso IX, 104). 
 
In light of this strange set of affairs, Marc Cogan wonders if there is a 
contradiction implicit in the status of Purgatory itself, as the souls learn the 
new habits of virtue, in order that they become worthy to ascend to 
Heaven.43 
                                                 
43 See Purgatorio I, 6. 
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In the course of their purgation, the souls not only lose vices that 
once enslaved them, they also acquire virtues whose intended 
operation is not of this world but of the next […] The soul has 
always been of the same nature, but it took the regimen of 
Purgatory to reveal that real nature to us, since that true nature was 
concealed or obscured by flesh and worldly pursuits.44 
 
But in Heaven, the souls have no use of sensitive appetites, which the souls 
have seemingly trained on the terraces of Purgatory—and not merely for 
the purpose of directing the glorified bodies after the reunion of soul and 
bodies at the Last Judgement, ‘the only use that Aquinas sees for the 
sensitive appetites’.45 To be sure, Dante claims something similar,46 but he 
also suggests that the faculties of the soul must be rehabilitated in order 
that they are capable of rising to Heaven; the virtues which the souls learn 
in Purgatory are used to bring ‘amor d’animo’ back into line with the love 
for the Creator, which was present all along. The faculties must be in a 
‘perfected state’.47 At the end of the Purgatorio, Virgil says that Dante-
personaggio’s will is healthy, upright and free: the souls acquire those 
qualities which the Beatitudes bless, and as such they are ready to see the 
Godhead ‘face to face’.48  
 
There remains, however, the question which Augustine raises by his paean 
to the nature of memory, to the substantial work that it does in its creation 
of the inner self, and his insistence that one must, in fact, pass beyond it in 
order to find God. This Augustinian question, as it plays out in the 
Commedia, as we have seen above, connects the moral psychology, the 
virtues, of the penitent souls—who have learned through and because of 
memory—to the nature of Heaven itself. It is Monica and Augustine’s 
                                                 
44 M. Cogan, The Design in the Wax: The Structure of the Divine Comedy and its 
Meaning (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 146-47. 
45 Cogan, Design, p. 142. 
46 See Paradiso XIV, 37-60. 
47 Cogan, Design, p. 143. 
48 I Corinthians 13:12. 
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question at Ostia, about the kind of lives that the saints enjoy in Paradise. 
Once the mountain delivers the souls in the Purgatorio up to God—gives 
birth to them into the light of eternity—they have become purified and 
ready, they no longer need the memory of sin to be themselves in their 
fullest sense: their ‘real’ nature, as Cogan would have it, is ‘revealed’. 
 
2. Persons Vulnerable to Error 
Before the souls are ready to rise to Heaven, before the waters of the Lethe 
and Eunoë have done their work, they are still vulnerable: vulnerable to the 
vice that cause them as imperfect creatures to misdirect their desires, 
vulnerable to forgetfulness about where and how their attention and 
actions should be focused. The lessons on the mountain must correct them 
and remind them to turn, always, to God, to praise him and to become the 
perfected beings that His perfection necessitates. On Earth, of course, our 
vulnerability to error extends in all directions, but especially into the arenas 
of understanding and love. We are vulnerable to language and its 
deficiencies: to the misunderstandings to which it inevitably gives rise. 
And we are vulnerable to each other in love: to regret, to pain, to death. 
Such vulnerability need not be always wholly negative, indeed it allows 
spaces for growth and for flourishing. Vulnerability to misunderstanding, 
allows us to see that humility is required when faced by the eternity of the 
universe or, if you will, by God. Vulnerability to love, allows us closer and 
more meaningful human encounters. 
 
2.1 Memory and Particularity 
Purgatory is full of souls who remember their loved ones on Earth, and, 
indeed, their enemies. In some sense the author’s trick is to suppose that 
they have gone on ahead of their Earth-bound counterparts: that they have 
moved along some great conveyor belt in time, in history, that they are 
farther along the road. And yet the families that they appeal to on Earth 
remember them as persons in the past; these family members must both 
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look backwards to the person that they were, but also imagine them now in 
their current state, in order to pray for them. The souls of Purgatory have 
by necessity died in the past, and they too must remember how their selves 
were constituted in an earlier time; their families and loved ones must pray 
for them in their own present, looking forward to a future fate that ends in 
the Last Judgement. Souls like Nino Visconti (Purgatorio VIII, 47-84), for 
example, who, like the other souls that we have encountered in earlier 
chapters, wants to be prayed for and remembered: they are visibly and 
audibly vulnerable to the pain of being forgotten by the people whom they 
loved, or who supposedly loved them. Nino wants to be freed from the 
yoke that he finds himself under on the Mountain, but fears that his loved 
ones have forgotten him, believes that their attention has been lost: he says, 
simply, ‘Non credo che la sua madre più m’ami’ (Purgatorio VIII, 73). Nino 
is here already thrice-removed from his wife: first by death itself; again by 
his wife’s subsequent remarriage; and now, by way of his very own 
language, in referring to her only via his daughter, in whom his hope to be 
remembered must now remain.  
 
Nino’s wife, he suggests, is fully culpable for no longer loving him, for 
forgetting her vows. There appears to be no failing on his part, no reason to 
suggest that his actions on Earth would not secure the loyalty of a wife in 
perpetuity, beyond the threshold of the grave. The portrait is entirely 
Nino’s own and as such is partial and perhaps error-laden. In Ante-
Purgatory, Nino is no perfected creature: indeed, he seems to take a cruel 
relish in the fact that his wife might be repaid in an unhappy future for her 
new marriage. What can he, in his vulnerability, in his error, teach the 
pilgrim?   
 
Dante knows that ‘imperfection is inherent in the human condition’, but at 
the same time knows the importance of the truth that this ‘does not make 
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life unliveable or words unsayable’.49 We live most fully when we connect 
with human beings, in community, in friendship and love, in family, even 
when our language is sometimes inadequate to our meaning. But because 
language is operative only relationally, attentiveness is required; it 
becomes vulnerable to error when meaning breaks down across the 
interstices between individuals. So language, too, then, is vulnerable when 
it fails to mean. When we attend to other people; when we see them in all 
their contingency and particularity; when we see them defined by time and 
place, by good fortune or bad; when we see them trying and failing, stained 
by sin and damaged by error, we see what it means to be so far removed 
from a timeless, eternal, perfectly meaningful creator. Communicating 
within that imperfection requires attention: it requires shared connection, 
love and humility. For Dante it is the same love that gave the world the 
Incarnation, the same humility that said, ‘ecce ancilla Domini’.50 Indeed, the 
Annunciation provides a paradigmatic response of one human being to 
another individual’s presence and, therefore, to the call of God. In his 
commentary on the terrace of pride, Robin Kirkpatrick underlines this 
necessary condition for meaningful language when he says that ‘[h]umility 
is not humiliation, but a rediscovery of our human interdependency.’51 
 
The lessons of the Purgatorio are built, in large part, around the ways in 
which Mary embodies virtue.52 From the humility that she demonstrates at 
the Annunciation onward, scenes from the Holy Mother’s life provide 
opportunities for the souls, and at one pace removed, the pilgrim, to learn 
how their own language, and their attentiveness to each other and to God, 
should be directed. And yet, although the Virgin’s humane response never 
seems to fall below the mark that the Divine will requires, for both Dante 
                                                 
49 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, pp. 251-52. 
50 Luke 1:38; Purgatorio X, 44. 
51 The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri 2: Purgatorio, ed. and trans. by Robin 
Kirkpatrick (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 372. 
52 Mary’s example is found throughout the second cantica, at: X, 34-35; XIII, 28; XV, 
85-93; XVIII, 100; XX, 1-24; XXII, 142-44; XXV, 128. 
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and Augustine, it is clear that error and imperfection are no barrier for 
learning what God is, or how to participate in his glory: 
 
Augustine, at the outset of the Confessions makes a remarkable 
observation—the gift of faith is breathed into us not only by the 
humanity of the Son but by other people, by the ministry of 
preachers […] God revealed through other people, in all their 
peculiarities and contingencies, even their failings. 53 
 
Janet Soskice reminds us that Augustine says it need not only be Christ, or 
the saints, who can provide the gift of faith: instances of his charity are all 
around us, if we would only look. It is worth, I think, repeating Soskice’s 
words that I quoted in the last chapter: ‘we must ask who we love, what we 
attend to, in order to know who we are and should be’.54  
 
Human beings with their ‘peculiarities and contingencies’ might be the 
subtitle of the Purgatorio, because if it is anything that the pilgrim finds 
there, it is humanity in its particularity and multiplicity: a dazzling display 
of errors—failings in glorious Technicolor, imperfections writ large. As 
individuals in the process of learning, they must ask what to attend to, in 
order to know who they are and what they should be, in order that they 
can direct their love, in order that they can understand themselves and that 
love, as part of God’s caritas. This is no small undertaking for either the 
souls or for the pilgrim, and indeed for him the effort is at times dizzying. 
Heather Webb describes the cantica’s programme of rehabilitation in terms 
of a double aspect—the ‘close-up’ encounters of an individual’s situation 
made sense of by the ‘widescreen’ of humanity’s place sub specie aeternitatis, 
and vice versa: 
 
                                                 
53 Soskice, ‘Monica’s Tears’, p. 449.  
54 Soskice, The Kindness of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 8. 
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The Purgatorio calls upon us, as readers, to view both a widescreen 
vision of the human condition and a series of close-ups of 
individual persons, often in deliberately vertiginous alternation.55 
 
Indeed we may well find ourselves dizzied by this ‘vertiginous alternation’: 
too much to comprehend at one time within our imperfect heads. But the 
double aspect is absolutely necessary for Dante to perform his educative 
programme, which depends upon our responses as humans, vulnerable to 
the pain of love and death, and to the errors of an inadequate 
understanding. 
 
The character of Gregory the Great, as he is presented in the Commedia, 
connects these themes: he embodies what it means to love attentively; what 
it means to be pained by death; and further how, on Earth, our intellects are 
inadequate to the task of understanding God. Although Gregory’s smile 
has been a topic of some discussion in Dante studies, his figure more 
generally has been, according to Vittorio Montemaggi, rather neglected,56 
largely due, no doubt, to the paucity of references to him in the text itself. 
As I noted in my introduction, Gregory’s name appears only twice in the 
                                                 
55 H. Webb, Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the Transhuman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016) p. 89. 
56 See Montemaggi, ‘Dante and Gregory the Great’. For discussions about the smile, 
see: Jacoff, ‘The Post-Palinodic Smile’; Kirkpatrick, Dante’s ‘Paradiso’ and the Limits 
of Modern Criticism, pp. 166-68. Barolini, The Undivine Comedy, pp. 17-18. I have 
sympathies with Montemaggi’s position on Gregory’s smile, but also Barolini’s, 
which is suspicious of Dante’s motives. Indeed, it does seem like some kind of 
vanity for a poet-theologian to pass over what he perceives as his own earlier 
mistake (in the Convivio), by a creative sleight of hand—by creating in his text the 
conditions in which a theological authority claims for himself an error instead. 
Further, to make that theologian smile at this error could be read as a double 
conceit: the character of a theological heavyweight reduced to a smiling clown, 
perhaps. (If any relation between author and his creation exemplifies Dante’s own 
definition of the proud, as ‘È chi, per esser suo vicin soppresso, | spera eccellenza, 
e sol per questo brama |ch’el sia di sua grandezza in basso messo’ (Purg. XVII, 115-
18) then this, it could be argued, might be it.) Montemaggi’s, on the other hand, is a 
more charitable reading of the author’s intention, but runs the risk, as Barolini is 
always at pains to point out with other critics, of succumbing to Dante’s own all-
controlling grasp of the text and its interpretation.   
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entire poem, at Purgatorio X, 75,57 and at Paradiso XXVIII, 133.58 In Purgatory 
he is remembered as the intercessor who prayed for Emperor Trajan’s soul. 
In Paradise he is found encountering the orders of the angelic intelligences. 
The third, implicit, reference to Gregory at Paradiso XX, 109,59 also refers to 
the story of Trajan, a myth which by Dante’s time had become 
commonplace in medieval culture. 
 
On the terrace of Pride, the pilgrim sees the story of Trajan and the widow 
in one of the incredible marble reliefs: the figures seem to move and speak. 
The scene in which Trajan helps the grieving woman is the same scene in 
which Gregory purportedly saw the emperor represented in art (perhaps 
carved on Trajan’s column), and which moved Gregory to pray for him. 
Gregory sees a portrait of Trajan’s humility—an example of human-to-
human attentiveness—wherein inequalities of status and power are set 
aside and an individual is seen as a person, suffering and in need of 
recognition. Trajan responds to the person and the suffering, and Gregory 
responds to it too: their attention is directed towards the same need. But 
                                                 
57 Quiv’ era storïata l’alta Gloria 
del roman principato, il cui valore 
mosse Gregorio a la sua gran vittoria; 
     i’ dico di Traiano imperadore; 
e una vedovella li era al freno, 
di lagrime atteggiata e di dolore. 
   Purg. X, 73-79. 
58 E Dïonisio con tanto disio 
a contemplar questi ordini si mise, 
che li nomò e distinse com’ io. 
Ma Gregorio da lui poi si divise; 
onde, sì tosto come li occhi aperse 
in questo ciel, di sé medesmo rise. 
   Par. XXVIII, 130-35. 
59 Ché l’una de lo ’nferno, u’ non si riede 
già mai a buon voler, tornò a l’ossa; 
e ciò di viva spene fu mercede: 
di viva spene, che mise la possa 
ne’ prieghi fatti a Dio per suscitarla, 
sì che potesse sua voglia esser mossa.  
   Par. XX, 106-11 
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Gregory sees also that Trajan is in need—despite being long dead—because 
as a pagan he has missed out on the love that would secure him an eternal 
life. Gregory’s loving attention towards Trajan and—in turn—to Trajan’s 
own loving attention, his response to his death, and his faith in the power 
of Christ, give rise to the hope which causes him to pray for a miraculous 
end.  
 
Gregory’s hope transcends the limitations of time, of a before and after, of 
alive and dead, of saved and damned: his great victory is great because he 
saw this as no impediment but rather understood something of God’s 
eternity, of his limitlessness. That is worthy of celebration, certainly, and 
speaks to a good man with a strong faith. But I also suggest that it is in the 
attention itself, in the close attention which both Gregory and Trajan 
display, that Dante gives us the means through which we can learn to 
participate in God’s love. The pilgrim examines the bas-reliefs on the 
terrace of Pride in the same way that Gregory must have attended to the 
carvings on Trajan’s column. Dante-personaggio has an easier task in 
deciphering the messages that he is shown: these are God’s own artworks 
which have supernatural visual and auditory properties.60 Even so, the 
pilgrim moves his feet in order to pay closer attention: ‘I’ mossi i piè del 
loco dov’ io stava,| per avvisar da presso un’altra istoria’ (70-71). Gregory’s 
task, I argue, required even closer attention. It required the summoning of 
human personhood out of a representation in blocks of inanimate marble. 
This re-creation of a human-to-human encounter, of two lives from the 
long-past, was rendered by Gregory in such high-definition that he was 
moved to pray for Trajan’s damned soul.61 
                                                 
60 See Vickers ‘Seeing Is Believing’. Vickers also explores the possibility raised by 
several of the vitae of Gregory, that he was punished by God for his presumption 
or, indeed, pride. 
61 Of course, characterised in this way, one wonders about the fate of the poor 
widow herself, and why she was deserving of only Trajan’s and not Gregory’s 
pity. But the salvation of other pagans, including the man on the banks of the 
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In the Paradiso, rather than hearing of his actions via another person’s 
salvific journey, we get a glimpse of Gregory himself. In canto XXVIII, the 
pilgrim is in the final Heaven, the Primum Mobile, and Beatrice here 
explains the order of the angelic hierarchies which the pilgrim can see 
wheeling around the central ‘favilla pura’ (38). The author lets Beatrice 
describe the scene, and in so doing attempts a textual representation of a 
‘vision’ which he is well aware defies description: articulating in language 
something which he believed was necessarily beyond language. It is a topic 
which theologians had long grappled with, not least because one of the 
problems that they encountered was how to integrate seemingly non-
convergent systems of thought, of natural philosophy, with the Bible. It is a 
problem that still, for some, seems intractable. So, in this canto, the 
controversy, such that it was, over the angelic hierarchies, is given another 
airing, perhaps because the author wanted to revisit and retract his earlier 
position of the Convivio, perhaps for other, more noble reasons. At any rate, 
it is Gregory to whom an error is given, Gregory who is given ‘correction’, 
and the opportunity to respond to that error. The author and Dante-poeta 
remain entirely silent about any such errors that they may have made. 
 
Read in a more positive light, Gregory’s response to his own intellectual 
error in Heaven demonstrates how such error is, thankfully, no 
impediment to salvation. More than this, though: my claim is that 
Gregory’s example can show how individual souls can retain a level of 
particularity in Dante’s Paradise that otherwise might have seemed at risk. 
It seemed at risk given the function of the rivers in the Earthly Paradise, as 
we saw above, when souls seemingly forget their sins, lose their memory, 
and perhaps, too, the persons that they were, as they pass through this 
turning point, the threshold, from Purgatory to Paradise. My argument will 
                                                 
Indus (Par. XIX, 71), and the Ethiopian (Par. XIX, 109), is a topic that extends 
beyond the scope of this present study. 
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be that Gregory demonstrates, as he smiles in acceptance at his error, an 
affirmation of his own personhood. He performs his particularity: he 
memorialises the person that he was on Earth and who he still remains, and 
this fact makes him recognisable to the loved-ones that he will meet in 
Heaven, and to himself.62  
 
The smile can be read as an acceptance of his own limitation: arriving in 
Heaven perfected, and now enjoying an understanding which was 
unavailable on Earth, here is a moment of quasi-remembering and 
enlightenment. He knows that his intellect was mistaken on Earth, and the 
new-found knowledge is a moment for joy, for pleasure in truth and 
beauty. But it could also be a moment for smiling at the person he was: a 
fallible, error-struck person—someone, indeed, who claimed for himself an 
authority on theological matters such as these. This vignette is a portrait of 
a theologian at the very moment of transition from before to eternity: on the 
very threshold of fully becoming. And yet the smile is a gesture that must 
look backwards in time as well as forwards, and is thereby a way in which 
the author can retain the qualities of the earthly person: Gregory’s smile is 
acceptance of the limitation of his intellect in life, yes, but it is also an 
affirmation of the fact that he was this particular person, with these 
particular failings.  
 
Gregory’s smile is a bodily gesture demonstrated by a person who has no 
body. Such contradictions need not worry readers too much, now that we 
are accustomed, thanks to Beatrice’s instruction, to adjusting our thinking 
about how the heavens have been arranged for the pilgrim’s—and our—
benefit. Dante knows too well that the only way for poetry to mean 
anything at all is via the meaning-making bodies that we are clothed in on 
Earth, and via a language that is necessarily temporal. So it is a puckishness 
on the part of the author to write this moment of transition in a timeless, 
                                                 
62 For more on this theme, see: See Gragnolati, ‘Nostalgia in Heaven’. 
  166 
placeless place, in an eternal present where there is no need for learning, 
because there are no new things to be known, and signalled by a gesture 
which has no attendant body, no place at all.63 It introduces the theme 
which we return to again, of how to write Paradise out of time; how to 
speak of God meaningfully, without falling, ourselves, into error. I 
introduced this section by claiming that language can fail, importantly, for 
Dante, in two ways: firstly, it can fail to mean something between 
individuals, when we fail to attend to one another in love. Secondly, 
language fails to mean everything: it does not have within its capacity the 
ability to gather the totality of being and give it expression. As a 
consequence, understanding, predicated as it is upon language, must fail 
too. Gregory exemplifies just one way in which intellectual understanding 
about God might fail. But we each share, as humans, this more general 
failing: our cognitive capacity is simply not up to the task. Like Gregory, 
we need not see this failure as purely negative: we should remember again 
Botterill’s words, which celebrate Dante’s own linguistic virtuosity, in 
showing us that even amid such failure it ‘does not make life unliveable or 
words unsayable’.64 Dante’s cannot ever be construed as a pessimistic 
position about the nature of language—this would make no sense for the 
author of such dazzling work as the Commedia. And yet, he is well aware of 
its limitations, and of the richness that an apophatic silence contains. Before 
we attend to that silence and the meaning that might arise from it, I first 
consider those words which are indeed sayable, and which are indeed 
meaningful, from a particular and temporal point of view. For Dante—and, 
of course, for the other theologians within this study—the ultimate 
exemplar of meaningful, particular and temporal matter is the person of 
Christ, the Word himself.  
 
                                                 
63 On God and memory, see Purgatorio X, 94: ‘Colui che mai non vide cosa nova’; 
on angels and memory, see Paradiso XXIX, 79-81: ‘[…]però non hanno vedere 
interciso | da novo obietto, e però non bisogna | rememorar per concetto diviso’.  
64 Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition, pp. 251-52. 
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2.3 Language as peculiarly human 
In the last chapter we saw how Bernard and Dante share a ‘rejoicing’ in 
language, which might not be what we think of when we read, for 
example, Thomas Aquinas. And yet Thomas’s choice of rigid style and 
torpid prose also betrays an authentic commitment to loving God and to 
converting souls through Christ. Via Aquinas, I suggest, we can better 
understand Dante’s own depiction of humans as embodied creatures, 
defined by space and time, by the ‘comically small scale, within the limits 
of […] human lineaments’,65 and by the vulnerability to love and death that 
is also embodied in Christ. In Aquinas we find the means to understand 
something of Dante’s commitment to persons and the way in which (my 
reading of) personhood in the poet’s work is construed. In order to see this 
more clearly, one must first see what Aquinas’s commitment to 
embodiment reveals and, further, what repercussions it has for his 
understanding of God’s ineffability.   
 
One critical point of departure between Aquinas and Augustine concerns 
the nature of ineffability, because it rests on very different assumptions for 
each theologian. For Aquinas, the fact of ineffability signifies that the 
Godhead remains unintelligible to us whilst we are still on Earth. What 
God is cannot be expressed, because it cannot be understood: there is no 
way that our human capacity can encompass God’s totality. Aquinas’s 
point is, I think, easier for us to understand in the modern age, because the 
nature of the conundrum works in two directions, and fits with a modern 
view of mental capacity and language: we cannot express, or put into 
language, what is unintelligible; at the same time, and in the opposite 
direction, if concepts are impenetrable to language, then they are by 
definition unintelligible, or meaningless, nonsense. Ineffability equals 
unintelligibility, and vice versa. Aquinas’s position is accessible for a 
modern reader, in a way, perhaps, that differs from Augustine’s. For 
                                                 
65 Kirkpatrick, ‘Polemics as Praise’, p. 18. 
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Augustine agrees that God is, indeed, ineffable, but makes no claim for his 
being unknowable. That God remains ineffable is not due to our incapacity 
to understand; indeed, we can understand God, it is just that language fails 
in expressing his intelligibility. We need to know God, if at least 
imperfectly on Earth, in order that we can love him. In the closing prayer of 
De Trinitate, he says, ‘Meminerem tui, intelligam te, diligam te. Auge in me 
ista, donec me reformes ad integrum.’66According to Phillip Cary, this 
idiosyncratic position sets Augustine ‘[…] apart from the rest of the Nicene 
or orthodox traditions, which unanimously affirm the incomprehensibility 
of the divine nature’.67  
 
Augustine’s doctrine of intelligibility with its heterodox peculiarity, brings 
with it the epistemological upshot that the powers of language and intellect 
come apart when we think about God. Words are sensible things, and may 
not ‘give adequate expression to intelligible things’,68 and thus because we 
are, for the Neoplatonist Augustine, ultimately intelligent souls, we are 
able to understand things which might remain inexpressible. Aquinas, of 
course, is fully committed to persons as embodied creatures, persons who 
will become fully realised only at the Last Judgement when bodies are 
resurrected:  
 
Alio modo quia constat quod homo naturaliter desiderat salutem 
sui ipsius, anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus 
homo, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima consequatur 
salutem in alia vita, non tamen ego vel quilibet homo.69 
Super I ad Corinthios, 15, 2. 
 
                                                 
66 De Trinitate, ed. by W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie in Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 
LA (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), p. 534. ‘Grant the power of finding you to the one 
you have created to find you. May I remember you, understand you, love you. 
Increase all these things in me until you reform me fully.’  
67 Cary, Augustine’s Invention, p. 45. 
68 Cary, Augustine’s Invention, p. 58. 
69 ‘A human being naturally desires the survival of his or her selfhood. [E]ven were 
the soul to survive into another life, [that surviving soul] would be neither I nor 
any other person.’  
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The upshot of Aquinas’s position on bodies and souls for the ineffability 
topos is that whilst on Earth, meaningful discourse between human beings 
is possible because matter itself can be meaningful, as Denys Turner notes:  
 
What exists is a person; what makes me a person is my possessing 
an intellectual soul, and that one and only soul runs all the way down 
through my animal and vegetative life […] Thus […] my vegetative 
and animal life (eating, having sex) can bear sense, carry meanings, 
become a discourse […] [W]hat else is language but the material 
world replete with the human meanings that it bears, what else are 
human beings but matter articulate? 70 
 
Our real self, for Aquinas, our personhood—the one that will be glorified, 
God willing, at the Last Judgement—is no rarified intellectual soul but, 
rather, a creature who lives and breathes, who eats and has sex, who loves 
and grieves, and who feels regret and joy, and who feels, bodily, the entire 
spectrum of human emotion.71 This in itself allows us access to something 
                                                 
70 Turner, Thomas Aquinas, pp. 95-96. 
71 ST, Iª q. 75 a. 4 co: Respondeo dicendum quod animam esse hominem dupliciter 
potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed 
compositum ex anima et corpore, puta Socrates. Quod ideo dico, quia quidam 
posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem 
individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam 
speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus 
non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars 
speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium 
individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est 
quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod 
sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse 
quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie 
contentorum. Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic, quod etiam haec anima sit hic 
homo. Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae 
operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur 
homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur 
operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. 
Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur 
sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod 
homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. 
Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset 
anima utens corpore. ‘It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this 
man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive 
soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations 
which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs 
the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the 
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of the mystery of the Incarnation.72 How, aware of our own createdness, of 
our contingency, of our imperfection and of our particularity, we 
understand, if only through a glass darkly, what it might mean for a 
Creator—necessary, perfect and eternal—to become man, one tempted by 
sin, and one fearful of death. 
 
Respondeo dicendum quod Christus tentari voluit, primo quidem, 
ut nobis contra tentationes auxilium ferret. Unde Gregorius dicit, in 
homilia, non erat indignum redemptori nostro quod tentari voluit, 
qui venerat et occidi, ut sic tentationes nostras suis tentationibus 
vinceret, sicut mortem nostram sua morte superavit […] Unde 
dicitur Heb. IV, non habemus pontificem qui non possit compati 
infirmitatibus nostris, tentatum autem per omnia, pro similitudine, 
absque peccato.73 
ST, IIIª q. 41 a. 1 co. 
 
                                                 
operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (Article 3) that sensation 
is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, 
but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something 
composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to 
the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.’ 
72 ST, IIIª q. 2 a. 5 co: Respondeo dicendum quod Christus dicitur homo univoce 
cum hominibus aliis, utpote eiusdem speciei existens, secundum illud apostoli, 
Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus. Pertinet autem ad rationem speciei 
humanae quod anima corpori uniatur, non enim forma constituit speciem nisi per 
hoc quod sit actus materiae; et hoc est ad quod generatio terminatur, per quam 
natura speciem intendit. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerit anima 
unita corpori, et contrarium est haereticum, utpote derogans veritati humanitatis 
Christi. ‘I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being 
of the same species, according to the Apostle (Philippians 2:7), “being made in the 
likeness of a man.” Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul 
be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch 
as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through 
which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was 
united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of 
Christ's humanity.’ 
73 ST, IIIª q. 41 a. 1 co: ‘I answer that, Christ wished to be tempted; first that He 
might strengthen us against temptations. Hence Gregory says in a homily (xvi in 
Evang.): “It was not unworthy of our Redeemer to wish to be tempted, who came 
also to be slain; in order that by His temptations He might conquer our 
temptations, just as by His death He overcame our death”. […] Hence it is written 
(Hebrews 4:15): “We have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our 
infirmities, but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin”.’ 
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Further, only such a conception of matter and soul, of embodied persons, 
can make sense of the sublimity of the Eucharist, and of human persons 
becoming part of God’s Church:  
 
[It is] the mystery of how the lowest and most material of all forms 
of human life […] carries the weight of an utterly transcendent 
meaning […] of the Cross, the resurrection and ascension. If ever 
there was a case of matter making sense, of material life becoming 
Word—indeed the very Word of God—then the Eucharist is it.74  
 
 
That mystery of the Incarnation, and that sublime transcendence of the 
Eucharist, has purchase on us because of our embodiedness, and because of 
our very imperfection. The human questions of life and action which so 
preoccupy us should be the terrain of both poetry and theology: in learning 
what we are and what we can be; in knowing what is beyond us; in 
considering the nature of language itself; in, perhaps, becoming critics of 
poetry, we increase our understanding of what it means to be created.  
 
The ultimate bearer of meaning, for Christians, must be the person of 
Christ. When human language, whether vernacular or no, cannot contain 
the plenitude of the Godhead, we can see God when we see Christ; we can 
read truth when we read the Word; and in becoming the Church, the body 
of Christ, we can participate in God through the Eucharist; in loving 
neighbours and enemies alike, in forgiveness and in charity, we become 
like him and know him better.  
 
For Dante, as meaning-making creatures we can become intoxicated by our 
own ability to mean: we run the risk of falling into pride because of the 
brute fact of language and our apparent manipulation of it. But it is the 
pride of the orator (perhaps a Bernard), of the rhetorician (an Augustine), 
of the philosopher (an Aquinas), and of the theologian (a Gregory), and, of 
                                                 
74 Turner, Thomas Aquinas, p. 98. 
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course, the pride of the poet, which has the potential to obscure the 
limitations of language: language does not have the power within itself to 
mean everything. For Augustine, despite casting off the role of professional 
rhetorician with such determination, the choice of linguistic style remains 
important. As Erich Auerbach has shown, Augustine recommends that the 
work of those preaching to convert a congregation incorporate sublime, 
intermediate or lowly styles. Christian discourse, or so Augustine says in 
De doctrina christiana, and in particular, instruction and exegesis, can be 
written in the low style, because ‘a Christian’s […] subject matter is always 
sublime’.75 This is one example in which theological language and its 
interpretation becomes what Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt calls a 
‘totalizing discourse’. It is ‘totalizing’ because it gives the impression that 
within its very own limits, God’s truth might be articulated; that through 
and within language we might make progress towards understanding; that 
had we but world enough and time, we could contain the Godhead and its 
meaning in our discourse. According to Bauerschmidt, the tyranny of such 
a metaphysics will only be disrupted by something totally Other: 
 
Only a divine discourse that breaks into and breaks apart human 
speech can in fact rupture the totalizing discourse of metaphysics; it 
is only such a claim that can in fact confront us with a God who is 
truly Other, without delivering that Other to us as an effect of our 
consciousness.76 
 
One way in which to end such a discourse, might be to stop altogether, to 
break off, to leave room for silence. In allowing for an apophatic silence, 
one might be able to understand how language is ‘iconic of humanity’s 
difference from God’s eternity’.77 This suggestion brings us back to 
Augustine and Monica at Ostia, returning to Earth from their shared 
                                                 
75 Auerbach, Literary Language and Its Public, p. 37. 
76 F. C. Bauerschmidt, ‘Aesthetics: The Theological Sublime’, in Radical Orthodoxy: A 
New Theology, ed. by J. Millbank, C. Pickstock and G. Ward (London: Routledge, 
1999) p. 215. 
77 Morgan, The Incarnation of the Word, p. 38. 
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mystical vision, back into the world and ‘to the noise of […] human speech 
where a sentence has both a beginning and an ending’ (IX, x, (24)). 78 As 
Elena Lombardi has shown, syntax itself demonstrates that language 
desires its own end: a desire, that is, for the resolution and satisfaction of 
the meaning-making form that is found within sentences, with their 
beginnings and endings.79 The limitedness of language, even when taken as 
a whole—as a system, as an entity—is radically contingent and dependent 
on human creatures, in a particular space and in a particular time, as Dante 
has the character of Adam make explicit to the pilgrim in Paradiso XXVI:  
 
‘La lingua ch’io parlai fu tutta spenta 
innanzi che a l’ovra inconsummabile 
fosse la gente di Nembròt attenta: 
ché nullo effetto mai razïonabile, 
per lo piacere uman che rinovella 
seguendo il cielo, sempre fu durabile. 
Opera naturale è ch’uom favella; 
ma così o così, natura lascia 
poi fare a voi secondo che v’abbella.’ 
 
Paradiso XXVI, 124-32 
One might find the prospect of a silence, the end of language, unbearably 
nihilistic: what can one learn, what can one even think, with silence? It is 
here that the stranglehold that language has on us seems at its most 
powerful. And yet, Aquinas saw that there was a power in the 
disappearing word, there is meaning in things that are left unarticulated. 
At the end of his career, famously, and perhaps mythically, before the great 
summa is completed, he says to Brother Reginald, ‘I can write no more. I 
have seen things which make all my writing like straw.’80. And if Thomas’s 
vast output is mere straw, then what hope the rest of us for making sense 
of reality through language? In my last chapter I considered how Aquinas 
                                                 
78 Chadwick, p. 171. 
79 Lombardi, The Syntax of Desire, especially, pp. 47-66. 
80 G.K. Chesterton recounts this episode in Thomas Aquinas: The Dumb Ox (New 
York City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 116. 
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conceals the person of Thomas within his own writing: how the text gives 
up nothing of the man, except what we read into the negative space which 
surrounds it. Here the task is greater still: the negative space is now 
blanketing, blinding and perhaps suffocating too. What can we see and 
understand with no language? What templates do we have for negotiating 
such a disappearance?   
 
The disappearances, contained within the Gospels, of Jesus Christ: his 
death, his bodily removal from the tomb, his vanishing from Emmaus—
these disappearances help us to understand, literally, the death of the 
W/word. Witnesses to those disappearances were left without the ability to 
make sense of them, their meaning seemed utterly lost. Without knowing 
that Christ had risen from the dead, absence was interpreted as some kind 
of abandonment and meaninglessness. The tears of those at the foot of the 
Cross; the tears of Mary Magdalene; the confusion of the disciples on the 
road to Emmaus (‘nos autem sperabamus quia ipse esset redempturus 
Israhel’81): these are outward signs of a loss of meaning. In his analysis of 
these disappearances, Bauerschmidt goes further, and shows that the 
vanishings themselves contain within them the meaningfulness of the 
particularity of Jesus Christ.  
 
The cross, the tomb, the way to Emmaus: all places of negation, of 
vanishing. At the same time, the transparency of the sign does not 
make it […] nugatory. For it is this particular negation (cross and 
resurrection) of this particular sign (Jesus of Nazareth) that moves us 
beyond mere negation of meaning to an excess of meaning.82 
 
That particular absence, that particular silence, might well be the same 
silence that rings out at the end of the Commedia: the beat that Dante 
deliberately constructs and asks us to attend to as the poem ends. For 
Aquinas, ‘silence is not the absence of speech. It is what the fullness of 
                                                 
81 Luke 24:21. 
82 Bauerschmidt, ‘Aesthetics: the Theological Sublime’, p. 210. 
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speech demonstrates […] speech falls short.’83 An excess of meaning cannot 
be contained within language itself, the vision that Dante-poeta participates 
in cannot be articulated in words. And so the ‘fullness of speech’ in the 
Commedia, the virtuosity of Dante’s language, does not contain within it the 
totality which is God, but, rather, as it falls into silence, shows us 
humanity’s ‘iconic […] difference’ from God. It shows us that difference, 
through characters like Gregory—who is both vulnerable to the love 
between humans and vulnerable to language’s misunderstandings, as it 
draws us into the ‘totalizing’ discourse of theology. For Dante, there is a 
requirement upon us to recognise our createdness as humans—and 
language as being definitive of this—in the light of a Creator who is 
perfectly meaningful and suffers no such vulnerability; whose Son once 
and for all rescued meaning from the meaninglessness that the  ‘grande 
errore’ (Paradiso VII, 29) of original sin had so threatened.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Turner, Thomas Aquinas, p. 42. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Beatrice as Theologian 
Ending the last chapter, I considered what can be gained by accepting the 
finitude of language, by the appreciation of an apophatic silence. It is a 
question which must have preoccupied Dante, even as he dealt in words, 
their craft and their power. This final chapter considers what Dante is able 
to do in light of his commitment to an apophatic God, given Dante-poeta’s 
self-declared calling as scriba Dei: how he can write powerfully and 
meaningfully about God and our approach to Him. The focus of this 
chapter will be the character of Beatrice: I propose that of any of the 
characters who appear in the poem, it is Beatrice who fulfils the role of 
theologian most effectively, because of, rather than in spite of, the role she 
plays in Dante’s own biography and poetic career. It is Beatrice who 
‘grounds and humanizes a poem that could otherwise fall into silence or 
abstraction’.1As we saw in the previous chapter, that silence may well be 
necessary at the last, but in order for us to see this fact clearly, Dante first 
offers up a literary production in Beatrice, ‘a radically alien construct’,2 who 
is able to up-end our expectations about theological authority, and who 
embodies in her own unique personhood a means for understanding 
something about the Godhead itself. How Dante achieves this, and why, I 
explore below.  
And so in this chapter I read Beatrice among my chosen theologians: how 
she shares some of their qualities—indeed the qualities through which their 
authority as theologians is constructed, either historically, or by Dante, in 
the poem. It is, necessarily, a somewhat contrived reading, because of 
course the qualities that I pick out here are not the only ones for which 
these theologians are known, and conversely, they are not the only ones 
                                                 
1 T. Kay, Dante’s Lyric Redemption: Eros, Salvation, Vernacular Tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 80.  
2 Barolini, Dante and the Origins, p. 366. 
  178 
which are important in the character of Beatrice. But there are indeed 
important ways in which by comparing them, or setting them alongside 
each other, we can see that what is absolutely necessary and sufficient for 
the pilgrim to arrive at the vision of God at the end of the poem, can only 
be provided by the person of Beatrice, and not by any other person. What 
that fact means for readers more generally, I take up in the conclusion to 
the thesis.  
 
1. Interpreting Beatrice through Augustine 
It is my suggestion that any interpretation of Beatrice necessarily reads her 
personhood under the Augustinian rubric that Dante outlines in the second 
chapter of the Convivio —that is, in the autobiographical mode of talking of 
oneself, authorised by Augustine himself in the Confessions: 
 
L’altra è quando, per ragionare di sé, grandissima utilitade ne segue 
altrui per via di dottrina; e questa ragione mosse Agustino ne le sue 
Confessioni a parlare di sé, ché per lo processo de la sua vita, lo 
quale fu di [non] buono in buono, e di buono in migliore, e di 
migliore in ottimo, ne diede essemplo e dottrina, la quale per sì vero 
testimonio ricevere non si potea. 
     Convivio I, ii, 14 
 
Here in the Convivio, Dante claims Augustine was justified in writing about 
himself, because his life proceeded from ‘[non] buono in buono, e di buono 
in migliore, e di migliore in ottimo’. No other testimony could have 
provided so powerful a lesson.  In the Commedia, these words are echoed in 
a description of Dante-personaggio’s journey. Tellingly, it is Beatrice herself 
who picks out the way for the pilgrim, such that it is: ‘Bëatrice quella che sì 
scorge di bene in meglio’ (Paradiso X, 38). The echoes of the Convivio 
passage are apparent, and here in the Heaven of the Sun, Dante authorises 
again his own autobiographical project, placing it alongside the reasons 
that he claimed authorised Augustine’s own life-writing. But the additional 
datum in this example, of course, is that it is Beatrice who sees for the 
pilgrim in which direction one’s life moves from good to better: Beatrice is 
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necessary for the pilgrim to become what is worthy of writing. And as 
such, the author pairs the two inextricably together: Dante’s own 
conception of himself, transmitted in all of his works, but reaching an 
apotheosis in the Commedia, is only understood, through and because of, 
his relationship with Beatrice.     
Dante continued his career, after a disruption, by returning to the figure of 
Beatrice. Her life and death provided both the prima facie motivation for 
writing the Vita nova and the impetus for Dante’s self-proclaimed change in 
poetic direction which ends it. But far from seeing the Commedia as a kind 
of continuation of the lovers’ story of the Vita nova, Zygmunt G. Barański 
suggests that even though the later poem calls forth the Vita nova in both 
narrative content and explicit stylistic references, this ‘is not really to 
celebrate it, but to take over and rewrite its concerns’. At a fundamental 
level, the Commedia resurrects Beatrice from the death she reportedly 
suffers in the Vita nova and of course, reunites her with Dante in a most 
dramatic way. According to Barański:  
The Commedia openly overturns and supersedes the pivotal and 
determining event of the Vita nova, thereby restoring a moral order 
to the character’s life which Beatrice’s death had severely 
undermined.3 
The fissures between the two texts are made clearer still in the portrayal of 
Beatrice’s character. In the Commedia, Barański hears a ‘psychologically 
complex […] voice’,4 which was not present at all in the Vita nova. This 
voice, of course, is the subject of much discussion in the literature. 
Barolini’s now famous description of Dante’s heroine as Beatrix loquax5 is 
important, and I return to it in the discussion below, but Barolini also 
suggests, in seeming opposition to Barański, that the Beatrice of the 
Commedia is far from a complex character with a recognisable subjectivity. 
                                                 
3 Barański, ‘New Life’, p. 286. 
4 Barański, ‘New Life’, p. 286.  
5 Barolini, Dante and the Origins, p. 360.   
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Indeed, she says, in Beatrice, Dante seems to have ‘failed to create [a 
cohesive] character’.6 For Barolini, the various symbols which Beatrice 
embodies undermine the characterisation of any particular personhood.  
So it is impossible to consider the role of the character of Beatrice in the 
Commedia without considering her appearance in the Vita nova, and the 
type of poetic production that Dante was engaged in in his earlier life. 
Barański’s concern that we do not read the journey from Vita nova to 
Commedia as a straightforward continuation of the poet’s biography, must 
also be squared with a consideration of the choice of genre, style, and 
language—but also narrative content—which the earlier work exhibited, 
and how in the Commedia this choice was rejected, recapitulated or refined.  
Even if we agree with Barański, that the Commedia supersedes the Vita nova 
and reappraises its significance and worth, what we must see is that 
Dante’s choice of Beatrice as sometime subject of the Vita nova and as 
character in the Commedia, means that we can only understand the driving 
force of the latter as a journey toward, and motivated by, love. Indeed, 
Beatrice is identified as Dante’s beloved early in the poem, at Inferno II, 
when we hear Lucy, via Virgil, implore Beatrice to act on behalf of Dante-
personaggio: to help ‘quei che t’amò tanto’ (Inferno II, 104). Whether the love 
referred to here is an erotic love brings with it a host of questions, and 
complications, which some critics have tried to side-step through 
employing only allegorical interpretations for the lovers’ story—mirroring 
those Biblical love stories which theologians have for centuries used to 
illustrate the love between humanity and God. That is certainly one 
explanatory route to take, but it is not the only one, and it leaves aside rich 
interpretive possibilities. 
In Book II of the Convivio, Dante describes the Empyrean as resembling the 
‘divina scienza’, or theology, because within it all is peace: it suffers no 
                                                 
6 Barolini, Dante and the Origins, p. 363.  
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diversity of opinion or sophistical reasoning because of the certainty of its 
subject, which is God:  
 
[L]o Cielo empireo per la sua pace simiglia la divina scienza, che 
piena è di tutta pace; la quale non soffera lite alcuna d’oppinioni o 
di sofistici argomenti, per la eccellentissima certezza del suo 
subietto, lo quale è Dio. E di questa dice esso a li suoi discepoli: ‘La 
pace mia do a voi, la pace mia lascio a voi’, dando e lasciando a loro 
la sua dottrina, che è questa scienza di cu’ io parlo. Di costei dice 
Salomone: ‘Sessanta sono le regine, e ottanta l’amiche concubine; e 
de le ancille adolescenti non è numero: una è la colomba mia e la 
perfetta mia’. 
Convivio, II, xiv, 19-20 
 
I touched on the idiosyncratic nature of this particular conception of 
theology within the Introduction, and it is important to reconsider it here, 
because what it means to be a theologian must of course depend on what is 
understood by the term theology itself. Beatrice’s theologising, her ‘God-
speak’, dissolves both conflict and misguided desire, it is not subject to 
contradiction (‘non soffera lite alcuna d’oppinioni o di sofistici argomenti’), 
and as such it can in fact reassert peace. It is Beatrice in the Commedia who 
can direct Dante-personaggio’s eyes to the truth, even though in the poem 
the other theologians who appear, explicitly or implicitly, retain at least 
some authority.  
 
It is as authorities that the theologians are venerated, for their ability to 
illuminate the truths of the Bible: Dante calls theology perfect because it 
enables us to see the truth, but, of course, theology is everywhere practised 
differently, it has different methodologies and theoretical commitments. As 
we have seen in Chapter I, even in Dante’s relatively recent past, Thomas 
Aquinas had already accrued to himself if not an established authority then 
certainly a celebrated notoriety, which reverberated from Paris throughout 
thirteenth-century Europe. Indeed his canonisation in 1323, so soon after 
his death in 1274, bespeaks the influence and penetration of his works. 
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Bernard, we know, was remembered and celebrated for his preaching and 
his affective theology, even though he was concerned to retain what he 
viewed as a wholly orthodox type of Christianity: in Dante’s Florence his 
image appears in the church of the Badia at Settimo, and laude were sung in 
his honour in the streets by members of the confraternities, and a 
considerable number of his works were housed in the convent libraries. 
Augustine and Gregory, by Dante’s time, are towering authorities, 
however they are named among the Church Fathers who go unread, in 
Dante’s letters to the Italian cardinals and Cangrande.7 The character Folco, 
at Paradiso IX, 133-4, reiterates this same lament, when he says that ‘i dottor 
magni | son derelitti’. 
 
Beatrice differs from these theologian-characters, of course. Even though 
she may well have been a real person who lived in Florence, and whom the 
author had seen or met, the reality of Beatrice, such that it is, is brought to 
us only by the mediation of Dante himself.  
 
In the Vita nova, then, Beatrice is a living woman from the reality of 
Dante’s experience—and in the Comedy she is no intellectus 
separatus, no angel, but a blessed human being who will rise again 
in the flesh at the Last Judgement.8 
 
The historical theologians have their texts and their reputations—their 
hagiographies, iconographies—that provide multi-layered and multi-
authored texture to their saintly personalities. This texture has been the 
focus of the previous chapters, and part of my purpose has been to show 
                                                 
7 Epistola XI, 16:  ‘Iacet Gregorius tuus in telis aranearum; iacet Ambrosius in 
neglectis clericorum latibulis; iacet Augustinus abiectus, Dionysius, Damascenus et 
Beda.’; Epistola, XIII, 80: ‘Et hoc est insinuatum nobis in Matheo, ubi tres discipuli 
ceciderunt in faciem suam, nihil postea recitantes, quasi obliti. Et in Ezechiele 
scribitur: “Vidi. et cecidi in faciem meam”. Et ubi ista invidis non sufficiant, legant 
Richardum de Sancto Victore in libro De Contemplatione, legant Bernardum in 
libro De Consideratione, legant Augustinum in libro De Quantitate Anime, et non 
invidebunt’. 
8 E. Auerbach, Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (New York: Meridian 
Books Inc., 1959), p. 74. 
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how Dante the author incorporated or rejected the characterisations that 
had been handed down. But Beatrice’s representation in the Vita nova is 
authored by only Dante, and its characterisation of her person is, at best, 
shadowy and enigmatic, at worst, two-dimensional.  
And so the author of the Commedia writes anew about his beloved and, of 
course, about a gamut of other characters—some of whom are the 
theologians that I consider in this study. A template he has at his disposal, 
which plays with the auto-citation that he began in Vita nova and continued 
throughout his oeuvre, and which Erich Auerbach has helpfully brought 
into focus, is one inaugurated by Augustine himself: the one that uses the 
figural mode of scriptural interpretation; the one, that is, which reads 
earlier selves as pre-figuring ultimate selves, ultimate realities. It is indeed 
playful on Dante’s part, as he makes use of that earlier Beatrice of the Vita 
nova, and responds to it in the Commedia by representing his beloved, now, 
as a culmination of that underdetermined, pasty figure. For Auerbach, 
‘theological interpretation […] does not compel us to abandon the historical 
reality of Beatrice—on the contrary’.9 The conceit, of course, is that the 
Beatrice of the Commedia is the one which could not be any more Beatrice: 
she has reached a fulfilment of her person—she is the most she can possibly 
be in Heaven. Happily for Dante-personaggio, that person retains a love and 
commitment to him, despite his inconstancy, which moves her even to the 
threshold of the damned. Thus the autobiography that Dante writes, 
sanctioned by Augustine’s own model in the Confessions, and concerning a 
story of a life that moves ‘di bene in meglio’ (Paradiso X, 38), in fact 
becomes ‘migliore’ only under the condition of understanding that 
Beatrice’s personhood provides. In life, she withheld her salutation from 
                                                 
9 Auerbach, Scenes, p. 76. 
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Dante; in Glory she provides salvific power: these two facts are inexorable 
in a poema sacra and its precursors, figurally interpreted.10   
2. Beatrice and Bernard 
Below, I read Beatrice alongside Bernard of Clairvaux, and in so doing, I 
look again at some of the qualities that I discussed in Chapter II, regarding 
Bernard’s personhood. My claim there was that the person who emerges 
from his texts is one whose theological authority is underpinned by an 
authentic desire for God. This desire is heard in his affective language 
about experiencing the divine, an experience framed as an erotic encounter, 
and secondly, in his prioritisation of person-to-person communication, that 
is, in his loving attention for individuals. Lastly in this chapter, I also 
consider how the significance in the poem of the Veronica veil unites 
Bernard and Beatrice and brings into focus the importance of names and 
naming. 
That person-to-person embodiment of the love of the Creator can be heard 
in the voice of Bernard’s works, and in the words which Dante gives him in 
the poem. Bernard’s outpouring of his love of God and his love of 
humanity, apparent, in particular, in his letters—and his lack of a 
systematic theology elsewhere in his writing— helps to create an 
authenticity which is defined by its personal nature: Bernard’s concern is 
for particular individuals, the state of their souls, and their vulnerability to 
the corruption of sin. And it is this personal concern, and the love of God 
                                                 
10 It is impossible to pass over in this discussion Dante’s choice of salvific language 
in Book II, chapter xiv, of the Convivio, which celebrates the gifts of Lady 
Philosophy, handed to him by Boethius, but which echoes the words that he 
reserves for Beatrice in the Commedia: ‘O dolcissimi e ineffabili sembianti, e 
rubatori subitani de la mente umana, che ne le mostrazioni de li occhi de la 
Filosofia apparite, quando essa con li suoi drudi ragiona! Veramente in voi è la 
salute, per la quale si fa beato chi vi guarda, e salvo da la morte de la ignoranza e 
da li vizii’. How Beatrice assumes and replaces Lady Philosophy is a question that 
I consider below. 
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that is realised in the person-to-person encounter, that is the defining 
feature of the relationship between the pilgrim and Beatrice.  
A figural interpretation, as we saw above with Beatrice, might also be 
applied to the other characters within the poem. In Chapter II we saw how 
Bernard’s burning love transmits itself through the language of his written 
works, his sermons and letters. In the poem, the character of Bernard is 
written with this same burning desire, which now extends to an ardour for 
the salvation of the pilgrim’s soul. Beatrice, too, embodies this ardour, and 
in important ways she has things in common with Bernard, both the 
character as he appears in the poem, and with the historical Bernard: his 
way of being in the world that emerges from his works. Placing Beatrice at 
the centre of his poem, Dante fuels the pilgrim’s desire, and provides the 
hunger for satisfaction which drives him onward, through the fire of the 
terrace of lust, in Purgatorio XXVII, which curbs excess desire but does not 
remove desire entirely. Beatrice and Bernard both display an ardour in 
their eyes, for God, or for Mary, and in doing so are able to direct the 
pilgrim’s eyes too. In Paradiso XXXI, through word and gesture, Bernard 
encourages Dante-personaggio to look again at the Virgin enthroned:    
 
 Bernardo, come vide li occhi miei  
 nel caldo suo caler fissi e attenti,  
 li suoi con tanto affetto volse a lei,  
 che ' miei di rimirar fé più ardenti.  
 
Paradiso XXXI, 139-42 
 
This passage recalls the fourteenth-century Florentine lauda to Bernard, in 
which he is called an aquila contemplativa.11 The eagle was a common 
symbol for clear-sightedness in the Middle Ages; indeed, there is reference 
                                                 
11 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, Magliabechiano 11, 1, 122 (Banco Rari 
18) f. 110r.  
  186 
in a thirteenth-century sermon, by the Franciscan preacher Saint Anthony 
of Padua to a capacity of eagles which extends the metaphor further: 
 
[T]he eagle has keen eyesight- ‘eagle-eyed’, we say- and can gaze at 
the sun without flinching. Natural History teaches us that it has 
extremely keen sight, and makes its young look at the sun before 
their wings are fully-fledged. It strikes them, and turns them to face 
the sun […] The eagle is a symbol of the saints’ keen understanding, 
and their sublime contemplation, which directs their children (their 
works) towards the true sun and light of wisdom, so that any hidden 
impurity, or anything foreign to its nature, may be revealed in the 
sun’s brightness.12 
 
So Bernard is known in Dante’s Florence as a contemplative Eagle and in 
medieval Italy saints were venerated for their eagle-like eye-sight, their 
‘sublime contemplation’ and understanding, the product of which is their 
works, their children. It would not be too far a stretch to suggest that those 
reading their works, or hearing their sermons, are also directed to the sun 
and benefit from the wisdom that shines there: are also, that is, the children 
of the saints. Dante-personaggio certainly has the appearance of a child, even 
a grandchild, of the venerable sene, Bernard. And this parental relation he 
shares with Beatrice, the mother bird of Paradiso XXIII,13 who ‘con ardente 
affeto il sole aspetta | fiso guardando’ (8-9), and who in Paradiso I, 46-48 
looks towards the sun: 
 
 quando Beatrice in sul sinistro fianco 
vidi rivolta e riguardar nel sole: 
aquila sì non li s’affisse unquanco. 
 
                                                 
12 The Sermons Of Saint Antony Of Padua, translated into English by P. Spilsbury 
from the critical Latin edition of the Centro Studi Antoniani, Padova, Italia (1979). 
This quote is from the Sermon on the Fourteenth Sunday After Pentecost. 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/23435333/Sermons-of-St-Anthony-of-Padua 
[Accessed 1 August 2017]. I have been unable to access the Latin critical edition in 
the UK. 
13 Beatrice as mother bird also echoes Christ in Matthew 23:37 when he says he 
would nurture the children of Jerusalem, like a hen under its wing: ‘Hierusalem 
Hierusalem quae occidis prophetas et lapidas eos qui ad te missi sunt quotiens 
volui congregare filios tuos quemadmodum gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas 
et noluisti’. 
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The effect of Beatrice’s looking, like the eagle in Saint Anthony’s sermon, is 
to turn Dante-personaggio’s gaze towards the sun too, beyond his usual 
capacity, in lines 52-54:  
 
 così de l’atto suo, per li occhi infuso 
ne l’imagine mia, il mio si fece, 
e fissi li occhi al sole oltre nostr’ uso. 
 
This early in the cantica he is unable to sustain the sight for long, but 
instead reverts to looking at Beatrice herself. Both Bernard and Beatrice 
compel the pilgrim to look; something of their desire for God transmits to 
Dante-personaggio. This looking is literal: Beatrice turns (‘revolta’) towards 
the light (Paradiso XXIII, 11) and at lines 28-29, the pilgrim sees Christ in 
Triumph, Christ as ‘un sol’. Theologians furnish their readers with 
understanding; they direct their readers and their congregations; they teach 
them how to see the theological truth of the scriptures, or so they should, 
according to the Convivio—and the light of the sun, of Christ, reveals the 
truth that the theologians help to uncover.14  
 
The maternal in Beatrice—the mother bird who looks to the sun and who 
helps her offspring to do the same—can be read as an important element of 
her personhood. In Purgatorio XXX, Dante-personaggio’s response to 
Beatrice’s arrival in the poem reduces him to a boy running to his mamma, 
even though it is to the now-disappeared Virgil that the pilgrim has turned 
(43); a little later, the pilgrim is still the child, but now Beatrice, after she 
has delivered her first rebuke, has become like a scolding mother (79).  In 
Chapter III we saw that Beatrice also shares some of the maternal qualities 
of Monica, who in her way enables Augustine to ‘see’ the truth. And both 
these literary productions inevitably draw comparisons with the mother of 
                                                 
14 In Paradiso V, 27, Beatrice herself recommends that the pilgrim to start with 
biblical exegesis rather than be swept up by the words of preachers or by the 
sophistry of the philosophers, a point I return to below, in a discussion about her 
own particular discourse.  
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Christ, who in the same canto, Paradiso XXIII, 121, the pilgrim sees desired 
by an array of souls, reaching upward ‘come fantolin’. Teodolinda Barolini 
reorients us to the main theme of the Commedia, however, when she says:  
 
[I]t is certainly true that Dante invests his Beatrice with maternal 
energy [but] the dominant register in Dante’s portrayal of Beatrice 
is erotic. The interpretative challenge is that she is both ‘good’ and 
not desexualized.15 
 
The maternal and erotic are forms of human love that can only be 
understood in each case as particular: one cannot be in love with just 
anyone; not everyone can be one’s own child, unless, in beautiful paradox, 
one is the Virgin herself. If Beatrice is a mother bird in Paradiso XXIII, then 
elsewhere she is like the dove of the Song of Songs—the beloved One: ‘una 
è la colomba mia e la perfetta mia’ (Convivio, II, xiv, 20). Among queens, 
handmaids and concubines, theology is the one love, just as Beatrice is the 
one, among the other women, of both Dante’s love- and intellectual life. 
 
The integration of theological truth with erotic love within the person of 
Beatrice has of course been the preoccupation of many of the responses to 
the Commedia, both in the academic sphere and the wider cultural milieu.16 
We saw above that Beatrice shares with Bernard the same desire for seeing 
God, and it is Bernard, of course, who uses the language of eros to describe 
his desire to experience God on Earth, and also the fruits of that desire. But 
Beatrice’s desire is double-sighted: it looks at God, and it looks at Dante-
personaggio too, and not only because she desires his salvation. The 
pilgrim’s encounter with Beatrice is remarkable for the complex interplay 
of looking-at and looking-away-from that goes on between the two 
characters. They are each intent upon this lovers’ dance of the eyes: 
desiring to look; looking; fainting; turning away from; returning the gaze; 
                                                 
15 Barolini, Origins, p. 366. 
16 For a scholarly discussion beyond the sphere of traditional Dante studies, see 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, pp. 557-77. 
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commanding the other to look. It is an almost entirely erotic interplay, even 
though at the same time, Beatrice is teaching the pilgrim to look beyond her, 
by looking at her. Only after the pilgrim has seen the light of Christ in 
triumph approaching, has he, according to Beatrice, gained enough 
strength to look at her unveiled face and behold her smile, to see what she 
really is (‘riguarda qual son io’, Paradiso, XXIII, 46 ). Peter S. Hawkins notes 
that, ‘it is to the sign of her face that he will continually turn his gaze, as if 
pulled by her beauty to the mark of his greater desire […] and therefore to 
a reality that lies beyond her’.17  
 
The eroticism of the encounter between the two characters—and the whole 
of the pilgrim’s journey is an encounter, inaugurated as it is by the sound 
of Beatrice’s name in Inferno II and spurred on again in Purgatory on the 
terrace of lust, when Dante-personaggio responds again to the sound of her 
name—can be illuminated by considering the recurring metaphor of the 
arrow, from a poem replete with such imagery, which builds an erotic 
intensity: the shiver of a sexual spark between the two. Of no greater or 
lesser importance, this metaphor also stands for the dawning of intellectual 
insight, and thus we see again, just as we saw in Chapter II, when I 
considered Bernard’s language of love, that the affective and the 
intellectual modes of thought are forever tied together by Dante, integrated 
into a picture that would otherwise be incomplete.18  
 
The image itself is important—the arrowshot—but its arrangement in the 
poem also deserves attention. In Paradiso II, Dante-personaggio and Beatrice 
have moved to a new location, the Heaven of the Moon: ‘forse in tanto in 
quanto un quadrel posa | e vola e da la noce si dischiava’ (23-24). The rapid 
transferral is quickly followed by the pilgrim’s new awareness—he reaches 
                                                 
17 Hawkins, Dante’s Testaments, p. 141. 
18 The primacy of the intellect over the will is a question I return to in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
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a place where he can ‘see’, and this knowledge dawns only after looking at 
Beatrice herself (22). Here, then, the looking, and the movement through 
the heavens, and the new knowledge belonging to the pilgrim, become 
phases of an integrated action, just as the arrow’s hitting the target, its 
flight, and its release from the bow are part of the same. But this beautiful 
tercet not only gives a sense of rapid movement, and of knowledge 
dawning—the target is hit—it simultaneously brings us back to the ways in 
which Dante-personaggio is tethered to Beatrice.19 The formulation of the 
flying arrow is here presented to us backwards: we hear of it hitting its 
target before it has left the bow—and in crafting his imagery in this way, 
the poet achieves something all the more powerful.  
 
In Purgatorio XXXI, 55-63, Beatrice describes lofted arrows which have the 
power to kill the pilgrim: he might not make it to maturity, and yet fully-
fledged birds are evidence alone that some survive the hunt, that death 
need not be the inevitable conclusion for Dante, even though, after 
Beatrice’s death, he failed to lift up his wings to avoid those darts. The barb 
from Beatrice is double-edged: are these arrows deceptive ideas, or 
deceptive lovers? By Paradiso II the pilgrim is no longer the target; in fact he 
might even be the originator of the arrow itself, one that ends, 
teleologically and necessarily, given his location, in knowledge.20 And yet 
there remains an erotic reading of the arrow: it hits a target before one is 
even aware it has left the bow; it looses its catch as though there is no way 
of controlling it, a body directed by eros: Eros the bowman, Dante the 
bowman. Beatrice is the target, the locus of a lover’s attention. And how are 
we to understand, from our Earthly perspective, just how the heavens are 
arranged, how bodies can penetrate bodies, ‘se corpo in corpo repe’ 
                                                 
19 The image is repeated at Paradiso V, 91-92, where the target is hit whilst the cord 
is still vibrating, from the release of the arrow. 
20 For a discussion about the connection between Dante’s teleology and his early 
love poetry, see R. Durling and R. Martinez, Time and the Crystal (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 185-91. 
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(Paradiso II, 39)? How can we understand the ways in which God exists? 
Such affective language about Beatrice provides a means, just as Bernard 
had provided a way to talk about God, through his exegesis on the Song of 
Songs and his sermons, such as De diligendo Deo, where, as we saw in 
Chapter II, he described his experience of God as being lost in Him. Desire 
to know, desire to see, desire to experience: Dante-personaggio first has to 
learn that all these desires, begun as they are in Beatrice (who is also the 
originator of her own arrow at Purgatorio XXXI, 117) must end, necessarily, 
in God. The target remains steadfast, permanent, necessary: it is the archer 
who is wavering, inconstant and contingent. 
 
The final way in which I read Beatrice alongside Bernard is through the 
image of the Veronica veil that appears in both the Commedia and the Vita 
nova. It is significant because it focuses attention on two things: on the 
necessity of Beatrice’s disappearance from the pilgrim’s side, and the 
appearance of Bernard; and the importance that the poet attaches to names 
and to naming: at its heart the essential character of the particular and 
personal relationships which Dante and Beatrice embody and which 
provide the ground for approaching the final vision of the poem.   
  
On the sounding of Bernard’s name at Paradiso XXXI, 102, the poet begins a 
description of a (perhaps) Croatian pilgrim, viewing the veil of Saint 
Veronica, a veil believed to show the image of Christ’s face. The Croatian 
pilgrim asks, ‘Segnor mio Iesù Cristo, Dio verace, | or fu sì fatta la 
sembianza vostra?’ (107-08).  Dante-personaggio is confronted by Bernard, 
face to face, just as the Croatian is brought face to ‘face’ with the image of 
Christ, a vestige of God on Earth. The image on the veil stands in relation 
to something real, something verace, just as Bernard’s name picks out him 
as a person, the real historical person, who is also—if we read the poem 
figuratively as a poema sacro—the fully elaborated and glorified Bernard of 
the Paradiso. 
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And so the Croatian’s question is a double one, because Dante is 
responding to Bernard, his name and his life, and his response is like that 
of another pilgrim moved to ask questions about semblances—seemingness 
and reality. Bernard’s name is an earthly sign, just as the image of the 
Veronica is an earthly sign, and they now stand in relation to something 
heavenly. Dante is meeting the person of Bernard, recognisable through 
this sign—and through the attributes he exemplified in his life—in a place 
the very opposite of earthly.  
 
Of course, we are being asked to read the Croatian’s question not just in 
relation to Dante’s recognition of Bernard, but of Dante’s experiencing 
God’s presence in the Empyrean. And in being a question it throws this 
episode into tension with those earlier pilgrim images in which awe and 
wonder prevailed, problematising the notion of pilgrimage itself, and of 
Dante’s pilgrimage in particular. In the earlier moments, in Paradiso XXXI, 
31-58, the poet first compares himself, and his experience of seeing the 
souls in the Empyrean, with northern savages coming to Rome and seeing 
the Lateran, towering above all mortal things, and being stunned to silence. 
If even these savages are stupefied, can we wonder at Dante-personaggio 
being glad to stay ‘muto’? The second image of a pilgrim, which follows 
straight on from the first, from line 43, moves from the overwhelming 
stupefaction of seeing the Lateran, to that of a pilgrim reaching his 
destination at a temple.  Whilst still experiencing the site of the pilgrimage, 
he ‘spera già ridir com’ ello stea’. This more positive image of a pilgrimage, 
setting up a comparison with Dante’s experience of the Empyrean and his 
writing of it—a moment of being moved to tell—is part of the same 
dramatic moment in which Beatrice disappears and Bernard arrives on the 
scene.  The shock of losing her—back to her rightful place—is palpable and 
moving; the introduction of Bernard is painful. But the tension raised in the 
questions that Dante asks about Beatrice’s seeming disappearance, and in 
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the tension raised by the questions asked by the Croatian pilgrim, provide 
part of the necessary conditions for Dante’s movement towards the divine. 
 
Because the pilgrim cannot understand what Beatrice means fully, until he 
has lost her one more time. This time, unlike in the Vita nova, his shock does 
not give way to mourning: it cannot, because to lose her to Heaven is of 
course no loss at all.  Dante-personaggio cannot possess Beatrice as a lover, 
even though it is through the words of lovers that he understands his 
relation to her, and consequently, it turns out, to God. With Bernard, the 
pilgrim is now in the company of someone who caught the taste of the 
divine on Earth, ‘contemplando, gustò di quella pace’ (Paradiso XXXI, 111). 
And as we have seen, some of Bernard’s most powerful writing about his 
mystical experiences of God are in his Sermones super Cantica canticorum, 
where ‘taste’ is just right: ‘osculetur me osculo oris sui quia meliora sunt 
ubera tua vino’21, writes the author of the Song, a passage which Bernard 
uses to describe the mystical union with God, through the primacy of the 
Incarnation. An experience of God on Earth is made possible through 
bodies, both through the contemplative himself, who desires the 
experience, akin to erotic desire, but also through the body of Christ in the 
Incarnation. The experience is sensual like a kiss, a taste of God, something 
to be desired, bodily. But Christ is also the event of the kiss itself—the 
mediator between two lovers, man and God. 
 
So Bernard and Beatrice are linked by the Veronica in more than one way: 
firstly, because the loss of Beatrice and then the sound of Bernard’s name 
initiate the image of the Croatian’s pilgrimage, which in turn recalls the 
Veronica in the Vita nova, when Dante mourned another disappearance of 
Beatrice—in fact, her death. In Vita nova XL, 9-14, Dante composes a sonnet 
addressed to the pilgrims on their way to Rome to see the Veronica: they 
                                                 
21 Song of Solomon 1. ‘Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth: for thy breasts 
are better than wine.’ 
  194 
do not understand, he thinks, that the city is desolated to have lost its 
blessedness, its Beatrice: 
Se voi restaste per volerlo audire, 
certo lo cor de' sospiri mi dice che lagrimando n'uscireste pui. 
Ell'ha perduta la sua beatrice; 
e le parole ch'om di lei pò dire 
hanno vertù di far piangere altrui. 
The naming of Bernard and the almost-naming of Beatrice in the Vita nova, 
each coincide with the mention of the Veronica. The sounding of Bernard’s 
name brings forth questions about semblance and reality: about figurae and 
elaboration. Beatrice’s emphatic and terrifying sounding of her own name 
in the Commedia at Purgatorio XXX, 73, and her calling Dante by his name in 
the garden of the Earthly Paradise (55) creates an irresistible connection 
between the two as lovers. It is an anchor: an event which pairs them 
forever together, and it brings in to focus the necessity of particular 
commitments to particular persons. The theologian Janet Soskice has said it 
this way:22 that we need names in order to be in relation to someone; and 
the relation between the pilgrim and Beatrice, although at this moment in 
the poem seems precarious, is of course beyond doubt, even though the 
pilgrim may as yet be unaware of his ultimate destination. 
The second way in which Bernard and Beatrice are linked through the 
Veronica is because Beatrice, as she appears in the Vita nova, might be 
understood as a Veronica, a true icon, herself, as Robert Pogue Harrison 
has suggested in his nuanced study. For Harrison, the fact that the veil 
bears the figure of Christ is less important than the fact that it was created 
directly by Christ’s face itself. It is not, above all, a representation of Christ, 
but rather a creation of Christ, an acheiropoieta.  For Harrison, the Veronica 
‘must be seen as a figure for an authentic language of representation with 
                                                 
22 Soskice, ‘Creation and Naming’, a seminar given at Notre Dame Summer 
Seminar Tantur Ecumenical Institute, Jerusalem, June 27, 2013. 
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regard to Beatrice’,23 because she creates Dante’s career directly, in both the 
Vita nova and for his character in the Commedia—where ‘career’ means 
something like the work of finding himself in God, and God in himself, and 
then his writing of it. No one else besides Beatrice could have made Dante’s 
career, just as nothing other than the Christ could have made the image on 
the Veronica veil. The pilgrim has in Beatrice a concrete vestige of God’s 
love: she herself is an acheiropoieta of the Creator, and only in and through 
her—in and through a particular, personal love relationship, rather than 
through the teaching of abstract or formal treatise of a theologian—can he 
come to understand his place amongst creation. Understanding what 
Beatrice’s death really means, not a tragedy for Dante, but an instance of 
creation, fully elaborated and glorified, moves Dante from being able to 
understand both her death and his own personhood from the perspective 
of eternity, and returns us again to Auerbach’s claim that ‘theological 
interpretation […] does not compel us to abandon the historical reality of 
Beatrice—on the contrary.’24 
Is the lovers’ discourse in the Paradiso only meaningful through ‘theological 
interpretation’? In the Heaven of Venus, where Dante-personaggio is 
particularly keen to find answers to his questions, the poet describes how 
Beatrice becomes the conduit through which the pilgrim can receive 
knowledge from the souls he meets (in this case, Cunizza): 
 
Li occhi di Beatrice, ch’eran fermi 
sovra me, come pria, di caro assenso 
al mio disio certificato fermi. 
  ‘Deh, metti al mio voler tosto compenso, 
beato spirto’, dissi, ‘e fammi prova 
ch’i’ possa in te refletter quel ch’io penso!’ 
 
Paradiso IX, 16-24 
                                                 
23 Harrison, The Body of Beatrice, p. 127. 
24 Auerbach, Scenes, p. 76. 
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Beatrice’s face— her eyes, her mouth, indeed, her whole person—is the 
target of a lover’s gaze. The lover-speak which continues throughout the 
Purgatorio and Paradiso weaves its way into the truth-speak that is there too: 
it becomes, that is, part of the theology. Beatrice’s face and truth become 
one, for example, at Paradiso III, 1-3, when the poet writes: 
 
Quel sol che pria d’amor mi scaldò ’l petto,  
di bella verità m’avea scoverto,  
provando e riprovando, il dolce aspetto. 
 
Bernard delights in the language of eros, these words, he thinks—their 
overflowing abundance—will enable one to understand God: they are able 
to capture something of the divine presence, which he reports as having 
personally experienced.  That language of ecstasy is found in the pilgrim’s 
desire for Beatrice too, but Dante stops short of Bernard’s commitment to a 
cataphatic, affective theology. One cannot experience God, know God, 
through desire alone, and anyway one could not write accurately of such 
an experience, no matter how many beautiful words were at your disposal. 
If the fiction of the poem were played out for real, and a person—perhaps 
like Saint Paul, or like Bernard, or like Catherine of Siena or Teresa of 
Avila—experienced some divine ecstasy, some raptus, then any words 
would be insufficient to the task of telling it. The Croatian pilgrim can tell 
of what he has seen; but Dante-pilgrim cannot and does not. Tristan Kay 
captures this paradox: ‘the poem does not fashion itself as a model to be 
emulated but rather, like Beatrice herself, as a unique and unrepeatable 
poetic event.’25   
 
The pilgrim’s love for Beatrice as a unique and unrepeatable event, 
contains within it the truth of God’s creative power and love. Once he is 
able to understand what this means, he is able to see the face of God itself, 
because his love for her has been transfigured: the truths contained in 
                                                 
25 Kay, Dante’s Lyric Redemption, p. 248. 
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Beatrice are in fact God’s own truths. Bernard’s love manifests itself at an 
individual level too—for his congregation and those who receive his 
letters—but his love is for everyone, it is global, and as such it is not an 
erotic love. A commitment to a particular person is one of the hallmarks of 
personhood: erotic love tethers two separate individuals together, the 
arrowshot pierces and unites two hearts. And in love, from the limited 
perspective of human personhood and consciousness, one draws closest to 
understanding the possibility of being Other, of being created otherwise, 
because the desire for union with the beloved—for their presence, their 
touch, and the loving preoccupation for their person—only throws into 
relief the ways in which they are not one’s own self, the ways in which they 
are not I. 
 
3. Beatrice and Gregory 
In Chapter III, we saw that Janet Soskice draws attention to the fact that 
Augustine, in the Confessions, claims that God can be ‘revealed through 
other people, in all their peculiarities and contingencies, even their 
failings’.26 In the Commedia, the person most at risk from his failings is the 
pilgrim himself, all other individuals within the drama of the poem already 
accounted for, eschatologically. My claim in the previous chapter was that 
the failings, the errors, that characterise our earthly lives become for Dante 
in the second and third cantiche a way of maintaining the particularity of 
persons: Gregory the Great, smiling in Heaven at his own error, in fact 
memorialises the person he was on Earth, and the intellectual error to 
which he was subject. The pilgrim is still subject to a raft of errors—not all 
of them intellectual—and the correction he receives hardly ever engenders 
a smiling response, like Gregory’s. Shame (‘tanta vergogna’ in Purgatorio 
XXX, 78),  that powerful indicator of an internal, cognitive affirmation of 
culpability, accompanies many of Dante-personaggio’s lessons in error, but it 
                                                 
26 Soskice, ‘Monica’s Tears’, p. 449.  
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remains the case that the pilgrim’s particular ways of erring are his alone, 
they constitute who he is and what he is able to learn.    
 
Beatrice provides the most powerful corrective for the pilgrim, in her 
reproach in the Earthly Paradise, at Purgatorio XXX-XXXI. As we saw in 
Chapter III, Dante-personaggio’s response to Beatrice’s rebuke is an 
emotional breakdown, followed by a confession. After verbalising his 
confession the pilgrim’s own self-indictment causes him to faint: 
 
Tanta riconoscenza il cor mi morse, 
ch’io caddi vinto; e quale allora femmi, 
salsi colei che la cagion mi porse. 
 
Purgatorio XXXI, 88-90 
 
The episode highlights the importance of shame as a response to error, and 
the power that it can effect over one’s person. The philosopher Bernard 
Williams described this power, in his typically elegant way, in the book, 
Shame and Necessity: 
 
[T]he most primitive experiences of shame are connected with sight 
and being seen […I]n the experience of shame, one’s whole being 
seems diminished or lessened. In my experience of shame, the other 
sees all of me and all through me […] It is not even the wish, as 
people say, to sink through the floor, but rather the wish that the 
space occupied by me should be instantaneously empty.27  
  
The pilgrim’s response might be seen as the same wish: as an annihilation 
of self, of wanting to be immediately unseen. This fainting response, the 
loss of all bodily and mental control—temporarily—annihilates the person 
of the pilgrim altogether. It requires a renewed strength to see himself and 
his particular error as worthy of being restored and rehabilitated, through 
the confession that Beatrice demands (Purgatorio XXXI, 5-6). In the final 
                                                 
27 B. Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993), p. 89. 
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canto of the Purgatorio, Beatrice tells the pilgrim to free himself from the 
shame that overcomes him: ‘Da tema e da vergogna|voglio che tu omai ti 
disviluppe.’ 
 
For Vittorio Montemaggi, as I noted in the Introduction, the pilgrim’s 
response to another one of his own errors, in Paradiso XXI, demonstrates a 
fundamental theme of the Commedia.28 In this episode, Beatrice is present 
again, but it is not through her voice that the Dante-personaggio receives a 
reoriented understanding, but through the character of the Benedictine 
monk Saint Peter Damian. Here, Peter Damian is a contemplative in the 
Heaven of Saturn but the pilgrim does not understand why it should be 
him who greets Beatrice and Dante on their arrival. The pilgrim asks his 
presumptuous question of Peter Damian, and even before he does so, sees 
that Beatrice thinks it better if he did not:  
Ma quella ond’ io aspetto il come e ’l quando 
del dire e del tacer, si sta; ond’ io, 
contra ’l disio, fo ben ch’io non dimando’. 
Paradiso XXI, 46-48 
Beatrice knows the reason for the pilgrim’s hesitation, because, the poet 
says, she sees Him who sees all (‘veder di colui che tutto vede’, Paradiso, 
XXI, 50). But Beatrice gives permission for the pilgrim to ask his question 
anyway (‘Solvi il tuo caldo disio’, 51), knowing that his question cannot be 
answered in a way that Dante will find satisfactory. Beatrice’s role in the 
interlude—causing a hiatus in the dialogue between the pilgrim and the 
saint, and then allowing Dante to continue—draws attention to the 
importance of the episode and, indeed, the importance of the pilgrim’s 
failing, of his error. 
 
                                                 
28 Montemaggi, ‘Dante and Gregory the Great’. 
  200 
Peter Damian’s response—that he moves in response to the divine will—is 
not satisfactory to the pilgrim because it does not answer his question as to 
why it should be Peter Damian rather than any other of the souls (50-78) 
who greets the visitors. As Montemaggi shows, Dante’s question is error-
struck, because it trades on false assumptions about the capability of 
creatures. Human individuals, even beatified, cannot comprehend the 
divine will ‘not because of a weakness of intellect […] but because of the 
creature’s dependence on God.’29 In realisation of this error, the pilgrim 
retreats to the best type of understanding available to him, that which is 
realised in the encounter with another person: 
 
Sì mi prescrisser le parole sue, 
ch’io lasciai la quistione e mi ritrassi 
a dimandarla umilmente chi fue.  
Paradiso, XXI. 103–05 
 
Montemaggi suggests this episode is one of the most important in the 
poem.  He is undoubtedly right that the pilgrim’s error and consequent 
reorientation draws into ever greater focus the importance of the 
encounters between two individuals, and the opportunity for love and 
knowledge to which these give rise. As Montemaggi says: 
 
Progress in theological understanding is, ultimately, not made 
through accuracy of theological proposition but in and through the 
humility and love required fully to encounter another human 
being.30 
 
This must be true; it makes sense of the personal encounters that we find 
throughout the Commedia, and in particular, as we have seen above, in the 
person-to-person relationship between Dante and Beatrice. But reading the 
Commedia only in this way leaves unanswered questions about the primacy 
of the intellect over love, a question which Beatrice herself makes explicit at 
                                                 
29 Montemaggi, ‘Dante and Gregory the Great’, p. 234. 
30 Montemaggi, ‘Dante and Gregory the Great’, p. 235. 
  201 
Paradiso XXVIII, 111.31 Further, it makes it difficult to explain why the 
author does in fact include so many overtly ‘theological proposition[s]’ in 
the poem, when, on this reading, there was no such need, theologically 
speaking. The question of the need for theological discourse, and the 
primary vehicle of that discourse—Beatrice herself—is the theme to which I 
now turn.   
 
4. Beatrice, Aquinas and Theological Discourse 
This section examines the nature and mode of Beatrice’s theological 
discourse—what she says about theology, and the manner in which she 
says it—and asks what these two questions mean for the characterisation of 
her personhood in the Commedia. I suggest that the poem invites us to 
compare Beatrice directly with Thomas Aquinas, again, both in the form 
and the content of their teaching, and in so doing, it is possible to question 
whether Beatrice’s discourse can be straightforwardly understood as a 
mouthpiece for Dante’s own theological position. 
It is Bernard, ‘quel contemplante’ (Paradiso XXXII, 1), rather than Thomas, 
who is called to mind by Beatrice’s seated location in the celestial rose, next 
to Rachel, (Inferno II, 102). Indeed, Rachel Jacoff notes that the commentary 
tradition has long drawn attention to this particular detail; for Jacoff, the 
commentaries show ‘either Beatrice […] seen as a type of contemplation or 
she is seen as a type of theology, seated next to [Rachel] and thus paired 
with contemplation’.32 But if she is contemplative in the Empyrean, 
elsewhere in the poem she is active, and her speech is demonstrative. It is 
this active, dynamic demonstration, characteristic of so much scholastic 
theology in general and Thomist philosophy in particular, at its apogee, 
that Beatrice’s discourse becomes the primary conduit of Dante-
                                                 
31 See Robert Durling’s commentary ‘The Primacy of the Intellect, the Sun, and the 
Circling Theologians’, in The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, ed. by R. M. Durling 
and R. L. Martinez (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), III, pp. 708–14.  
32 Jacoff, ‘The Tears of Beatrice’, p. 5. 
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personaggio’s theological learning. As Dante’s teacher, she becomes a 
theologian in her own right, correcting points of doctrine and contradicting 
some of the teaching of the Fathers of the Church who accompany her in 
Paradise. Ferrante suggests that  
[p]erhaps because Dante did not agree entirely with any of the 
theologians he respected enough to place in paradise, perhaps 
because he wished to emphasize the distance between God’s realm 
and the earthly church, Dante gives the office of major theologian in 
his heaven to someone whose sex would have shocked virtually all 
of the doctors of the church there. And he does not hesitate to have 
her correct them or other great thinkers, some of them by name, 
beginning with Plato.33  
Ferrante goes on to point out the ways in which Beatrice disagrees on 
points of doctrine with Gregory (on angels); Jerome; Thomas Aquinas (on 
moon spots); and Aquinas again on causation and secondary causes; and 
with both Aquinas and Augustine on whether angels have memory. On 
other theological debates such as free will and vows, she ‘teaches like a 
professor of philosophy, getting the pilgrim to give his answer, then 
correcting it’.34 The creation of a female character who speaks with such 
authority over a range of subjects, traditionally properly defined as male, is 
startling. Even our modern ears can hear in that voice the sounding of a 
new clarion, a wake-up call to reconsider our relationships with God, with 
knowledge, and our understanding of theology.  
The range of subjects that Beatrice expounds upon is vast and, on the face 
of it, she deserves the moniker of Beatrix loquax that Teodolinda Barolini 
famously bestowed upon her.35 From free will to vows; from angels to 
moon spots; causation, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the role of the 
Church—her ‘infallibile’ knowledge (Paradiso VII, 19) is clearly limitless, 
and her willingness to express it, very nearly the same. It should be 
                                                 
33 Ferrante, ‘Dante’s Beatrice’, pp. 195-96. 
34 Ferrante, ‘Dante’s Beatrice’, p. 199. 
35 Barolini, Origins, p. 360. 
  203 
unsurprising to us that as an inhabitant of Paradise she should now have 
an understanding beyond that of her earthly life: souls in Heaven have 
direct access to God’s knowledge and, as she points out to Dante, the 
ignorance on Earth that is corrected in Heaven is a cause for joy, as we saw 
in the case of Gregory’s error, at Paradiso XXVIII, 133. 
 
A demonstration of that understanding can be found in Beatrice’s lecture of 
Paradiso II, which illustrates to Dante-personaggio and to the reader early on 
in their journey together, just how far her encyclopaedic knowledge 
extends: the entire cosmology of the universe from the Empyrean 
downwards is spelled out and its workings explained (lines 112-48). As an 
example of the kind of the theological discourse that Beatrice expounds, 
and that Dante-personaggio must hear and comprehend before he is able to 
reach the final vision, it is a good one, and one that will only be extended 
and elaborated upon on their journey through the celestial spheres (for 
example, see Paradiso XXVIII, 40-78; Paradiso XXIX, 13-48). Here, the 
fundamental metaphysical makeup of the universe, beginning with the 
‘Heaven of God’s peace’ or the Empyrean, is outlined by Beatrice, and 
includes the principles by which each of the nine subsequent heavens is 
created and put in motion.    
 
Dentro dal cielo de la divina pace 
si gira un corpo ne la cui virtute 
l'esser di tutto suo contento giace. 
    Lo ciel seguente, c'ha tante vedute, 
quell' esser parte per diverse essenze, 
da lui distratte e da lui contenute. 
    Li altri giron per varie differenze 
le distinzion che dentro da sé hanno 
dispongono a lor fini e lor semenze. 
    Questi organi del mondo così vanno, 
come tu vedi omai, di grado in grado, 
che di sù prendono e di sotto fanno.  
 
Paradiso II, 112-23 
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Such a Christianised account of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system —the 
complex genesis of which has been traced by critics via the many 
tributaries of antique and early medieval influences, including those from 
both European and Arab sources—was widely discussed in medieval 
theological and philosophical debates. However, the cosmology found here 
in Paradiso II is by no means an agreed doctrine of the Church: it is 
peculiarly Dante’s own. It is an account which departs from many of his 
contemporaries’, insisting as it does on the uncreated, and immaterial 
nature of the Empyrean and, as such, positions itself alongside Aristotle’s 
description of the Unmoved Mover: the pure intellect which is the ground 
of all being, which does not exist in space or time. Étienne Gilson36 and 
Christian Moevs37 have underlined the fact that the Empyrean, tellingly, is 
only named as such once in the entire Commedia, at Inferno II, 21, adding 
further grist to the intellectual mill regarding the question of the status and 
function of the Empyrean in Christian cosmology.  
 
For it is a hugely vexed question in the Middle Ages, debated at length by 
all major theologian-philosophers. Indeed, Aquinas’s final position on the 
nature of the Empyrean and its ability to cause motion in the first heaven, 
was outlined in a retraction found in his Questiones Quodlibetales 6.11.19 
(c.1272), which serves to show that even in the most lucid and definitive of 
medieval thinkers the question was in no sense straightforward. In the end, 
Aquinas’s account describes the power of the Empyrean as a power of 
conservation or causation. In this canto, Dante suggests that the Empyrean, 
as the being of all it contains is indeed a type of causal power – although 
not as we moderns have now come to think of causality—but rather, that it 
is the ground of existence, without which there would be nothing at all. 
The author has the character of Aquinas make reference to the same 
                                                 
36 E. Gilson, ‘À la recherche de l’Empyrée’, Revue des etudes italiennes, 11 (1965), 145-
61 (p. 160.)  
37 Moevs, The Metaphysics of Dante’s Comedy, p. 23. 
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cosmological question concerning the Primum Mobile and its 
undifferentiated nature in Paradiso XIII, 100. It is notable that Aquinas 
points out to Dante-personaggio that Solomon did not seek to know answers 
to questions such as these, but, rather, concerned himself with how to be a 
worthy and wise ruler. Again, as we saw in Chapter II, Dante’s disruption 
of our expectations about what Aquinas might do or say in the poem 
should make us pause over his characterisation, and therefore his 
representation as a theological authority, more generally.  
 
Beatrice’s own authority, by comparison, is never in question. Peter S. 
Hawkins says:  
 
Throughout Beatrice's discourse in Paradiso 28 [which also concerns 
the Primum Mobile], there is no sense of the tentative ‘forse’ 
‘perhaps’ that elsewhere in the Commedia indicates we are in the 
realm of surmise. Dante's personal angelic doctor tells us what is.38 
 
That the author of the Commedia chooses Beatrice to lecture upon the 
subject, indeed, to be the mouthpiece for this type of exposition at all, is a 
theme which underpins this entire chapter, but here, for now, suffice to say 
that from the perspective of the reader, medieval or modern-day, the 
content of Beatrice’s speech is intellectually rich, theologically challenging 
and in dialogue both with centuries of philosophy that have gone on 
before, and with the debates raging within Dante’s lifetime. In this case, it 
is a theological position which does not take up with any particular school 
of thought, but sets out its own stall. The fact that this should be so is made 
all the more surprising given that it is Beatrice who says it—not an 
authority, not a theologian, not even a man. But beyond merely startling 
the reader, in giving Beatrice the voice of a teacher Dante provides a means 
by which his own theological position can be understood on its own terms, 
and can be distanced from other louder voices, the loudest, perhaps, being 
that of the original angelic doctor himself.  
 
                                                 
38 Hawkins, ‘All Smiles’, pp. 38-39. My emphasis. 
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This is a pattern found throughout Paradiso, as more thorny problems of 
contentious theological debate arise. In Paradiso XXIX, to take another 
example, Beatrice expounds on the creation of angels, including the fall of 
the rebel angels and beatitude of the loyal angels—and further, puts to bed 
an old argument about whether angels have memories, a question 
discussed by, amongst others, Augustine and Aquinas. This specific 
question serves to validate Dante’s wider argument concerning the timing 
of the creation of angels in general, refuting Jerome’s interpretation. 
 
Queste sustanze, poi che fur gioconde 
de la faccia di Dio, non volser viso 
da essa, da cui nulla si nasconde:  
però non hanno vedere interciso 
da novo obietto, e però non bisogna 
rememorar per concetto diviso   
 
Paradiso XXIX, 76-81 
 
In addition to her contributions to the finer points of theological debate, 
Beatrice also has words to say about those who engage in the debates 
themselves, and those who supposedly preach the Word of God, yet fail to 
engage with scripture.  
 
Ma perché ’n terra per le vostre scole 
si legge che l’angelica natura 
è tal, che ’ntende e si ricorda e vole, 
ancor dirò, perché tu veggi pura 
la verità che là giù si confonde, 
equivocando in sì fatta lettura […] 
sì che là giù, non dormendo, si sogna, 
credendo e non credendo dicer vero; 
ma ne l’uno è più colpa e più vergogna. 
Voi non andate giù per un sentiero 
filosofando: tanto vi trasporta 
l’amor de l’apparenza e ’l suo pensiero! 
E ancor questo qua sù si comporta 
con men disdegno che quando è posposta 
la divina Scrittura o quando è torta. 
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Non vi si pensa quanto sangue costa 
seminarla nel mondo e quanto piace 
chi umilmente con essa s’accosta. 
Per apparer ciascun s’ingegna e face 
sue invenzioni; e quelle son trascorse 
da’ predicanti e ’l Vangelio si tace. 
 
Paradiso XXIX, 70-75; 85-96. 
The theologians, she warns, in the schools, are both believing and 
unbelieving, that is, they are either ignorant or deliberately misleading in 
their lessons (Paradiso XXIX, 70-84), the latter occasioning more guilt and 
more shame. Her disapprobation seems to be for a type of intellectual play 
that does not take seriously the task of the theologian: that is, for 
illuminating the truths of the Bible. The theologians—for example, the 
professional university teachers in Paris or Bologna, or indeed, in the 
Florentine centres of learning, the studia of the convents of Santa Maria 
Novella, Santa Croce and Santo Spirito —engage in philosophical games 
and disputations which have no inherent value, but indeed have the power 
to mislead.39 Preachers, too, are silent about the Gospel, and are more 
concerned with their own celebrity and inventions (95-96). Beatrice advises 
Dante-personaggio to take more heed of the Bible, in Paradiso V, 76-78: 
‘Avete il novo e ’l vecchio Testamento, | e ’l pastor de la Chiesa che vi 
guida; | questo vi basti a vostro salvamento’. Later in this canto she warns 
against leaving the mother’s milk of the Bible and even ‘warring’ with 
one’s self:40 her concern, again, appears to be with the type of theological 
discourse practiced in the universities and found too in the quodlibetal 
                                                 
39 Dante, as we saw in Chapter I, records his own learning in Convivio II, xii,7, ‘ne le 
scuole de li religiosi e a le disputazioni de li filosofanti’. 
40      Non fate com’ agnel che lascia il latte  
      de la sua madre, e semplice e lascivo 
      seco medesmo a suo piacer combatte.  
   Paradiso V, 82-84.  
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debates and disputations of the more public arenas of Santa Maria Novella 
and Santa Croce.41 
 
Indeed, one could claim that Aquinas’s own theological discourse might 
itself be read as ‘warring’ in its very structure.42 In the Heaven of the Sun, 
Dante has Thomas dancing in harmony with other theologians with whom 
he disagreed—dancing, no less, like a woman (Paradiso X, 76-81). But in his 
summae, at least, the rhetoric is combative: propositions presented and 
defeated; objections defended; replies devastating, and these all internal to 
the text itself: warring, in some cases, with only himself. Although the aim 
of Thomas’s arguments may well have been to reach a position of ‘rest’—a 
position from which it is possible to be content in the knowledge that 
reason has supplied—the discourse which he employs to get there is far 
from peaceful and harmonising: it is divisive. So when, in reply to Beatrice, 
in Paradiso I, 97-98, the pilgrim uses the technical scholastic term for ‘resting 
content’ (‘Già contento requïevi | di grande ammirazion’, Paradiso I, 97-98) 
we are alerted to the fact that Beatrice might not be quite the anti-
theologian that she later claims. She on the one hand rejects the 
methodologies employed by the theologians in the schools, and yet deploys 
a series of devastating explanatory missiles herself.  
 
                                                 
41For an account of Florentine quodlibetal debates and their significance in the 
Heaven of the Fixed Stars, see M. Treherne, ‘Reading Dante’s Heaven of the Fixed 
Stars (Paradiso XXII-XXVII): Declaration, Pleasure and Praise’, in Honess and 
Treherne (eds) Se mai continga, pp. 11-26. For other explorations of these types of 
practices in Florence, see N. Maldina and A. Pegoretti, and the outputs of the 
University of Leeds/Warwick University AHRC project, ‘Dante and Late Medieval 
Florence: Theology in Poetry, Practice and Society’. 
https://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/125117/dante_and_late_medieval_florence 
42 Mark Wynn suggests an alternative, perhaps more forgiving, characterisation of 
Aquinas’s methodological style. See ‘Charity and Human Flourishing: Some 
Reflections Drawn from Thomas Aquinas’, in Theology and Human Flourishing: 
Essays in Honour of Timothy J. Gorringe, ed. by M. Higton, J. Law and C. Rowland 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011), pp. 224-37. 
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It is thus hard to ignore the fact that the author is content to have a 
character expound at length on so much philosophy and doctrine—
engaging as it does with centuries of theological discussion and 
argument—and at the same time urge readers to rely on Biblical exegesis 
for their understanding and salvation. The seeming conservatism inherent 
in such a position recalls the debate between the Biblical exegetes and the 
scholastics, and in particular, the twelfth-century Victorines, who restored 
a new impulse to look at Biblical interpretation, opposing the ‘abstract, 
formal problematics of logicians and theologians’.43  This, perhaps, mirrors 
the concerns made explicit in the addresses to the reader at Paradiso II, 1-18, 
X, 22-26 and XXIII, 64-69, when Dante-poeta suggests that the reader might 
not be equipped to engage in depth with the intellectual debate that he 
presents. But by drawing on the methods of both the theologians and the 
exegetes—the Victorines themselves were inspired by the symbolic, 
imaginative and affective theology of Augustine, in addition to calling for a 
‘return to examine the philological and grammatical integrity of the 
Bible’44—Dante, through Beatrice, expands the purview of the theological 
rather than limits it.   
 
Yet it does appear to be the case that in having Beatrice lecture on a 
particular subject, Dante effectively closes the book on those debates 
altogether: the character of Beatrice is, as he has her say, infallible. All 
knowledge she conveys comes directly from the mind of God, as it does for 
all of the blessed in Paradise, and so as a mouthpiece for a theology she is 
an extremely powerful one. But even though much of her discourse mimics 
that of historical theologians, and as such seems to derive an intellectual 
authority from the same sources as theirs, my claim is that this authority is 
in actual fact established in life: it is a power that is already there. Her 
authority over the pilgrim is fuelled by her very earthly personhood, and 
                                                 
43 G. Mazzotta, Dante’s Vision and the Circle of Knowledge. p. 34. 
44 Mazzotta, Dante’s Vision, p. 35. 
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the relationship to which their love gave rise. From the perspective of 
Dante-personaggio at least, there is no need to construct her authority anew 
in Heaven. In Paradise, she has the additional qualities that other 
theologians demonstrate on Earth: she elucidates; she teaches; she answers 
and calms a questioning mind—all these qualities I explore in greater detail 
below. But even though she can only be a theologian in Heaven, she 
authors the pilgrim’s journey before we even hear anything of that 
infallible voice. In Paradise, Beatrice becomes Minerva, wreathed in olive, 
or the Wisdom of the Old Testament, or even revealed Truth.45 And yet it is 
her relationship with Dante-personaggio, built, in the fiction, upon years of 
human love—that forces a reappraisal of what understanding the nature of 
God consists in.  
 
Early in the final cantica the author tells us the pilgrim’s gaze is unable to 
sustain the beauty of Beatrice’s face. Dante had claimed this before in his 
youth, in ‘Donne ch’avete’, lines 55-56, where he says, ‘Voi le vedete Amor 
pinto nel viso, | là ’ve non pote alcun mirarla fiso’. By Paradiso XXIII Dante-
personaggio beholds her, but the poet is unable to capture her smile in 
poetry—that leap that his sacrato poema must make46—becomes, according 
to Vittorio Montemaggi, ‘paradigmatic of what writing about paradise in a 
“sacred poem” is, in fact, all about’.47 That Beatrice herself has become 
ineffable, that an absence of words, a failure of human language, has come 
to define her being, foreshadows the apophatic silence of the last canto of 
the poem.   
                                                 
45 In his Soliloquia, Augustine, somewhat uncharacteristically, employs the 
metaphor of a female lover as embodying Wisdom. ‘What kind of lover of Wisdom 
are you who longs to see and to hold naked in a perfectly pure gaze and to 
embrace her with nothing in between?’ Augustine, Soliloquia I, 13, 22, in 
Augustine’s Soliloquies, Library of Christian Classics, 6, (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1953). 
46 Paradiso XXIII, 62. 
47 V. Montemaggi,‘The Theology of Dante’s Commedia as seen in the light of the 
cantos of the Heaven of the Fixed Stars’, in Honess and Treherne (eds), Se Mai 
Continga, pp. 45-61 (p. 45). 
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Barolini suggests that Beatrice loses all trace of a recognisable subjectivity. 
Indeed, she says, in Beatrice, Dante seems to have ‘failed to create [a 
cohesive] character’,48 even though in making Beatrice speak he has 
‘explode[d] the courtly code’,49 and pushed at the limits of what had been a 
restricted and passive model for female characters in courtly and stilnovist 
poetry. Does Beatrice lose her subjectivity by virtue of the content of her 
speech? Certainly, the Beatrice of the Commedia is profoundly different 
from the character we find in Dante’s earlier works. The fact that she 
seems, on the face of it, to be merely a puppet for Dante’s theology or, at 
other times, a symbol standing for a particular concept, creates a tension 
between a recognisable personhood and a mere cipher for exposition.  
 
Robert Pogue Harrison calls Beatrice’s speechifying ‘cantankerous’.50 That 
she is at times forceful in her arguments is certainly the case. She often 
addresses Dante-personaggio as a not-particularly-able student and, 
according to Ferrante, she ‘teaches like a professor of philosophy, getting 
Dante to give his answer, then correct[ing] it’.51 Robin Kirkpatrick has a 
rather more positive spin on her lecture-style: ‘Beatrice’s words […] 
throughout the Paradiso reflect a delight in the processes of teaching and 
learning and a lyrical involvement in the lessons she is enunciating’, as 
opposed to Virgil’s lessons which he thinks are rather more ‘tight-lipped’.52 
But Virgil, of course, is not party, as an inhabitant of Limbo, to the bounty 
of knowledge that Beatrice enjoys: he does not understand the causes of 
things and counsels the pilgrim, too, in Purgatorio III, 37, to be content with 
quia.  
 
                                                 
48 Barolini, Origins, p. 363. 
49 Barolini, Origins, p. 374. 
50 Harrison, Body, p. 19. 
51 Ferrante, ‘Dante’s Beatrice’, p. 199. 
52 See Kirkpatrick’s commentary on Paradiso II, p. 336. 
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Beatrice is interested in ‘whys’, and, as a teacher at work in Paradiso II, her 
lengthy lecture on the spots of the Moon causes Dante-personaggio’s 
ignorance to melt like snow (lines 106-07) under the light of her instruction. 
Beatrice begins with a reductio ad absurdum, attacking Dante-personaggio’s 
reply to her question about the causes of dark spots on the Moon (lines 64-
82); she then appeals to empirical evidence supplied by the senses, and 
goes on to outline an elaborate thought experiment to show why the 
pilgrim’s explanation cannot be the correct one (lines 83-105). Such a 
combination of logical, empirical and experimental reasoning demonstrates 
a methodological approach straight out of classical philosophy, indebted in 
particular to Aristotle and, of course, to the medieval scholastic heirs of his 
intellectual fortune. So Beatrice’s style of argumentation, here, echoes that 
found in the works of medieval philosopher-theologians, not least among 
them, Aquinas. At Paradiso XIV, 1-9, Dante-poeta compares Thomas and 
Beatrice directly, noting that their explanations share the same lucidity: 
underlining again her heavyweight methodological inheritance. 
 
Dal centro al cerchio, e sì dal cerchio al centro 
movesi l’acqua in un ritondo vaso, 
secondo ch’è percosso fuori o dentro: 
ne la mia mente fé sùbito caso 
questo ch’io dico, sì come si tacque 
la glorïosa vita di Tommaso, 
per la similitudine che nacque 
del suo parlare e di quel di Beatrice, 
a cui sì cominciar, dopo lui, piacque. 
 
In Paradiso V, on the nature of vows, we see more of the same type of 
argumentative style. But here Beatrice’s tone takes on rhetorical devices 
that would make any quodlibetal debater proud. Below, I trace in detail the 
instances in her speech which demonstrate her skill in the formal 
construction of philosophical debate, including the persuasive techniques 
that she utilises to convince Dante-personaggio of her position.  But first I 
analyse a strange terzina at the beginning of the canto, which many 
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commentators have considered almost empty of all meaning, but which 
helps to construct Beatrice’s authority all the more. It begins at line 16, just 
after she has introduced the canto and her intention to spell out to Dante-
personaggio the repercussions of unfulfilled vows: 
 
Sì cominciò Beatrice questo canto; 
e sì com' uom che suo parlar non spezza,    
continüò così 'l processo santo: 
 
As a comment on the nature of Beatrice’s speech it serves to highlight that 
she talks, ‘com' uom che suo parlar non spezza’, and yet, at the same time, 
does precisely that: her spoken discourse is cut in two by the poet’s 
interjection. In his commentary on the canto, Hollander puts this down to 
mere playfulness of the author, but I suggest that there is more at work 
here than first meets the eye.  
 
Commentator Niccolò Tommaseo, in 1837, says that this is a ‘terzina che 
pare inutile’,53 but which, perhaps, serves to prepare the reader for the 
importance of what is to come in the exposition on vows. Tommaseo was 
the first commentator to link the spezza/non spezza theme to the Aeneid 
when, in Book IV, line 388, Dido interrupts her excoriation of Aeneas and 
departs the scene, knowing that he is about to leave her. That Dido’s and 
Aeneas’ relationship is called to mind in a canto about broken vows makes 
perfect sense: perhaps Dido believes that Aeneas has broken an implicit 
vow to her, in the marriage that she presumed to be tacit. More likely, we 
should consider Dido’s own broken vow to her dead husband, which a 
‘vertical’ reading of this canto with Inferno V, 62, illuminates: Dido ‘ruppe 
fede al cener di Sicheo’. The comparison between Beatrice and Dido is set 
up nicely here, and in fact, is made almost explicit by Beatrice’s very first 
                                                 
53 From the commentary to Paradiso V, 16-19 by Niccolo Tommaseo in 1837, as 
found in the Dartmouth Dante Project, http://Dante.Dartmouth.EDU. [Accessed: 4 
July 2016]. 
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words of the canto, ‘S’io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore…’ (1): Dido being 
the bearer of the original ‘antica fiamma’ (Purgatorio XXX, 48) or, rather, the 
‘veteris vestigia flammae’ (Aeneid IV, 23).54 
 
So, the terzina that breaks Beatrice’s speech on the one hand compares her 
to a man who does not interrupt his speech, and on the other, to a 
woman—and, indeed, a lover—who does. What are we to make of this? To 
what, specifically, does the ‘uom’ of line 17 refer? I propose that it refers to 
a type of man, a person who for reasons beyond his personality—
professional reasons, maybe—who must be someone who does not 
interrupt his speech, or whose speech must not be interrupted. My 
contention is that, in the context of her sermonising, and in particular, 
given the extraordinary example of the rhetoric which follows immediately 
after, this terzina compares Beatrice to a category—those, such as priests, 
preachers, public debaters, and philosophers—who, because of their trades, 
must be the kind of people whose speech goes uninterrupted; these kinds 
of people, of course, who would have been necessarily male.55 
 
So, Dante underlines here, again, the masculinity of Beatrice’s enterprise 
but then, in the same breath, reminds us that Beatrice is also the 
protagonist of a lover/beloved narrative that burns with the heat of Dido’s 
spurned love. We must not forget, he seems to suggest, that Beatrice is not 
merely spokesperson for his dry exposition—she is not just a caricature 
theologian or a sort of heavenly, jobbing street-preacher—she has a back-
story, a character, as Dante’s beloved, which must be borne in mind 
throughout her speech.    
 
                                                 
54 For an extended analysis of Dante’s co-opting of Virgil’s words, see Hawkins, 
Dante’s Testaments, pp.125-42. For a series of lectures that employ a vertical reading 
of the Commedia, see Vertical Readings in Dante's Comedy, ed. by G. Corbett and H. 
Webb, 3 vols (Cambridge: Open Book Publishing, 2015-17). 
55 In a telling reversal, the poet’s song, he says, is broken or interrupted by the 
loveliness of Beatrice’s face, which he cannot write, at Paradiso XXX, 28-33. 
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In my brief analysis of that speech, below, I draw out her peculiar mode of 
address to the pilgrim. From line 19, Beatrice begins expounding on the 
difficult nature of vows, and seeks to answer Dante’s questions which were 
first raised by the presence of Piccarda and Costanza, who were met in 
canto III. For now, I set aside the content of that answer and focus, instead, 
on the architecture of her argumentation.  
 
Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza 
fesse creando, e a la sua bontate 
più conformato, e quel ch’e’ più apprezza, 
 fu de la volontà la libertate; 
di che le creature intelligenti, 
e tutte e sole, fuoro e son dotate. 
Or ti parrà, se tu quinci argomenti, 
l’alto valor del voto, s’è sì fatto 
che Dio consenta quando tu consenti; 
ché, nel fermar tra Dio e l’omo il patto, 
vittima fassi di questo tesoro, 
tal quale io dico; e fassi col suo atto. 
Dunque che render puossi per ristoro? 
Se credi bene usar quel c’hai offerto, 
di maltolletto vuo’ far buon lavoro. 
Tu se’ omai del maggior punto certo; 
ma perché Santa Chiesa in ciò dispensa, 
che par contra lo ver ch’i’ t’ho scoverto 
 
Lines 19-24 begin with an opening statement from Beatrice about the 
freedom of the will, which Dante-personaggio is asked to take as fact. She 
goes on, in line 25: ‘Or ti parrà, se tu quinci argomenti…’, using what can 
only be read as the rigorous argument of a philosopher, guiding a pupil in 
the logic of her argument. Beatrice then continues, confident that the 
pilgrim has followed her reasoning, at line 34: ‘Tu se’ omai del maggior 
punto certo…’, a point which seems to contradict what Dante-personaggio 
had understood to be the case. But Beatrice has uncovered the truth for 
him: ‘t’ho scoverto’ (line 36). These difficult questions require step-by-step 
explanations from Beatrice, and she therefore suggests in lines 37-39 that 
her pupil requires ‘aiuto’ to digest the ‘cibo rigido’ that she serves. That he 
must sit a little longer at the table is an image which illustrates the 
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gastronomic metaphor, but also anticipates the address to the reader at 
Paradiso X, 22, when we, as pupils at our benches, are asked to consider the 
tastes of knowledge that we have enjoyed already and the feast that is to 
come.   
  
Her teacherly style continues in the next terzina, when she coaches Dante-
personaggio in holding on to the ‘scïenza’ that she has revealed to him: ‘Apri 
la mente a quel ch’io ti paleso | fermalvi entro; ché non fa scïenza, | sanza 
lo ritenere, avere inteso’. Moving towards her concluding remarks in this 
section, she provides Biblical (lines 49-50, 63-68) and classical examples (69-
72) to make her points, marshalling the argument—and the pilgrim—along 
the way (68). 
 
Her countenance remains that of a teacher right up until she finishes her 
lesson at line 84, but by the end of her speech, indeed from as early in the 
canto as line 55, a shift takes place in her mode of address: she is less the 
public orator—the philosopher of the quodlibetal trying out her 
syllogisms—she has become a preacher, explaining the import of her 
conclusions for the benefit of the erring souls on Earth: ‘Siate, Cristiani, a 
muovervi più gravi’(73). She is preaching here to the whole of 
Christendom, and the sounding of authority, now, to all who might hear 
her, is absolute.  
 
Throughout the cantica, we can see how Beatrice provides Dante-
personaggio with the means to understand truths which had previously 
been beyond his comprehension, and make sense of the sights and sounds 
with which he is presented. At Paradiso VII, 123, Beatrice clarifies her key 
point, in order that the pilgrim, if he heeds her words, will understand 
things as well as she does (‘perché tu veggi lì così com’ io’)—in this 
particular case, the apparent contradictions of the Incarnation. The 
overriding tenor of many of her lessons is combative and forceful; they are 
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‘la quale non soffera lite alcuna d’oppinioni o di sofistici argomenti’; they 
are not tempered or softened by being delivered by a woman, if anything, 
her sex only makes the opposite true.56 And so, as I suggested above, what 
can be seen throughout Aquinas’s oeuvre—in his style of explanation and 
the structure of his discourse—so too with Beatrice: if there is peace to be 
had here, as Dante claims is definitive of theology in the Convivio, if one can 
‘rest content’ in the wake of her argument, it is a peace brought about by 
the hammer-blow of a single, unyielding voice.  
 
5. The I am of Beatrice: Beatrice as herself—and with Christ  
The theologian, then, following Dante’s own idiosyncratic definition, will 
be a conduit of peace. In the Commedia, this peace is found from intellectual 
insight, in the knowledge that a sound argument secures; Beatrice, as we 
have seen, delivers this type of knowledge to Dante-personaggio in her 
extensive theological discourse which incorporates the trappings and 
argumentative devices of the academy. But as Peter S. Hawkins has 
highlighted, her insight itself comes from her personal experience, of seeing 
directly the truth of the Empyrean. The trope of intellectual understanding 
framed as dawning light, sight, and visibility recurs throughout the poet’s 
narration in response to Beatrice’s spoken words, for example, at Paradiso 
XXVIII, 87: ‘come stella in cielo il ver si vide.’ And so when she holds forth 
on the question of the angelic hierarchies, Beatrice does not agree with 
Dionysius over Gregory because of any particular argument, but because 
she has seen the truth in Heaven herself. Thus, as Hawkins says, Dionysus 
gets to agree with her, and not the other way around.   
 
[…] Dante is contrasting his certain vision of truth with the 
theologians’ mere speculation about it. Like him, they have 
scripture and tradition as their authorities; but Dante—like Paul—
sees for himself. Theologians do their best with their summas, with 
                                                 
56 One might think that as a twenty-first century readers, our responses to Beatrice 
as authority would be charitable, or, even better, neutral, compared with medieval 
readers; I am not at all confident that this is indeed the case.   
  218 
their careful winnowing of tradition, but the poet beholds the 
‘secret truth’ of the angels and in the vernacular lines of his 
Commedia discloses ‘that and other truths about these circles’.57 
 
Beatrice’s knowledge and the blessedness it endows is based on the act of 
seeing the truth of God directly, not in an act of love, as she makes explicit 
at Paradiso XXVIII, 109-11: 
 
Quinci si può veder come si fonda 
l’esser beato ne l’atto che vede, 
non in quell ch’ama, che poscia seconda 
 
The questing intellect will see and find rest, and this knowledge will give 
rise to love. Hence blessedness enacts the eternal return of desire for God; 
perfectly satisfied in Heaven, yet still perfectly desirous as creatures for the 
Creator. Seeing is knowing, and in knowing one can rest, but this rest does 
not extinguish love and desire, indeed it spurs it on and maintains it in the 
perpetual praise of the blessed for God, as his limitlessness deserves:58 
 
Lume è là sù che visibile face 
Lo creatore a quella creatura 
che solo in lui vedere ha la sua pace.   
 
Paradiso XXX, 100-102 
 
Dante-personaggio has seen and known his beloved before the story of the 
Commedia begins; theirs is a love story of retrieval. Along the way the pilgrim 
has lost what it was he knew in Beatrice, lost what seeing her as his beloved, 
and as part of God’s creation, really meant. And thus the Commedia is a 
positive re-writing of the Aeneid, because the pilgrim’s journey is a divinely-
willed mission, but Beatrice, unlike Dido, is absolutely necessary to its 
fulfilment. Beatrice’s knowing Dante, and being known by him, is the 
foundation stone on which his journey rests. And although the poet claims, 
                                                 
57 Hawkins, ‘All Smiles’, p. 43. 
58 For example, see Psalm 145. 
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‘Io non Enëa, io non Paulo sono’ (Inferno II, 32), it is indeed Saint Paul, in the 
first letter to the Corinthians, who provides the template for Dante to 
construct a way of knowing God ‘face to face’ and, in turn, of being known.59 
 
Being known, as a particular, concrete human individual, is a prerequisite 
for being loved, and being known by Beatrice, the pilgrim can come to know 
himself too: what is required of him in his approach to the face of God. In 
Paradiso I, 85, by way, almost, of an aside, the poet refers to Beatrice as 
someone who sees right in to him: ‘Ond’ ella, che vedea me sì com’ io…’. It 
is a profoundly intimate moment wherein Beatrice explains to the pilgrim 
that he is muddled and confused in his interpretation—even before he has 
had opportunity to articulate it—of the new sights of Heaven that he is 
witnessing. She is able to inhabit his perspective—she sees the pilgrim as he 
sees himself—still limited and prone to error, and through smiling words 
(‘per le sorrise parolette brevi’ (95) is able to help him see the truth. It is the 
realisation of a divine truth within a face-to-face human encounter, an 
encounter which remains human despite Beatrice’s beatitude and limitless 
knowledge. 
 
The pilgrim is able to see what Beatrice is (‘qual son io’, Paradiso, XXIII, 46) 
at her invitation, only after his mind experiences a kind of raptus upon 
seeing a vision of Christ at Paradiso XXIII, 43-44: ‘la mente mia […] fatta più 
grande, di se stessa uscìo’. And so one ‘seeing’ quickly follows another. 
Christ is followed by Beatrice, although, given Beatrice’s instruction to 
open his eyes, the first does not require the power of sight as we ordinarily 
conceive it. These seeings are punctuated by the pilgrim’s experience of an 
almost dissociative state (although he claims an inability to narrate it, of 
course), reminiscent of both Augustine’s Ostia ‘vision’ in Confessions IX, 
                                                 
59 1 Corinthians 13: 12 ‘videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie 
ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.’ 
‘We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know 
in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.’ 
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and Bernard’s description of his taste of the Divine in De diligendo Deo. 
What does this mean? Dante-personaggio has known Beatrice since youth, 
but his retrieval of her actual meaning can only occur now, once he has 
taken up a perspective beyond only his own. His own mind, exiting itself 
(‘di se stessa uscìo’), is able to see what Beatrice really is.  
 
This retrieval of knowing what Beatrice is began in the dark wood, but 
when he finally meets her again in the Earthly Paradise, he still lacks the 
capacity for knowing, even though, like Paul, he himself is known: ‘Dante’ 
says Beatrice, at line 55, and by naming him, as we saw above, she claims 
him for her own knowledge, and cements the reciprocal erotic relationship. 
But there is no peace to be found, yet, in the pilgrim’s trembling mind or 
shaking body (Purgatorio XXX, 47). Her words, which invite him for the 
first time to see and to know who she is, who she really is, emphasised in 
the repetition at line 73, (‘Guardaci ben! Ben son, ben son Beatrice’), cannot 
be met in reply with a truly face-to-face encounter: she remains veiled to 
him. Dante-personaggio can only let his eyes fall downwards and so, 
literally, shame-filled, sees only himself, and the limited perspective he 
occupies, Narcissus-like, in the reflection of a stream (76-78).  
 
She tells him not to weep at Virgil’s disappearance. In doing so the episode 
mirrors the events in that other garden, in John 20, when the risen Christ 
appears to a weeping Mary Magdalene, who also mourns a disappearance.60 
From the mouth of the empty tomb, she turns her face to Christ but does not 
know him—he is veiled to her—even though she knew him and loved him 
                                                 
60 John 20: 15-16. ‘dicit ei Iesus mulier quid ploras quem quaeris illa existimans 
quia hortulanus esset dicit ei domine si tu sustulisti eum dicito mihi ubi posuisti 
eum et ego eum tollam. dicit ei Iesus Maria conversa illa dicit ei rabboni quod 
dicitur magister.’ ‘Jesus saith to her: Woman, why weepest thou? whom seekest 
thou? She, thinking it was the gardener, saith to him: Sir, if thou hast taken him 
hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, and I will take him away. Jesus saith to 
her: Mary. She turning, saith to him: Rabboni (which is to say, Master).’ 
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in his old life; she does not know who he really is now, or what he means, 
not until, that is, he speaks her name, ‘Mary’. With this new knowledge 
comes the peace that Christ gives: he gives it three times, at John 20:19, 21 
and 26.   
 
The resemblances between these two episodes remind us that Beatrice will 
also confer a peace: not because she is the Christ, but because she is a 
theologian, and thus peace-giving is within her purview. In the introduction 
to his translation of the Paradiso, Robin Kirkpatrick says that ‘Beatrice is not 
Christ. Nor would Dante propose that she is. She is […] what Christ makes 
it possible for humans to be’.61 She directs the pilgrim toward blessedness, 
through the lessons she bestows in her theologically rigorous lessons, but 
also through her very person: she is the embodiment, for Dante, of the power 
of the Creator and his love. Without these two lessons—of intellect and of 
love—the pilgrim cannot hope to see the Godhead face-to-face.  
 
Desire for Beatrice ends not in the peaceful consummation of eros but in the 
eternal return of desire and satisfaction in God. This has only been possible 
through his particular relation to Beatrice: love for her has provided the 
conditions under which he can see his own place in the universe—see 
himself as part of God’s created order—and the participation that is required 
of him. Truth is found from considering the perspective beyond only his, but 
it has been a necessarily perspectival, particular journey: the one 
unrepeatable event of the poem; the one unrepeatable event of Beatrice—like 
the ‘ontological event’ of the second person of the Trinity becoming man—
an encounter with her person, and her face, has led the way to an encounter 
with the face of the Trinity itself. The I am of Jesus Christ (John 8: 58), of the 
                                                 
61 The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri 3: Paradiso, ed. and trans. by Robin 
Kirkpatrick (London: Penguin Books, 200t), p. liii. 
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Incarnation, becomes visible to the pilgrim once he sees what Beatrice is, 
what I am truly means.62  
 
Beatrice is never completely divested of her role of the beloved—we can 
continue to read her relationship with Dante-personaggio in these terms 
until well after her removal to the heavenly rose. We saw one example, 
above, in my analysis of that strange terzina of Paradiso V (16-19), how 
Dante is at pains to remind of us of Beatrice’s role as his beloved, setting up 
a comparison between her and Dido, that hot-blooded lover. The Commedia 
is replete with reminders that Dante is in the presence of his beloved and 
that ‘[m]ille disiri più che fiamma caldi’ draw his eyes to her eyes 
(Purgatorio XXXI, 118). Just the sound of her name causes a reaction in him 
(Paradiso VII, 13). We cannot take away from Beatrice the historical 
situatedness of her character like we can, perhaps, with the lovers of the 
Song of Songs, for example. Her personhood is never entirely erased, even 
though there is inevitably a tension between Barolini’s ‘radically alien 
construct’63 of her role as teacher, preacher and Christ-figure, and the 
person that the author supposedly saw walking in the streets of Florence.  
 
And so I suggest that instead of Beatrice merely standing for theology 
personified, which has been the suggestion of many critics—the walking, 
talking encyclopedia of heavenly knowledge—we should consider that in 
her relationship with Dante, theology becomes, instead, personalised, 
requiring of a person-to-person realisation. Indeed, the importance of 
human relationships, the face-to-face meetings of the pilgrim with the souls 
in the afterlife, and his growing understanding about his place in God’s 
universal order as a result of those meetings, is obviously one of the 
author’s primary themes. But in the characterisation of the relationship 
                                                 
62 ‘dixit eis Iesus amen amen dico vobis antequam Abraham fieret ego sum’.  ‘Jesus 
said to them: Amen, amen I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am.’ 
63 Barolini, Origins, p. 366. 
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with Beatrice, Dante enables us to see beyond mere encounters: he draws 
us closer to an understanding of the nature of human love and createdness, 
and he also voices in Beatrice, and demonstrates in her very personhood, 
the Divine love whose munificence is the ground of our being.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have suggested that the historical theologians provide authoritative 
sources which Dante puts to use in the Commedia: they provide both 
structural and qualitative ways in which to read the narrative of the poem. 
Chapter I introduced some aspects of the theologians, and also some of the 
modes through which they might have been known in Dante’s Florence, in 
the last two decades of the thirteenth century. The transmission of the 
theologians’ work, image and personhood took multifaceted form: textual, 
visual, oral, institutional. These portraits would have been diffused via 
similarly diverse media: libraries, artworks, sermons, debates, teaching. My 
discussion of the theologians’ in Florence built upon a more general 
discussion of the type of personhood that emerges from Dante’s poem. The 
aspects of personhood that I suggested Dante prioritises were: names and 
naming; embodiment; memory; language; interpersonal relationships and 
the values and commitments which are necessary for their survival. Over 
the course of the next three chapters, I explored the ways in which these 
aspects of personhood are brought into focus by a reading of the 
theologians in the Commedia, and how in different ways they undergird 
Dante’s conception of humanity’s place in the divine order, that is, in his 
theology. 
 
In Chapter II, I sketched ways in which Bernard and Aquinas provide 
models of virtue: how Bernard’s authenticity transmits his ardour for God 
in his eloquent sermons; how this same authenticity resounds in his 
evident prioritisation of the language of love, person-to-person, in his 
letters, but how language has also the power to seduce. The examples in 
Chapter II of Francesca, Ugolino, Manfred and Buonconte showed that 
Dante shares some of the concerns of Bernard’s authentic heart. Aquinas’s 
authority is transmitted in a different register altogether; the textual 
effacement of his own personhood from his written works belies a personal 
mission to advance the work of his order, to enlighten the souls of the 
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world in peril who are at risk from sin—but also from muddled thinking. 
Through Thomas’s character in the Commedia, Dante is able to play with 
our expectations about Aquinas: in some ways the character conforms to 
our preconceptions of him, and the preconceptions which might have been 
had in Dante’s Florence. Aquinas’s methodological rigour was a currency 
potently deployed in the debates within the mendicant studia, and, as we 
saw in Chapter I, his written works would have been essential sources for 
the preachers and teachers in Santa Maria Novella. But Dante’s portrayal of 
Thomas subverts expectations too: the encomium to Saint Francis is an 
obvious example of one such surprise, but there are other ways, as I have 
shown, through which the character’s speech complicates a one-
dimensional engagement with the historical saint and his oeuvre. 
 
In Chapter III, I showed how error occupies an important place in Dante’s 
conception of personhood: failures of language constitute breakdowns in 
relationships, both human-to-human, and human-to-God. But error also 
has the capacity to maintain the particularity of persons, a particularity that 
is preserved in memory—in our own and in our loved ones’. In the 
example of the character of Gregory the Great in the Commedia, I showed 
how human vulnerability to error provides the means for persons to retain 
their selfhood in the aldilà, when this may have seemed at risk, given the 
work of the waters of the Eunoë in the Earthly Paradise. Gregory’s smile at 
the heavens in recognition of his error, reclaims his earthly person: 
someone who will be remembered and recognised by those who loved him, 
after the Last Judgement. His error draws attention to the ways in which 
humans are vulnerable to intellectual misunderstanding, and highlights 
just one of the ways in which we might fail in our understanding of God. 
The ways are legion. I made a case that, for Dante, a failure to understand 
the limitations of language means that humans err in love and err in 
knowledge—with consequences for our relationships, earthly and divine.        
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Augustine’s turning away from error, his conversion, I examined at length 
in Chapter III, where I compared it with the turning point that Dante-
personaggio must navigate from Purgatory to Paradise. Here I suggested 
that the conversion story within the Confessions, and in particular, 
Augustine’s so-called vision at Ostia, together with his relationship with 
Monica, can provide a useful way to read Dante-personaggio’s confession to 
Beatrice in the Earthly Paradise. Augustine not only provides a framework 
in the Confessions, but, as Dante notes in the Convivio, he provides an 
authority, too. But why, then—given that here and elsewhere in Dante’s 
works—for example, in his letters—Augustine appears to be exactly the 
auctor that one might expect—why is he so notable by his absence in the 
Commedia? It is clear that I have not provided any answer to this question 
during the course of this study; and I am not at all confident that a 
definitive answer will ever be excavated from the poem itself. What I have 
tried to show is that the authority that Dante co-opts from Augustine 
derives from a reading of his personhood, that may well have been visible 
in some of the sources of Duecento Florence, especially, but not exclusively, 
from the Confessions.  
 
Augustine provides a structural, ‘informing presence’1 in the Commedia: a 
way of writing about an individual’s own approach to God, from the 
standpoint of an (almost) redeemed narrator. This narrator expounds and 
comments upon the moral and intellectual failings, the precarity, of his 
earlier sinful self and his journey towards redemption. This narrative 
reclaims the sinner and places his story in the context of providential 
history, but it does so on a radically personal plane. I have suggested that 
in creating the narrator-Augustine and the young-Augustine character, the 
author Augustine provides a useful model for Dante to adopt: these two 
characters stand apart but they are equally necessary for understanding the 
                                                 
1 Hawkins, ‘Divide and Conquer’, p. 472. 
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inward, personal and particular forces at work which colour the self’s 
engagement with its own desire and intellect.  
 
In constructing the characters of his theologians as he does, and immersing 
them in the narrative of a poem, Dante creates a way of thinking about 
theology which incorporates their authority; comments and critiques upon 
the form and content of their works; rejects a sterile treatise in favour of a 
poetic language which is able to distil and communicate something about 
both divine and earthly love with unprecedented power. Even as modern-
day critics, who by necessity do not share the same moral sources or 
publicly-shared religious beliefs as medieval readers, we can understand 
how Dante’s theological message might exert a force, because it activates 
something in us which is personal. In Chapter IV, I suggested a response to 
a story of a personal love and a personal rehabilitation discharges an 
empathic, affective response that might be missing from any reading of a 
more straightforward piece of theological prose treatise. That this fact is 
built into the fabric of Dante’s work means that there must be an 
engagement with it, even if that engagement is sublimated into a type of 
textual criticism that erases talk of a personal response in favour, perhaps, 
of only allegorical readings, or under other rubrics of interpretaton—
psychoanalytic, poststructural—or what you will.  
 
Indeed, there is an even deeper significance at play here, given the 
argument that I have developed over the course of this study, and it is this: 
there is a type of mirror-image relation, or perhaps an isomorphism, 
between the form of poetry itself, and what this poem in particular 
succeeds in doing. By this I mean that Dante-personaggio is only able to 
approach the face of God via a journey which is necessarily perspectival, 
and particular; it is contingent upon the dark wood being Dante-
personaggio’s very own personal crisis of identity. The pilgrim must ask—to 
paraphrase Janet Soskice one last time—who he loves, and what he attends 
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to, in order to know who he is, and what he should be.2 By loving Beatrice 
and attending to her, he can understand how she embodies the miracle of 
human creation and how the memory of her life and death can hold 
meaning beyond mere earthly love and grief. As this understanding 
develops, so too does the knowledge of how he should orient the values 
that constitute his own personhood, such that his renewed virtue can bring 
his love ‘d’animo’ back into line with the love ‘naturale’ (Purgatorio XVII, 
93)—the love that he had for his Creator, which was there all along. By 
loving and attending to the particular in Beatrice, by seeing her, hearing 
her, and ultimately knowing her, he is ready to turn towards the face of 
God himself.  
 
The narrative of the poem, and the lesson which I am claiming for it—that 
which understands the essential person-to person relationship between 
Dante and Beatrice as theologian, as the embodiment of what God’s love is, 
and how Dante should take up his position to both her and hence to God—
exerts a pull on us to read the poem through our own unique histories of 
love and error—the vulnerabilities that make up our own personhoods. As 
Dante knows full well, this pull is not exerted—at least not in the same 
way—by the theological treatise. Thus any reading of the theological lesson 
of the poem must itself, like the narrative which gives rise to it, be defined 
by a personal engagement with love.   
 
But there is a danger, as Barolini has pointed out,3 that we read Dante only 
as he wishes to be read, that his grasp on his own text is all-controlling. We 
risk being swept up by the majesty of his poetic prowess, by the audacity of 
his creative achievement, and find ourselves unable to untangle a 
legitimate critical response from the response that is the author’s own 
creation. As critics operating in (possibly, after) a postmodern era, we are 
                                                 
2 Soskice, The Kindness of God. p. 8. 
3 Barolini, The Undivine Comedy, pp. 17-18. 
  230 
naturally defensive about analyses which fixate on authors, when we know 
that they should by now, perhaps, be dead (Barthes), or that by privileging 
their status we are in fact applying principles that unify only our own 
psychological preoccupations (Foucault): that our analyses are ‘projections, 
in terms always more or less psychological, of our way of handling texts: in 
the comparisons we make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the 
continuities we assign, or the exclusions we practice.’4  
 
The danger seems especially acute with Dante, because the nature of his 
oeuvre has all the appearance of a developing sense of self in many 
respects; it seems a construction of a personal world-view in process—a 
textual demonstration of his own values and commitments, so to speak—
but this is only if we take him at his word; at the word that he presents in 
the voice of Dante-poeta, which of course, is only one of the author’s voices 
and not an imprint of the author’s personhood (as if such a thing could 
ever exist). Dante seems to delight in the dance of the veils of textual 
interpretation, his early works make this explicit: hiding himself and then 
revealing and then hiding again; layers of text seemingly translucent at 
first, but perhaps either impenetrable or, indeed, veiling nothing at all. And 
it is of course as modern and postmodern readers that we attempt to find 
meaning: at times there seems like a tug of war between reading the text as 
Dante wants it read, and what we in our particular place and time can 
make of it, both benefiting from and beholden to our particular 
hermeneutical horizons. And that brings with it those methodological and 
theoretical assumptions that preclude us from approaching the works in 
quite the way that the author may have anticipated.  
 
That is of course, by necessity, unavoidable, as I alluded to in the 
Introduction, by way of my brief digression on Gadamer. But regarding the 
risks of reading an ‘author-function’ (as Foucault would have it) into 
                                                 
4 M. Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p. 127. 
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Dante’s text which claims for him too much or too little, then I would 
suggest that this study, if it is at risk here, is so in the first sense: that my 
analysis of Dante’s construction of theology via his encounters with 
personhood, and in particular the theologians on which this study trains its 
focus, privileges the sense of a vision, wrought from of our own unifying 
psychological tendencies, which Dante may not have shared. And even if 
we credit him with a vision that begins simply and gradually deepens and 
complicates over a lifetime as he tells it, then our own unifying narrative 
still applies and, indeed, ever more strongly.  
 
One way, perhaps, to read Dante as he wants to be read, in a way in which 
Foucault would no doubt question, is to say, that this narrative of 
redemption and rehabilitation can be best understood only through the 
relationships in which we as readers are already immersed: that we can 
build out of these relationships something which transcends time and 
death and meaninglessness, just as Dante has done in the creation of his 
fiction. That is the ultimate therapy, and we must surely ask if we are 
playing the same game as Dante by creating our own analyses in this way. 
But perhaps Dante’s game is the game; perhaps there is no other way that 
we should be construing our own personhoods, our own redemptions. 
Without this game must there only be irony, or worse, nihilism? The 
nihilist’s silence might well sound the same as the silence containing the 
plenitude of meaning.  
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